ments in performance, reliability, and maintainability. We have been able to accelerate the production decision milestone of the UYK-43 program by six months, and I anticipate contract awards based on competitive development phases for production of both the UYK-43 and the UYK-44 by April of this year. Thanks to this progress, the DDG-51 combat system has been able to commit to the UYK-43 as the first major customer. The UYK-44 has already been selected by a number of programs including the SOS-53C sonar and ELF.

The AN/UYS-2 Enhanced Modular Signal Processor enters full scale development this year after a competitive critical item demonstration phase. The AN/ UYS-2 will be a high technology, high throughput programmable signal processor with a modular architecture to allow support of a variety of sensor system applications with varying throughput and capacity requirements. The AN/UYS-2, the successor to the AN/UYS-1 that is just being deployed in a variety of key antisubmarine warfare platforms, will also be one of the first users of the Very High Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC) program.

Electronic Warfare.-During the past year we have commenced a comprehensive and concentrated thrust in Navy Electronic Warfare (EW). This effort has included both near-term and long-term actions to enhance our EW capabilities and to integrate EW as high leverage component in a hardkill/softkill strategy in each of the warfare areas. This will result in a growth of EW work to provide increased effectiveness in both our offensive and defensive operations and capabilities.

Near-term efforts are concentrated on upgrading self-protection capabilities to cope with increasingly sophisticated threats. Systems such as the AN/ALR-67, AN/ ALQ-162 and AN/ALQ-126B for tactical aircraft and upgrades of shipboard systems such as the AN/SLQ-32 and SLQ-17 will improve our capabilities against missile threats likely to be encountered in areas around the globe.

Long term plans emphasize offboard techniques with generic applicability to be utilized in cooperative operations of multiple platforms. This new direction will apply not only in anti-shipping missile defense and aircraft self-protection, but also in C3 countermeasures for counter targeting and strike support. In addition, the individual electronic warfare devices will be coordinated in operations to support the overall force objectives. In support of these long term plans we are now developing EW equipment and operational concepts designed to shrink the enemy's weapons employment envelope, especially in the outer air battle, while maximizing the engagement envelope for our own forces. This is part of an overall push to utilize our EW capability as an offensive asset and to be prepared to operate effectively in an intense EW environment.

Amphibious assault

Of great concern to the Marine Corps is their aging medium assault force. The continued development of the JVX is critical to avert a medium assault lift shortfall in the 1990's. The Navy now has the lead on the Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft (JVX). The Joint Services Operational Requirements document has been completed. JVX is to satisfy the four Services' mission of Marine Medium Assault Transport, Navy Combat Search and Rescue, Air Force Combat Search and Rescue and Special Operations, and Army Special Mission Electronics Aircraft. The Marine Corps is also continuing in a joint effort with the Army to fulfill requirements for direct fire support and mobility through the joint Light Armored Vehicle program. Production contracts for the 25mm gun variant were let last year. Development work on other Marine "mission role vehicles" continues. The Mobile Protected Gun System merged separate Marine Corps and Army programs for a modern agile vehicle with substantial firepower provided by a high technology hypervelocity gun development. I strongly support joint programs. They offer additional management challenges but represent the most economic approach and, given the proper support in Congress and at the policy level in DOD, can succeed. General Russell will discuss Marine Corps Research and Development programs in detail in his statement. Closing remarks

I respectfully ask that you support the full budget DON RDT&E request before you. The budget is our best appraisal of what it will cost in fiscal year 1984 to execute our RDT&E plans. We are fully committed to satisfying the President's national security objectives. The budget is based upon a coherent national strategy and reflects a prudent balance of activities and programs which address both the near-term and the longer-term needs of our operational forces.

Our commitment to force modernization and readiness as well as to reforms in the R&D/Procurement Cycle to shorten the time and cost of acquiring new systems is firm. We will, of course, be pleased to provide additional information on our plans

and programs. More details on our RDT&E programs will be found in the Supporting Data Books provided along with the budget submission to the Congress.

Thank you. I am prepared to respond to your questions.

STATEMENT OF GERALD A. CANN, PRINCIPAL DEPUY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (RESEARCH, ENGINEERING AND SYSTEMS)

Mr. CANN. Mr. Chairman, I am going to make a number of comments about some ASW programs. When the session becomes closed we will talk about some of the details as to the why's.

I would like to make one comment generally and that is contrary to some of the reports about ASW, and so forth, the fundamental problem of detection, classification, and attacking potential enemy submarines is getting even more difficult than it has been in the past.

Even though we have put an enormous amount of effort in the ASW problem and been successful, the other potential adversaries are not standing still and have learned a great deal about the art of improving submarine design and the tactics to use them. We can talk more about those kinds of issues in a closed session.

LAMPS III

You have asked questions about the LAMPS program. First, let me talk about LAMPS III.

LAMPS III is part of a weapon system. It is part of an effort that started some 10 years ago to take and give the surface ship the kind of standoff capability required to give them protection against at least torpedo firing submarines and to give them a capability to be able to attack cruise missile firing submarines without having to sit there and absorb the impact of those weapons without any defenses.

The result of that effort has been a coupling together of three programs, tactical towed array [TACTAS] program, LAMPS III program, and the ships that have the SQS-53 sonar which gives us in some cases capability out to the convergence zone. Those first three programs not only are tied together from a conceptual point of view, but in many cases they share processing and display capability.

The LAMPS III program which successfully completed its development and is now in production is a fundamental improvement to the surface Navy in terms of giving it a standoff weapon delivery capability.

Now, in order to meet the needs of the fleet it became obvious that the LAMPS program would take time to get into the fleet, and there are certain classes of ships that will not have the LAMPS III, for example, the DD-1052 class will never get the LAMPS III, it is an older class of ASW destroyer and some of the FFG-7s will not get the LAMPS III. We made the decision that we should give a lesser capability, but still a significant capability to those ships by putting the LAMPS I helicopters on them. To that end because of the ability of the Kaman Corp., we have been able fortunately to reopen that line and have been producing those helicopters.

There is a definite requirement to have a force level of about 168 aircraft to support 135 active and reserve LAMPS Mark I capable

ships. Fifty-four of those helicopters are required for FFG-7s which will be in the reserve fleet.

SSN I

With respect to the new SSN I think some clarification is required and we really need to talk about the why's and wherefores in closed session, but what we are basically attempting to do in the new SSN effort is to make sure that all the technologies are in place so that the Chief of Naval Operations, the Secretary of the Navy, and Congress together can make a complete and informed decision about the approach we should go with for the next submarine.

We have taken the most important efforts that are representative of new submarine technology and bundled them together in our own planning. These programs are ongoing, they are not new starts. These are programs in propulsion, sonar, and quieting, coating, and so forth, and we have taken those and bundled them together, 350 million dollars' worth of effort.

We are trying now to coalesce those to the point where we have picked the ones that will impact on the new submarine and make sure they are complete so that as the various conceptual design studies go forward we will understand in the decision process when they will be available, how much money we have to put into them to make them meet the first ship anticipated right now, that potential for a new ship, what one could call a new ship start would be possibly in the fiscal year 1985 budget.

Work up to that point is all technology effort and conceptual design effort leading to a fundamental decision.

With respect to our torpedo programs, the advanced lightweight torpedoes-

Senator COHEN. Is 1985 the year you meant?

Mr. CANN. Yes; in 1984 the work that is going on is continuation of the conceptualization and various design efforts and technology efforts to bring this submarine forward to a decision.

I should also point out that the decision process is not a finitely bounded point. We are already doing many things that are leading to a decision. And whether that decision becomes one in 1984, the end of 1984, middle of 1984, or 1985, is one that will be obviously shared with everybody. It is not a finite effort.

The first major funding for a new SSN will probably be in the fiscal year 1985 budget separate from the technology efforts that are ongoing.

ADVANCED LIGHTWEIGHT TORPEDO

With respect to the advanced lightweight torpedo, I feel it necessary to point out that we have a very large number of platforms: naval air, which is the entire P-3 community, S-3 community, the LAMPS. All of these assets require a lightweight torpedo, plus your surface ships depend on the lightweight torpedo as a fundamental

weapon.

All those platforms currently depend on the Mark 46 torpedo. It is the primary, with very few exceptions, ASW weapon. We started

this advanced lightweight torpedo some time ago through a technology program. It is now in advanced development.

It has had some difficulties in the last year getting through its advanced development, but I am happy to tell you that we believe, based on the recent testing, that the advanced lightweight torpedo will go to full-scale development this summer and the technical issues we had in the propulsion area have been solved. In the last few weeks we have had all up torpedo runs which have been very successful.

ADCAP PROGRAM

With respect to the ADCAP program which is the improvement to the Mark 48 torpedo to give it the capability to go faster, deeper and provide basic detection capability, and again it is the only nonnuclear weapon for all of our submarines, it is moving along very well in the development program. As a matter of fact, the testing has gone along more rapidly than our current schedule and the data all appear to be very good. We are very pleased that that program is moving ahead. That is all I have to discuss.

Mr. PAISLEY. With that, I would like to have Admiral Monroe pick up the next two subjects.

STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. ROBERT P. MONROE, U.S. NAVY DIRECTOR (NAVY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION)

Admiral MONROE. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I will talk first about the SH-60F carrier-based ASW helicopter progran; and then address the whole broad issue of antiship missile defense, the systems we have for defense, the types of testing we do, and the targets we test against.

SH-60F CARRIER BASED ASW HELICOPTER

First, on the carrier-based ASW helicopter, what we are talking about is really our last line of defense against enemy submarines attacking our battle groups. We try to establish defense in depth, and engage and kill submarines thousands of miles or hundreds of miles or tens of miles away from the battle group.

However, once the surviving submarines leak through and reach the vicinity of the battle group, as some will, we depend upon this carrier-based helicopter-generally in a squadron of six on each carrier with an active dipping sonar to detect, localize, and attack.

This is an extremely effective system. Our submariners who exercise against these helos don't like them at all, because they don't know where the helo is until suddenly they hear the ping and the attack signal.

Their effectiveness is based on their great mobility. They can move from spot to spot within the inner confines of the battle group extending tens of miles from the carrier. They are a quick reaction system. From a spot on deck they can be off to a dip on a threatening submarine in a very few minutes. They have an active sonar; and I want to take a minute to discuss this.

Most of our ASW systems are passive: Our SSN's our towed arrays for destroyers-the ASQR-19 which Mr. Cann was talking

about-the P-3C long range patrol aircraft, the S-3A carrier-based aircraft, the LAMPS I and LAMPS III systems, the SOSUS underwater sound system and others. Most of the Navy ASW systems are passive.

However, once the enemy submarine gets through to the vicinity of the battle group, passive systems don't work well; too much noise in the water from the machinery and screws from our ships. We have found that you have to have active sonar, sending out pings. If that is in a surface ship, the ship is at risk to the submarine; so it is more effective in a helicopter.

The final point that makes these helicopters so effective is the accuracy of their attacks. They search from a hover. With the dipping sonar they can get the exact range and bearing of the submarine and drop a torpedo from the hover right on the target.

I should add that by having these helicopters on the carriers, we use them for a number of other missions, some of which are absolutely essential, such as plane guards. Every time we operate aircraft we have plane guard helicopters aloft in the vicinity ready to pick aircrews out of the water from any possible aircraft accident, and these helicopters are used for that purpose. Thus, having the helicopters on the carriers, in this number of about six per carrier, is an absolutely essential function.

Now, today we meet this requirement with an aging inventory of about 100 SH-3H Sea King helicopters. These helicopters represent technology of the fifties and sixties. We have upgraded their mission equipment, but the airframes and engines are quite old. We plan to extend the service life of this entire inventory through a SLEP program.

We plan to increase this inventory of existing helicopters by bringing some 20 odd additional basic SH-3's, but a different configuration, SH-3D's, into the SLEP program and make them SH3H's ASW dippers.

But even with all these actions, by 1989 or 1990, the inventory will drop well below requirement, and it declines at a steep rate after that. So, we feel we have no choice but to replace these helicopters. They are essential for both the dipping sonar role and plane guard role.

Now, aggravating this problem are two significant aspects of the threat. One of them is a change the increased quieting of the Soviet submarine force. I will go into this more in closed session. The end result is that we expect more of the threat submarines attempting to attack the battle group to leak through into the vicinity of the battle group, where passive systems won't work well against quieter submarines.

The second aspect that makes it so important is the relative ratio in the Soviet submarine force of torpedoes to missiles. They have many more torpedoes than missiles. Again, I will go into this in closed session, but the result is that threat submarines are going to be closing the battle group in order to use those torpedoes which are not launchable from outside this inner zone.

Now, the last point I would make on this program is to describe how we plan to meet this requirement, how we plan to replace the SH-3H's with our SH-60F program.