The fiscal year 1988 projected capability (figure 2) assumes a full spares inventory for the C-5, C-141, and the use of newly acquired KC-10s in a mobility role. Figure 2 also reflects our concerns about uncertainties in the airline industry. Economic pressures are forcing the sale or retirement of existing cargo-capable aircraft and causing a decline in the number of wide-body and narrow-body aircraft available for defense use. Another important factor between our 1983 and 1988 capability is a revitalized CRAF enhancement program. The CRAF enhancement program will modify passenger aircraft so they have the capability of carrying bulk and oversized cargo if needed. The procurement of 50 C-5B aircraft will further reduce the intertheater airlift shortfall in the near term, and I continue to support the buy of these outsize-capable airlifters. Despite their combined contributions, these programs still leave us short of our goal. Consequently, we must continue efforts to alleviate the remaining intertheater airlift shortfall with a technologically advanced and more capable aircraft-the C-17.

IMPROVING OUR AIRLIFT CAPABILITY

We are making improvements in our overall capability because of programs the Congress supported and funded last year. But while these improvements will make us more capable and ready, much remains to be done. The following areas need special attention this year.

Personnel

My primary concern continues to be the retention of quality personnel. The favorable, though fragile, retention posture we now enjoy is a result of the increasing

support shown by the Congress, the Administration, and the public for military members. The return to virtual pay comparability 2 years ago has been a major part of this support. Last year we experienced improvements in every enlisted category. Our first- and second-term reenlistment rates, for example, improved an average of 10.5 percent. Officer retention rates also continued to improve last year with pilot and navigator rates increasing an average of 10 percent and support officer rates increasing 3 percent.

These improvements must be viewed cautiously, however, because there are still problems in some critical, skill areas. Manning in the enlisted maintenance skill, which directly produces our wartime capability, is currently at 87 percent—a shortage of 1738 mid-level noncommissioned officers. The selective reenlistment bonuses have been particularly helpful in easing the shortages in this and other areas.

We need to build on currently improving trends to retain skilled manpower over the long term. Pay comparability is an integral part of this effort. Secondly, out-of pocket expenses continue to burden our members when they are required to move. Fairness dictates that this burden be alleviated by the government assuming the responsibility for essential moving costs. Thirdly, legislation is needed to extend the GI bill's expiration date of December 31, 1989. A transferability clause which allowed a member's dependents to use the authorized benefits would be a great boom to retention. Finally, it is important to maintain the integrity of the present retirement system. There is no retention incentive that approaches the effectiveness of that system. In addition, it is a primary tool used to manage our force structure. It provides the legitimate basis for our mobilization plans and ensures that a large, standing pool of skilled, experienced people are available to meet wartime requirements.

Spares

A year ago we anticipated full funding in fiscal year 1982 for our major weapon systems peacetime operating stocks (POS) and war readiness spares kit (WRSK)/ base-level self-sufficiency spares (BLSS) requirements. However, the POS requirements growth, which was revealed to us late in the fiscal year, resulted in far less than full spares funding. POS and WRSK/BLSS were funded at 81 percent for the C-5, 67 percent for the C-141, 90 percent for the C-130, and 97 percent for our helicopters. The expected fiscal year 1983 funds allocation will not significantly improve this situation. The historical underfunding of POS, WRSK/BLSS, and other war reserve material restricts our current ability to meet wartime objective utilization rates.

Because of the long lead time for spare parts, it will be at least fiscal year 1986 for the C-5 and fiscal 1988 for the C-141 before improved fiscal year 1984/85 funding could possibly correct our spares deficit. Full spares funding is essential to improv ing our readiness.

C-17

The C-17 promises to be a versatile aircraft that meets a growing requirement. It will be capable of rapid, intertheater delivery of troops and all categories of cargo, including outsize, directly to foward bases in the deployment theater. Because its advanced design will permit operation from small, relatively austere airfields and on short, narrow runways, it concurrently will have the capability to perform the intratheater airlift mission. Thus, this aircraft will provide a replacement for the overage portion of the C-130 fleet and some of our high-time C-141s as they reach the end of their service life in the decade of the 1990's. Ultimately, the C-17 will provide a replacement for all C-141 aircraft.

Operational C-17 capability will be needed no later than the early 1990's. Research and development funding is needed to support timely procurement phased after the peak funding years for the C-5B. I urge your support for this critically needed airlift program.

C-130

The C-130 is becoming a legend. It is an outstanding aircraft and the workhorse of our tactical airlift force. The C-130 design is more than 30 years old, and 60 percent of our active and reserve aircraft are already more than 20 years old. Increasingly, they are experiencing problems associated with their age and the hard use they experienced in southeast Asia. Efforts to maintain the structural integrity and update avionic systems on these aircraft must continue to be funded. The C-130 outer wing replacement, currently under contract, will correct wing fatigue problems and extend the aircraft's useful life. We are installing new station-keeping equipment in our C-130s to improve formation airdrop capability in adverse weath

er conditions. An inertial navigation system with a doppler interface will also be installed on our C-130s to permit them to effectively operate at low level using terrain masking tactics to avoid known ground threats. These programs will preserve the C-130 as a useful, combat-worthy aircraft for its remaining service life.

CRAF enhancement

The objective of a CRAF enhancement program is to obtain additional oversize cargo airlift capability for DOD emergency use through the modification of civil aircraft. A CRAF enhancement program would modify civil wide-body aircraft to provide approximately 3 million ton-miles of additional cargo capacity. After the last request for proposal was allowed to expire in January 1982, MAC was given a charter to review the program with members of the civil aviation industry. The review sought a program that would be acceptable to the carrier, DOD, and the Congress. Following that review, several different concepts (some involving leasing) were developed and have been undergoing extensive analysis. We are comparing these new options to the traditional enhancement program with the view to select the one most cost-effective, yet realistically acceptable to the airline industry. We are requesting funds in fiscal year 1984 to modify three aircraft. CRAF enhancement is the least expensive way of increasing our airlift capability. I urge your support of this program.

Command and control

A crucial element in making effective use of our airlift forces is a reliable, flexible, and responsive command and control system. Our present system uses 1950's technology and is inadequate to respond effectively to time-sensitive, geographically diverse airlift requirements.

Our command and control system is currently undergoing a long overdue upgrade. We are replacing old, outdated high-frequency radios with new Air Force standard systems that will serve as the backbone of our command and control network and will be able to incorporate an anti jam capability in the future. In the satellite communications area, we are procuring_terminals that can be used in the air or on the ground for worldwide command and control of MAC aircraft employed in crisis or contingency operation. We are also procuring jam resistant secure communication terminals that will allow us to be more responsive to the national command authorities and the supported commanders in chief.

Rescue and recovery

To satisfy the critical shortfall in combat rescue and special operations vertical lift capability, we are procuring the HH-60D Night Hawk. The HH-60D combines proven UH-60A reliability with state-of-the-art avionics to provide the night, adverse weather, low-level capability required for survival and successful mission completion in medium- to high-threat areas. During 1982, we accepted the first five of nine UH-60A Black Hawks. These proven combat-capable airframes, though not designed for low-level, night, adverse-weather operations, will provide a lead-in to the HH-60D and help satisfy a shortage of combat rescue and special operations aircraft in the near term.

Other programs

Three other airlift programs being pursued merit your support for the efficiencies and economies they will provide. First, the C-140B is fuel inefficient, costly to maintain, range and payload limited, and does not have a secure communication capability. We are responding to Congressional direction to replace these aircraft. Second, the CT-39 fleet is at the end of its economic service life and has many operational deficiencies. We are proceeding, as authorized by the Congress, with the multiyear lease of operational support aircraft-the CT-39's replacement. New aircraft can be leased for less than the cost of operating and maintaining the CT-39 fleet. Third, and separate from the C-140B replacement and CT-39 replacement, is a program to acquire aircraft for a European Distribution System-an assured logistics system designed to enhance the combat capability of UŠAF forces in the European theater. A system of this nature will speed delivery of fighter parts, increase the number of mission-capable fighter aircraft, and save up to $470M in additional spares stocks. Continued support of the EDS aircraft is an inexpensive way to increase significantly the Nation's war-fighting capability.

Last year Congress supported the readiness needs of our weather support forces. Weather sensing systems, equipment for receiving and processing satellite data, communications trunks to overseas weather centers, and overseas weather intercept sites are all being upgraded. Continued funding support is needed for the Defense

Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP). This program provides the only assured means of obtaining critical weather data worldwide, during contingency and wartime operations. This year's requested DMSP funding provides for multiyear procurement to help insure a fully operational DMSP capability beginning in the mid1980's.

CONCLUSION

The challenges facing our Nation are many and varied. As America moves forward into the mid-1980's and beyond, MAC will remain dedicated to the defense of our national interests through the provision of airlift and support capabilities essential to the worldwide projection of our forces. Your continued support of our mission and required airlift improvements will enable us to meet the challenge.

Senator COHEN. I will defer questions until General Skantze makes his presentation.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. LAWRENCE A. SKANTZE, U.S. AIR FORCE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION

General SKANTZE. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

With your permission, I will submit my formal statement for the record and state few comments on the highlights and current

status of our program.

As General Allen has pointed out, the airlift acquisition program was integrated into an overall plan to meet the required capability level in an expeditious and fiscally responsible manner.

Initial increase in our capability is being provided by the KC-10. This effort is well established and on a multiyear basis. We have delivered 12 aircraft thus far with a total of 6 more to be delivered during fiscal 1983. This fiscal 1984 request will add eight more KC10's to the inventory.

The C-5B program went under contract in December with the first delivery scheduled for December 1985. The fiscal 1984 request will procure 4 additional aircraft toward an ultimate goal of 50 by 1987.

In addition, the fiscal year 1984 budget R&D funding will continue the C-17 program, allowing it to follow immediately after the C-5B. This will fulfill the shortfalls remaining upon completion of the C-5B and the KC-10 program providing key aspects of our overall airlift plan.

The C-17 will give us an outsize intratheater capability and will serve as potential replacement for the C-130A and C-141. The program went on contract in fiscal 1982 and significant progress has been made in verifying the C-17 design through wind tunnel testing.

A vital aspect of our ability to project and sustain tactical air power is the goal of our combat rescue forces, ability to recover down crews is integral to their efficiency and combat readiness. Without the HH-60D we will not have the combat rescue capability to support our tactical forces. The HH-60D program went on contract in October 1982 and the first aircraft delivery is scheduled for 1987.

The fiscal 1984 request provides funds to continue the development program as well as advanced buy funding for the first aircraft.

In addition to these programs, I am prepared to answer your questions on the C-140 replacement program and the program to lease a replacement for our aging CT-39 fleet.

This concludes my remarks. I will be happy to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Skantze follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. LAWRENCE A. SKANTZE, DEPUTY CHIEF of Staff, RESEARCH, Development aND ACQUISITION HEADQUARTERS, U.S. AIR FORCE

AIRLIFT

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased to appear today to discuss the Research, Development and Procurement strategy which we are following to address the requirements as stated by General Allen, the Commander in Chief of the Military Airlift Command.

As General Allen has stated, airlift is the most visible, responsive, and flexible element of our military resources. Its primary role is to project and sustain combat forces in a crisis or battle area until other means of transportation can deliver the required follow-on support. In many situations, airlift is the only means of responding rapidly, either because of the geographic location or the speed with which the threat develops. In these situations, airlift brings the forces to bear which could be decisive in the early days of a conflict.

The existing airlift force continues to have serious inadequacies in its capabilities to meet the mobility requirements of our conventional war strategy. The Air Force's RDT&E and Procurement strategy remains committed to correcting this airlift shortfall. We have programs under way to improve the readiness, sustainability and capabilities of our current airlift aircraft. These programs include increasing spare parts stocks and crew ratios to permit higher utilization rates of our C-5 and C-141 aircraft, increased aerial port personnel and airlift support equipment, and upgrade of the Military Airlift Command (MAC) C3 system. The C-5A wing modification will extend the lifetime of this system by adding 30,000 hours to the wing's lifetime. The first C-5A aircraft entered the modification line in February 1982 and 26 aircraft will be completed by the end of fiscal year 1984. The remaining aircraft are scheduled to be completed by fiscal year 1987.

Another of our problems has been the chronic and significant shortfall in our capability for long-range airlift of oversize and bulk cargo. The C-141 stretch program, which extended the fuselage and added an air refueling receptacle, increased the C141's average payload by some 30 percent. This modification was recently completed in 1982. Fiscal year 1984 funds for the C-141 will continue needed improvements in several on-board systems such as station keeping equipment, which enables us to deploy and employ a light army brigade size force in adverse weather. However, even after we have completed the enhancements planned for the existing force, we will still have serious shortfalls in our capability for intertheater airlift of outsize, oversize, and bulk cargo.

Compounding these intertheater shortfalls are the inadequacies of our intratheater distribution systems. We continue to have a need for intratheater mobility and resupply. The current backbone of our intratheater airlift force is the C-130. Therefore, we are requesting fiscal year 1984 funds to continue modifications which will ensure the continued safe operation of this aircraft.

For the near term, we are procuring additional KC-10s and the C-5B to provide substantial improvement to the U.S. defense mobility posture. Since the KC-10 and the C-5A aircraft are in the Air Force inventory, existing training and support elements will allow the new KC-10 and C-5B aircraft to transition quickly to operational status.

The air-refuelable C-5 has an intercontinental range and can carry all the major firepower and equipment items of our modernized ground forces. It is the only aircraft presently capable of transporting key outsize firepower equipment needed by the Army and Marine Corps to respond to worldwide contingencies. Our in-service fleet of 77 aircraft is not adequate to meet these outsize cargo needs. We plan to increase the C-5 force to 127 aircraft by procuring 50 C-5Bs through fiscal year 1987. The C-5B will be the original C-5 design, updated with all currently approved engineering change proposals-a 30,000 hour service life wing, modernized TF39-1C engines, improved avionics, and more durable and corrosion resistant aluminum alloys.