Senator LEVIN. We had already put our money into subs, right? Admiral BUTTS. The point I made earlier, the Soviets did not launch the first of their Yankee class until a month after we had launched the last of our Poseidon missiles.

Senator LEVIN. If you could give us those figures for the record on the tonnage, it would be helpful to us. The figures I get are that we added more naval tonnage than they did in the 1970's. The numbers of ships added are actually pretty close. They have a few more ships, but we are way ahead in tonnage.

Admiral BUTTS. But increasingly, the Soviets have turned from the smaller ships that they had in years past to the larger, more capable ships that they are building now.

Senator LEVIN. I am just talking about the 1970's, the decade of neglect that we are told about all the time.

That is kind of a strange way to describe it. I am not asking for an answer. It just seems to me if we acquired more tonnage and almost as many ships in the 1970's, and we acquired more surface combatants, and more carriers-while they acquired more of the smaller, nonopen ocean vessels-it is rather a strange way to describe a decade. I am not saying there are not areas where we want more capability, and I'm not arguing with you about the Soviets increasing their capability. Obviously there are areas in which we want more capability, and obviously they are increasing their capabilities. We shouldn't be standing still.

But that description of a decade in which we outbuilt them tonnagewise and in numbers of platforms in the major critical areas I think is a very inapt description, and it is one of the reasons I can speak outloud-and this has nothing to do with your presentation-why I think the American people are not believing what they hear anymore, and I just say that because I think it is important that we get a balanced view.

Your purpose here this morning is not to give us a balanced view. I understand that. You are telling us what their capabilities are. You are not here to show us in each instance their capability versus our capability, so I am not going to berate you for that. But I must say that in general I think the image that has been attempted to be portrayed by the Secretary of the Navy is inaccurate and ultimately strains credibility and ultimately loses credibility, and I say that because I believe it, not because it is particularly relevant to the proceedings this morning.

And you know, again, I don't think these ads are helpful. They don't help me. You tell me we have got a stronger Navy than they have got. We have got weaknesses and we have got to improve it and all the rest. This ad tells me every week they have got five times or four times as strong a navy than we have got. That is what it is trying to tell the public.

I don't know who pays for these ads. You don't happen to know who pays for them, do you?

Admiral BUTTS. No, sir, I do not.

Senator LEVIN. Whether it is taxpayers or whether it comes out of the profits of the organization.

Mr. Chairman, I have a number of questions that are more relevant to the proceeding, and I don't want to interrupt their flow, so

maybe we ought to let me terminate there and I will come back, or else I will file them for the record.

STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. LEE BAGGETT, USN, DIRECTOR,

NAVAL WARFARE

Admiral BAGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I just have a brief presentation, and hopefully it will prompt some questions.

I don't have a prepared statement for the record.

As the Director of Naval Warfare, my job is to look at requirements, to identify requirements of the U.S. Navy and be the officer primarily responsible for fleet readiness and training, battle group readiness across the board.

WARFARE TASKS

Primary

Strike and antiship warfare.

Antiair warfare.

Antisubmarine warfare.

Amphibious warfare.

Mine warfare.

Ancillary

Electronic warfare.

Cover and deception.

Tactical intelligence support.

Command and control.

Surveillance.

Warfare tasks, this morning I will cover it a little bit in depth, include antiair warfare and antisubmarine warfare. I won't go into details with respect to amphibious warfare, mine warfare or strike warfare, or the ancillary electronic warfare covered in this section, those elements that cover cross-warfare areas, if you will.

DIRECTOR, NAVAL WARFARE RESPONSIBILITIES

Warfare task sponsorship: Articulate warfare task elements; develop warfare task requirements; develop warfare task program guidance; maintain warfare task master plans.

Force level plans.

Resource allocation proposals: Among warfare tasks; within warfare tasks.
Assessment.

Battle force readiness.

Tactical training, development and documentation.

Just a quick look at maritime strategy, in the context of what is the Navy's maritime strategy and how does it match up with national strategy. This slide-[slide deleted]-shows two fundamental things, the symmetry between the Atlantic and the Pacific, and that comes about just because of the location of the Soviets. [Deleted.] We now have 13 carrier battle groups, actually 11 carriers which are deployable at any one time with Kitty Hawk being in overhaul right now on the west coast, and Forrestal being in a service life extension program in Philadelphia today.

We have 11 carriers that are deployable in a relatively short time.

Senator COHEN. How many are actually deployed at any one time?

Admiral BAGGETT. Actually, at any one time, we have Midway and one other carrier in the Pacific deployed; we have generally one or two in the Mediterranean, depending on whether one is in the Indian Ocean or not. So we have four deployed at any one given time.

ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE

Antisubmarine warfare is really denying the enemy the effective use of his submarines, not going out and looking for submarines, per se, but denying him effective use of his submarines.

We have touched briefly this morning on the quieting trend. [Deleted.]

[Slide deleted.]

SOVIET NUCLEAR SUBMARINE CLASSES

This shows just briefly a summary in blue, the nuclear submarine classes that the Soviets have introduced, going back to 1960. In brown are the diesel electric classes, the Kilo, the Tango, the Juliet, and the Foxtrot that have come into the inventory in the last 20 years for the Soviets.

The next slide shows those cruise missiles and ballistic missiles above the line, just to give you a feel numerically as to the five classes of ballistic missiles; and the eight cruise missile variants that have come in over that period of time in the Soviet submarine inventory.

[Slide deleted.]

Front line Soviet submarines showing numbers, total numbers, 270-odd the numbers that we build versus the numbers they build per year. We have still got a baseline, a starting point and a point of departure. They build and they continue to keep an inventory almost three times the inventory that we have for front line submarines.

[Slide deleted.]

This is really a slide that just shows basically how the U.S. ASW forces numerically are compared to the Soviets, and these numbers represent surface ships, P-3 and S-3 aircraft and helicopters on a platform-to-platform basis. We have [deleted] platforms per Soviet submarine in the inventory. At the end of World War II the ratio, just for comparison, was 100 to 1. We had 100 antisubmarine warfare platforms for every German submarine that was in action.

The counterpart of that shows our submarine force levels, 125 total, counting the SSBN force, matched against the Soviet antisubmarine warfare forces.

We talked earlier today about the Soviet noise trends, the quieting trends. [Deleted].

[Slide deleted.]

This shows, for example, [deleted].

Senator LEVIN. Will you be showing us any changes in our own ASW capability? Is that part of your presentation?

Admiral BAGGETT. I will. I will allude to it. I won't show you quantification.

This really shows antisubmarine forces that we have, the nuclear submarines operating in the forward area, the P-3's, nuclear submarines operating in barriers together with captor mines in the open ocean areas, the Orion aircraft, the P-3's, again the SSN's which are a major player in all the antisubmarine warfare scenarios, and finally, undersea surveillance, the [deleted].

These forces here show the integral ASW forces in the battle force, underway replenishments, group surface, action groups, con

voys.

We are really talking about antisubmarine warfare that uses defense in depth, from surveillance leading all the way through barrier operations, area search, inner zone screening. In a geographical context it involves antisubmarine warfare, [deleted].

Finally, the close-in ASW involved with surface action groups, marine amphibious forces, underway replenishment groups.

And this is antisubmarine warfare in depth, which is really to give an indication of where the VP operates, [deleted] and closer in, the destroyer types, the LAMPS helicopter. On a geographic scale, to just get you out of a mind set-if anyone has a mind set that sees a bullseye with the carrier in the center-I want to give you some appreciation for the span of ocean control I am talking about, and that is the keyword, rather than defense, it is control of the oceans, with a carrier fixed here at Washington, it would spread all the way down into Delaware, down to Roanoke, the western reaches of Pennsylvania. That is the expanse of control that a carrier battle group would have. And those are typical positions where you would find patrolling aircraft [deleted] submarines here, surface towed array ships in that area.

[Deleted.]

The bases from which their submarines operate are shown there, outside of the Soviet Union.

ASW BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT

Soviet trends

Harder to find-detection and classification.
Harder to kill-localization and attack.

More lethal damage to U.S. forces.

That really tells the story that I think you have heard today, the [deleted] torpedoes they are developing, the cruise missile capabilities. They are getting harder to kill [deleted].

As far as our limitations, first and foremost are the [deleted].

ANTIAIR WARFARE

The destruction of enemy air platforms and airborne weapons, whether launched from air, surface, submarine, or land platforms.

In the time remaining I would like to just run through briefly the counterpart to antisubmarine warfare which is almost a mirror image, and that is antiair warfare. It is a mirror image in the context of defense in depth or operations in depth.