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by the National Command Authorities. [Deleted.] However, it will be extremely difficult to redeploy forces from one theater to another during a global war. The NATO International Military Staff is conducting a study which would detail the impact on NATO of the loss of those forces and support considered for deployment to SWA. The study is due to be completed this summer.

Senator NUNN. What types and mixes of forces are best suited for SWA scenarios? General KINGSTON. UŠCENTCOM has the unique capability to tailor a force to meet a specific threat, thereby receiving the maximum contribution from each of the services. This force can be designed to accentuate our strengths and capitalize on enemy vulnerabilities. A typical force package would consist of air defense forces followed by light ground forces and reinforced by heavy forces as strategic lift per

mits.

Senator NUNN. How important are tactical air and E-3A AWACS capabilities? General KINGSTON. [Deleted.]

The E-3A AWACS is a valuable asset and a significant "force multiplier" within this environment. Its long range air surveillance radar can detect, identify, and characterize enemy air movements in time to marshal U.S. tactical air forces against the threat. The AWACS communication (voice and data) capabilities with USN, USMC, USA, and host nation forces also help integrate our total offensive, air defense, and C2 effort.

Senator NUNN. What arrangements, if any, do you have with Saudi Arabia in terms of facilities and training with other forces?

General KINGSTON. Currently, USCENTCOM has no arrangements that allow our forces use of Saudi Arabian facilities. [Deleted.]

Senator NUNN. What E-3A AWACS capability do you have available to USCENTCOM now, from where, and what do you anticipate when the Saudi AWACS sale is operational?

General KINGSTON. The main E-3A AWACS operating base is Tanker Air Force Base, Oklahoma. [Deleted] the Saudi AWACS buy will not see deliveries until fiscal year 1985-86 (longer to become operationally ready) USCENTCOM does not see significant Saudi airborne early warning and surveillance support until, at least, the late 1980's. [Deleted.]

USCENTCOM MISSION

Senator NUNN. What is the mission of your organization and what are the specific responsibilities?

General KINGSTON. As a Unified Command, USCENTCOM has a geograhic area of responsibility encompassing 19 countries in Southwest Asia, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Horn of Africa. The command is also responsible for security in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. Missions for which USCENTCOM is responsible include deterring aggression through readiness and executing the military contributions to U.S. foreign policy in my area of responsibility. USCENTCOM must plan and, if directed, execute operations to assist friendly nations. The command trains and exercises U.S. and foreign forces and establishes regional military relationships as directed by JCS.

USCENTCOM furnishes advice and assistance to U.S. diplomatic missions throughout the area, and provides for noncombatant evacuation and disaster relief operations. On October 1, 1983, USCENTCOM will assume responsibility for managing security assistance in the region. In peacetime, USCINCCENT commands the U.S. forces located in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility; during wartime or crisis, augmentation forces deployed to his area of responsibility would be placed under this command.

U.S. READINESS COMMAND

Senator NUNN. Admiral Hunter, how large is the U.S. Readiness Command in terms of the headquarters staffing? What is the military/civilian breakdown since 1978 to the present? What is planned in the fiscal year 1984 and FYDP?

Admiral HUNTER. The current headquarters staffing of USREDCOM is 367. There are 290 military and 77 civilians assigned. The military/civilian breakdown since 1978 to present is as follows:

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The fiscal year 1984 increase, as requested, is for an additional 52 spaces-43 officers, 2 enlisted and 7 civilians. Increases beyond these are predicated upon formalization of tasks already assigned to USREDCOM and the anticipated formalization of additional mission/tasks. Such increases, however necessary, remain subject to OJCS and Service approval and inclusion in individual Service FYDPs.

RDJTF

Senator NUNN. When the RDJTF was established, and then CENTCOM, did REDCOM become smaller? If so, why? If not, why not? Did any of REDCOM's previous responsibilities shift to CENTČOM? How many general/flag officers are assigned?

Admiral HUNTER. Yes; USREDCOM did become smaller. Spaces were transferred to the RDJTF to help establish the RDJTF Washington Liaison Officer and to transfer responsibility for a JTF capability based on the assumption that the RDJTF would have a worldwide JTF responsibility.

The responsibility to provide a JTF Hq for contingency planning worldwide went to the RDJTF for one year, then reverted to USREDCOM when the RDJTF was designated as having a Southwest Asia focus only. Therefore, there are no USREDCOM functions which have been shifted to USCENTCOM.

Currently there are six general/flag officers assigned against USREDCOM spaces. While the manning charts show eight general/flag officers, both the Deputy Commander in Chief and myself are actually assigned against Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) spaces but serve in a dual-hatted capacity with both USREDCOM and the JDA.

JOINT DEPLOYMENT AGENCY MISSION

Senate NUNN. General Baginski, what is the mission of your organization? What are the staffing levels, past, present and future, and where were these functions performed prior to establishment of this organization? How many general/flag officers are assigned?

General BAGINSKI. The mission of the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) is to plan, coordinate, and monitor movements of mobilized US Armed Forces, both Active and Reserve, within the United States and to overseas areas as reinforcements for US unified and specified commands, During a crisis situation, the JDA coordinates deployment activites to ensure that combat forces and materiel are provided, when needed, to a commander conducting operations anywhere in the world. In particular, the JDA:

Functions as the focal point for information relating to deployment planning and actual deployment operations.

Coordinates activities to ensure forces and materiel are available and can be moved to support military objectives. This is accomplished through and OPLAN refinement process, which identifies specific forces and equipment in an OPLAN and adjusts resupply and reinforcement schedules. By matching validated requirements of overseas commands with capabilities of providing organizations and Transportation Operating Agencies (TOAs), the refined OPLANS accurately reflect how specific units or materiel are planned to move to which port on what day.

Assembles and maintains timely data relating to the deployability of military combat and support forces. This information is constantly refined and updated by members of the joint Deployment Community (JDS) and is available to the unified and specified commands for planning and execution purposes.

Administers a computer-based data processing system, the Joint Deployment system (JDS), to optimize strategic lift resources in support of crisis deployments. When a crisis situation develops requiring execution planning and possible execution, JDA loads the applicable OPLAN(s) into the Joint Deployment System data based and coordinates deployment-related actions to support the crisis. The JDS and

its interfaces with the JDC ensure efficient use of limited transportation assets and a coordinated deployment flow.

During actual deployments, monitors the movement of forces and materiel, provides movement status to the JDC, and interacts with the JCS and other members of the JDC to optimize the deployment flow.

Prior to JDA several organizations tried to perform its functions. There was no focal point for information relating to deployment planning and execution. For example, the Joint Transportation Board allocated lift. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were responsible for OPLAN refinement. The supported CINC in conjunction with the National Military Command Center attempted to monitor deployment execution. Supported and supporting CINCs plus Service Headquarters all dealt directly with the Transportation Operating Agencies. Resolving deployment problems was a secondary mission for all these commands and agencies. Time and resources were not available for them to properly deal with the entire deployment problem. All these considerations led to the formation of JDA.

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Senator NUNN. General Kingston, from an operational commander's perspective, what are the pro's and con's of the current arrangements for command of U.S. forces operating in or near the Persian Gulf Littoral?

General KINGSTON. Under existing command arrangements all forces within the USCENTCOM AOR are under my operational command. This unity of command is necessary for success on the battlefield. There presently exists command agreements between myself and the other unified commanders which delineate the exchange of operational command/control that will occur during certain situations.

LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLE

Senator NUNN. General Kingston, specifically, what level of utility do you attach to the Army and Marine Corps efforts to field the so-called light armored vehicle with their light forces?

General KINGSTON. There are potentially two major problems that could be significantly reduced with the adoption of the light tank. First, the light tank would satisfy both the Army and Marine Corps' desire to enhance the fire power and ground mobility of their light forces; the light tank does exactly that. Second, because of the tank's reduced size and weight in comparison to a main battle tank, we could deploy greater numbers into the region which would increase our creditability as both a deterrent or fighting force.

Senator NUNN. In reports over the past 2 years, the GAO has expressed concern with the availability of units to provide support services to combat forces if they

were to be engaged in SWA. What is the situation now with regard to availability of these support units to USCENTCOM?

General KINGSTON. The GAO surveys were generally performed during the formative years of the Rapid Deployment Force. The reports recognized that major efforts required were in the Army, which tasked to provide the preponderance of interservice support such as port operations, grave registration, water and POL distribution and ammunition handling. Since then, those combat support and combat service support units, required for SWA support have been specifically designated.

In addition, their authorization level of organization have been increased to match the units being supported which will facilitate equipping and staffing the organizations. The Army also identified in their [deleted] service support units. This will enable a [deleted] force with adequate service support to deploy with little or no warning. Efforts to increase our combat service support are continually monitored to ensure programs are maintained and contingency plans are supportable.

Senator NUNN. Does the operational environment (weather, altitude, soil, et cetera) place a premium on certain types of equipment and limit others—compared, for example, with the effectiveness this equipment might show in the European theater?

General KINGSTON. Yes. There are certain types of equipment that will be of more value in USCENTCOM's AOR than in the European theater. Examples of this equipment may be light weight desalinization equipment or improved chemical protection clothing with lower thermal stress. This equipment may be needed to withstand or because of the harsher environmental conditions encountered in the AOR, but it should function equally well in the more temperate European theater.

PROPOSED CONSOLIDATION OF MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND AND MILITARY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMAND

Senator NUNN. How many flag/general officer billets will be reduced, if any, with the proposed consolidation of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and Military Traffice Management Command (MTMC)?

General KINGSTON. None, pending a manpower survey to be conducted six to nine months following establishment of the integrated command, the Military Transportation Command.

Senator NUNN. How many and what grade does each organization have now? General KINGSTON. MSC is authorized two flag/general officers and has two assigned. MTMC is authorized five and has four assigned.

Grades and services

MSC: 0-9 Navy (three stars), and 0-8 Navy.

MTMC: 0-8 Army (two stars), 0-7 Air Force (one star), 0-7 Navy, 0-7 Army, and 0-7 Army.

Senator NUNN. How many military and civilian spaces will be reduced with this consolidation?

General KINGSTON. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics) has estimated a savings of 200 to 300 personnel spaces (primarily civilian) by consolidation of duplicative functions during the elimination of one major command headquarters and four subordinate headquarters. Hiring controls currently in place in both commands will permit reductions to be achieved through attrition.

The consolidation of the two commands was predicated upon achieving improved efficiency in the surface transportation system. The accompanying fiscal economies and personnel savings were important additive benefits.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

FORWARD HEADQUARTERS ELEMENT

Senator LEVIN. USCENTCOM believes that a Forward Headquarters Element should be stationed on land for military reasons. Others are urging that this contingent be deployed at sea. Why does USCENTCOM think it is so important that the Forward Headquarters be land-based, and what military capabilities are degraded if this HQ is deployed aboard ships in the region?

General KINGSTON. Placement of a Forward Headquarters Element (FHE) ashore versus afloat is a qualitative decision based on this command's assessed value of the functions to be performed. Most seriously degraded by an afloat headquarters would be the objectives of demonstrating acceptance of U.S. Central Command and its

FHE by the area governments and displaying resolve and commitment by the United States of America. [Deleted.]

Senator LEVIN. If this time is far distant, isn't it better to have a forward HQ on sea than not having one at all in the region?

General KINGSTON. [Deleted.]

PROGRAM OBJECTIVE MEMORANDUM

Senator LEVIN. Even before DOD and the President decide the final shape of the defense budget, the services submit their 5-year requests, known as Program Objective Memorandum (POM) to the Secretary of Defense for his consideration in drafting a final total budget. In their attempts to satisfy SWA their highest priorities as individual services, do you think that each of the services gave adequate support to meeting USCENTCOM needs in fiscal year 1984 budget POM submissions-in both the equipment and sustainability (beans, bullets, spare parts, clothing) area?

General KINGSTON. In evaluating the service programming objectives to satisfy SWA equipment and sustainability requirement, the services are giving USCENTCOM adequate support. This is not to imply there are no shortages, but across the board, the services will achieve approximately [deleted] percent of their SWA objectives within the midterm.

These programming efforts require continual support by the services, DOD, and Congress if we are to have a viable deterrent in SWA.

Senator LEVIN. By service, in what major areas did you recommend programs to each service which were reduced or rejected by that service in its PÔM drafting process?

General KINGSTON. For the fiscal year 1984 POM development, USCENTCOM did not formally interface with the Services in the POM process. However, my staff did brief service POM committees on requirements for and areas of concern to USCENTCOM. As a RDJTF Commander, I also had the opportunity to express my concerns with the Service 84 POMs through the JCS Joint Program Assessment Memorandum and during Defense Resources Board deliberations. Of the top three USCENTCOM programming priorities which are, strategic mobility, command control communications and intelligence (CI), and sustainability, none have been significantly reduced by the individual Services. Generally the Services demonstrated support for these programs in their POM submissions.

BUDGET PRIORITIES

Senator LEVIN. In setting Central Command's priorities, if this budget were reduced, where would it hurt least in fiscal year 1984-procurement of major equipment, logistics support and sustainability, airlift and sealift programs?

General KINGSTON. The general order of priority of all Defense programs, in descending order, is achieving readiness, providing sustainability, procuring modernization, and expanding the force structure. Beyond this order of priorities, it is extremely difficult to specify programs for Southwest Asia that could or could not be reduced because so many of the programs, such as strategic mobility, are embedded in the overall force structure and are needed for other areas of the world as well. Senator LEVIN. As a way of helping to trim the defense budget, Senator Hart has suggested that the USCENTCOM headquarters complement be reduced from about 900 to 25. Just two years ago, your HQ had about 250 Personnel; now it is about 900. What accounts for this increase and how can you justify it? What would be the impact on USCENTCOM's ability to carry out its mission from imposing an HQ personnel reduction as Senator Hart proposes?

General KINGSTON. The 250 billets represents the mission requirements of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. The RDJTF was established on 1 March 1980 as a separate subordinate element of U.S. Readiness Command.

However, in April 1981, it was announced that the RDJTF would become a unified command with Southwest Asia as its Area of Responsibility. From this point, increased authorizations were required to keep pace with the added functions and responsibilities of an evolving unified command.

By March 1982, JCS had allocated 967 billets for the future USCENTCOM, which was formally established on January 1, 1983. These 967 billets represents the best estimates of the manning required to run the Command once the full transition was completed. This will not occur until 1 October 1983 when full responsibility for all security assistance programs is assumed. However, JCS just recently reduced our authorizations by 121 billets; cutting us from 967 billets to 846-a reduction of almost 13 percent.

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