Our capability to detect and destroy Soviet submarines, our ASW capability, is definitely more advanced than the Soviet capability to detect and destroy our submarines. Less than one half the surface ships in the Soviet Navy have anti-aircraft missiles. There are far fewer and less capable air defense aircraft in the Soviet fleet. The average displacement in tons of ships delivered to the U.S. Navy during the 1970-1979 period far exceeded the average displacement in tons of the ships delivered to the Soviet navy during the same period. Admiral BUTTS. The answers to your questions would be a qualified yes. If we look at our naval forces as individual platforms, it is possible to say that they are individually more capable than the Soviet naval forces. However, it is necessary to look at the respective navies from the standpoint of geography, mission and roles. When that is done, it becomes obvious that the Soviets do not have to defend sea lines of communication comparable to our own. Their mission is much more that of defense of the Soviet homeland with excursions at times and places of their own choosing to interdict our sea lines of communications, often through surrogate naval and air forces. Considering these significant factors, our Navy is spread very thin indeed, even considering the better individual capability of a particular platform as has been pointed out. Our need is for greater numbers of capable ships. U.S. RADIATED NOISE TRENDS Senator LEVIN. Admiral Baggett, you presented a chart that quantified the quieting of Soviet submarines over time. Would you furnish a comparable set of graphs for U.S. submarines; both SSNs and SSBNs? Admiral BAGGETT. The attached graphs show the general trend of U.S. radiated noise signatures from 1960 to the present. [Charts deleted.] NAVAL FORCES CAPABILITY Senator LEVIN. Admiral Baggett, you and Admiral Butts both have testified that our naval forces are more capable than the Soviet naval forces. Yet you have also stated that the U.S. Navy no longer has even a slim "margin of superiority" over the Soviet navy. Please explain the logical contradiction between these statements. Admiral BAGGETT. Yes, our naval forces ship per ship or battle group per battle group would be superior because of individual technology and capability. But we are discussing a contrast between powers where the technologically superior power is spread too thin, where the Soviet navy can put our naval forces at risk with pure numbers. We are also integrating in our statements a recognition of the differing commitments and tasks of the two navies. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAM NUNN EP-3 Senator NUNN. How important to Naval Intelligence and to the fleet commander are the capabilities provided by the EP-3? How does the EP-3 support the fleet commander in tactical situations? What other capabilities does the Navy have to perform this role; in other words, what would happen if the EP-3 capability did not exist? How important is the mission of the EP-3 to your work in determining the roles, missions and activities of the Soviet Navy? What priority should the program to update the EP-3 platform and the EP-3 sensor package be given? Admiral BUTTS. [Deleted.] SOVIET NAVY WEAKNESSES Senator NUNN. Admiral Baggett. What do you consider the main weaknesses of the Soviet Navy? What do you consider the main strengths of the U.S. Navy against these weaknesses? Admiral BAGGETT. The Soviet Navy has several distinct weaknesses or disadvantages which we are prepared to cash in on. Geography is not in their side if they choose to meet us on the high seas in an attempt to disrupt our sea lines of communication (SLOC). They must transit long distances or pass through various straits and chokepoints, in some cases both. [Deleted.] Many of their cruise missile launching submarines must still surface to launch [deleted]. Additionally, the Soviets have great respect for our ASW forces [deleted]. Again, Soviet acoustic disadvantage places them in a position of weakness [deleted]. From this our strengths are obviously our highly capable attack submarines and broad range of other ASW forces. These include our [deleted] airborne systems, both fixed and rotary wing, and the wide range of ASW capable surface combatants. In cooperation with our allies we are prepared to use mining and barrier patrols [deleted]. The essence of our carrier battle groups is the flexibility to keep the Soviets off balance. [Deleted.] Our heavy emphasis on at-sea time for our ships and aircraft, both forward deployed and in local operating areas, while expensive in operating costs, builds in both reliability and experience. Our system of fleet exercises prepares our sailors to do the kinds of things we expect across a broad spectrum of potential warfighting scenarios. ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE Senator NUNN. What developments do we see in the Soviet forces designed to diminish or negate U.S. advantages in antisubmarine warfare? Are the Soviets placing an emphasis in this area? Admiral BUTTS. The Soviets are expected [deleted]. The Soviets continue [deleted]. The Soviets have also [deleted]. USN/USAF COORDINATED OPERATIONS Senator NUNN. Have you changed your method or process of calculating the maritime balance to take into account the Navy-Air Force cooperative agreement or does this year maritime balance assessment represent strictly a naval comparison? Admiral BAGGETT. [Deleted]. LAND-BASED TACAIR CONTRIBUTION TO MARITIME OPERATIONS Senator NUNN. Have you included in your analysis the threat of the Soviet naval orienterd Backfire bombers designed to threaten our surface fleet? What is the potential of land-based tactical aviation to diminish or negate this threat? What contribution to protecting the fleet could land-based tactical aviation stationed in an area to threaten the Backfire bases, Turkey, for example, make? Admiral BAGGETT. The Navy is very much aware of the threat to surface fleets posed by the Backfire bomber. Analysis, tactical development, and procurement programs are all responsive to this threat. An example of tactical development is the Navy-Air Force cooperative agreement to utilize land-based air in support of maritime operations. [Deleted]. Attrition of Backfire assets, by whatever means, will lessen the threat faced by fleet units and by other allied units included in Backfire doctrinal mission responsibilities. CHOKE POINT NAVY DOCTRINE Senator NUNN. Is bottling up the Soviet fleet, both surface and subsurface, at appropriate choke points an element of naval operational doctrine? How does the Navy propose to do this, and can land-based forces contribute in any meaningful way? There have been media reports of Marine-operated land-based cruise missiles. Admiral BAGGETT. Geography does not favor the Soviet Navy and our maritime strategy applies pressure to ensure that the Soviet Navy remains bottled up at the choke points. [Deleted.] EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES AGAINST THE SOVIET FLEET Senator NUNN. What in your judgment is the best way to sink the Soviet fleet? Admiral BAGGETT. [Deleted.] SOVIET STRATEGIC RESERVE Senator NUNN. What in your judgment is the best way to put the Soviet strategic submarine capability, [deleted] at risk? How important is the Soviet SSBN fleet to their concept of deterrence and operations? Admiral BAGGETT. In my judgment the best way to put the Soviet strategic submarine force at risk is to [deleted]. Senator COHEN. Thank you, gentlemen. We stand adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:42 p.m., the subcommittee recessed subject to the call of the Chair.] DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1984 TUESDAY, MARCH 22, 1983 U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEA POWER AND FORCE PROJECTION, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, D.C. NAVY SHIPBUILDING PROGRAMS The subcommittee met in open session at 10:10 a.m., in room SR222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator William S. Cohen (chairman) presiding. Present: Senators Cohen, Quayle, Wilson, Nunn, Hart, and Levin. Staff present: L. Wayne Arny III, professional staff member; James G. Roche, minority staff director; James R. Locher III, and Patrick L. Renehan, professional staff members; Mark B. Robinson, research assistant; Kathleen L. McGuire, staff assistant. Also present: Jim Dykstra, assistant to Senator Cohen; Hank Steenstra, assistant to Senator Quayle; Frank Sullivan and Mary Shields, assistants to Senator Stennis; Arnold Punaro, assistant to Senator Nunn; Bill Lind, assistant to Senator Hart; and Peter Lennon, assistant to Senator Levin. OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR WILLIAM S. COHEN, CHAIRMAN Senator COHEN. The subcommittee will come to order. The Navy's shipbuilding and conversion program is the key to developing and maintaining a strong Navy for the future. Due to the large investments necessitated by the complexity of modern warfare, the shipbuilding program traditionally receives a great deal of congressional attention. This year will be no different. This morning it is my pleasure to welcome Mr. George Sawyer, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Shipbuilding and Logistics, and Vice Admiral Walters, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Surface Warfare. I also extend a warm welcome to Vice Admiral Fowler, Commander of the Naval Sea Systems Command, and Vice Admiral Thunman, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Submarine Warfare. I understand that Admirals Fowler and Thunman do not have prepared testimony, but are available to answer questions. With the four of you, I expect that any questions that members may have can be answered. There are several key issues that we must comprehensively address during today's hearing. First, there is the issue of whether our surface ships are truly as capable as advertised. The CG-47 Aegis cruiser, in particular, has been a continuing target of criticism, and it is important that we have a full airing of these accusations and the responses. At an appropriate time during this hearing, we will go into closed session for the purpose of reviewing the results of the test and evaluation of the Aegis combat system. The second key issue is whether the Navy could second-source the Aegis radar and combat system. We second-source major procurement items, including nearly every ship in the 5-year plan, except LHD's, SSBN's, and CVN's. Should we not be second-sourcing the major combat systems on these warships, as well? We are using Aegis on the CG-47's, which are being bid competitively, and an Aegis-type radar and combat system will be used on all the DDG-51's. Given the large number and cost of these systems, it seems important that competition be established among multiple suppliers. Third, we need to review more completely the Navy and Department of Defense's decision to charter, vice procure, certain ships for the maritime prepositioning ship program and the T-5 tanker program. Finally, we need to examine closely the combat capability you have proposed for the DDG-51 class guided missile destroyer, and your proposals and progress to control the cost of these ships, now and in the future. I expect that we will be able to fully explore these key issues with the expert witnesses. Since there are no other members here at this particular time, you may begin, Mr. Sawyer. STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE SAWYER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR SHIPBUILDING AND LOGISTICS, ACCOMPANIED BY VICE ADM. ROBERT C. WALTERS, U.S. NAVY, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR SURFACE WARFARE; VICE ADM. EARL B. FOWLER, U.S. NAVY, COMMANDER OF THE NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND; AND VICE ADM. N. R. THUNMAN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR SUBMARINE WARFARE Mr. SAWYER. Good morning, Senator. It is indeed a pleasure to appear before you and this committee again today to describe to you more fully our plans for the fiscal year 1984 shipbuilding program. I have prepared remarks and with your permission, I would like to introduce those in the record. Senator COHEN. They will be included in full in the record. I want to assure you that the program which we have submitted to you in the 1984 shipbuilding plan continues the momentum which, with the assistance of this committee, we were able to establish in 1982 and 1983 and build toward the assured attainment of our objective, the 600-ship 15-carrier battle group Navy, by the end of this decade. We are acutely aware that the attainment of these goals is not without its problems and potential pitfalls. Technically we believe that we are resolving the issues of affordability of our ships versus unit capability, an issue which you raised for further discussion today. Second, the proper allocation of our resources in the Navy, particularly between force structure and modernization and readiness and sustainability. Within the issue of force structure itself, of course, is the attainment of a balance of forces so that we can achieve the multimission capability necessary to win a war at sea. Last, for those of us who are concerned with the shore establishment there is the maintenance and management of our industrial base, particularly that base which resides not only in private industry, but also the very essential critical base within the Government. I would like to take a few minutes to review our performance of the past year and a half and our prospects this year. In terms of ships, we delivered 25 ships last year, 80 percent of which were on or ahead of schedule and on contract budget. At the current time we have over 110 ships in work in process in the various shipyards of the United States. Approximately 18 of those shipyards are currently involved in Navy new construction and conversion which represents about 70 percent of the generally perceived major active shipbuilding base in the country. For the first time in memory we awarded all of our fiscal year 1982 shipbuilding contracts in 1982 and indeed have gone a long way toward awarding our 1983 program, over 80 percent of which is currently under contract. Of our 1983 anticipated deliveries, we expect 90 percent, approximately 19 of 21 ships, will deliver this year ahead of or on schedule. It is a pretty good batting record, in my opinion. Also, for the first time, in many years there was an absence of shipbuilding claims. Over the last year and a half there have been no new claims entered for outstanding claims on the books in the area of new construction or conversion. As you pointed out, Senator, we have moved strongly in implementing a number of the major management incentives that were set forth by Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci at the outset of this administration. First and foremost is the move toward more competition. About 95 percent of the ships, in terms of new construction and conversion, that are in the 5-year plan will be awarded competitively, as you pointed out, leaving only the large LHD-1 class ships, the nuclear carriers and Trident submarine as sole-source procurement. We have moved into multiyear category of shipbuilding, counting on the program stability which we think is so important, particularly in this area of major ship construction. The two carrier awards, which it appears right now will exceed the $750 million savings which we committed to the Congress last year, are evidence of that initiative. This year we have a major multiyear proposal before you, the competitive multiyear program for five LSD-41 class ships, which |