More Victor III-class nuclear attack submarines were produced in 1982. In terms both of numbers and operational assignments, Victors remain the backbone of the Soviet Navy's nuclear attack submarine force.

Finally, we expect to see a new class of attack submarine follow the Victor program, probably beginning this year or next.

The Soviet Navy is also developing a sea launched land attack cruise missile similar to the U.S. Tomahawk, and expected to be operational this year.

To complement these submarine, surface combatant and weapon programs, the Soviets have a small but growing amphibious force. In 1982 they launched the second of the Ivan Rogov-class LPDS, and completed additional Ropucha-class LSTs. They also have the world's largest fleet of amphibious assault air cushion vehicles. The Soviets are also continuing to work on their ability to replenish their ships while underway. In addition to the 25,000-ton replenishment ship Berezina, the Soviet Navy has about 30 AORs and AOs able to refuel warships alongside while underway; some of them can also transfer solid stores. As a result, the amount of fuel provided by these oilers has increased from 65 percent of naval requirements in the early 1970s to about 80 percent today. Soviet technology for underway replenishment is nearly on a par with the best Western technology. Their operational experience is, however, spotty and we regularly see many Soviet ships refuel bow to stern, at slow speeds or at anchor.

In 1982, Soviet Naval Aviation continued to receive new Backfire bombers. We expect the number of Soviet Naval Aviation Backfire deliveries to increase steadily. The total number of Forger VSTOL fighter-bombers available for Kiev-class carriers also increased. Each Kiev normally carries 12 or 13 Forgers and 14 to 17 Hormone/ Helix helicopters. With these aircraft, Soviet Naval Aviation now can deliver a variety of weapons, for use in striking shipping, conducting ASW, or supporting amphibious operations.

Overall, then, the Soviet shipbuilding effort by the end of 1982 has resulted in a Navy with 4 Kiev carriers, 278 other major surface combatants, and 367 submarines. The steady improvement made to Soviet naval shipyards in 1982 further underscores the USSR's commitment to building the most advanced and capable ships in the world. The Soviets have purposefully developed a huge but underused shipyard capacity, which includes five yards for submarine production, eight for large combatants, and others for auxiliaries and small combatants. A single yard, Severodvinsk, has more building positions for nuclear submarine construction than has the entire U.S. nuclear submarine construction program.

The USSR leads the world in many aspects of shipbuilding. The Soviets are the leaders in the marine application of gas turbines. They increasingly use the section method of construction, which reduces both building time and cost, and permits maximum use of each shipway. They lead in techniques for welding and have stateof-the-art metal cutting equipment. While the Soviets still have relative deficiencies in other aspects of shipbuilding, they have a first-rate overall industry. One additional sign of this is the increase in recent years of ship production for export, most notably Kashin DDGS for India; Foxtrot-class submarines for India, Cuba, and Libya; and the Koni-class frigate designed expressly for foreign navies. Not since Moscow sold a cruiser and destroyers to Indonesia in the 1950s have we seen such large ships being built for export.

Large numbers of ships and shipyards do not, of themselves, make a country a naval power. It is the use of those naval forces which counts even more than numbers. The Soviets did use their Navy in 1982 and there were several new developments.

The Soviet operation which attracted the most attention was the simulated strike against two US aircraft carriers last fall by Soviet naval Backfire bombers in the western Pacific. On two occasions, Backfires came within about 100 miles of U.S. carriers as part of the overall reaction to one of our exercises. While the Soviets routinely monitor such exercises and simulate various reactions, this was the first use of Backfires against our carriers. It was also the first use of Backfire over the open ocean in the Pacific.

In December, the Soviet carrier Minsk operating in the Indian Ocean launched Forger VSTOL aircraft in reaction to U.S. carrier operations. This activity represented the first time Soviet carrier aircraft have intercepted U.S. carrier aircraft. Our pilots stated the Forger intercepts were not very polished. U.S. carrier pilots routinely practice these procedures; and the Soviets would probably like to do more such intercepts as opportunity permits.

Another important development was Shield '82, the largest Warsaw Pact exercise in the Balkans in at least a decade. The participation of the carrier Kiev was an interesting aspect. This was its first major amphibious exercise. The Soviets are

showing a growing interest in the development of carrier based air support for landing forces and probably already are working on concepts for the employment of their new aircraft carriers.

During 1982, the Soviet Navy kept ships year around in the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean, the South Atlantic off West Africa, and the South China Sea, and conducted deployments to the Caribbean. Particularly noteworthy in this regard has been Soviet activity at the former U.S. naval complex at Cam Ranh Bay, Viet Nam, to improve their operations in both the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. There are now Soviet ships always in port at Cam Ranh; and Soviet naval Bear aircraft routinely deploy to Cam Ranh Airfield from where they regularly fly reconnaissance and ASW missions throughout the region.

The overall level of worldwide Soviet out-of-area operations has remained fairly stable since the mid-1970s, measured by ship-days. However, in areas where we once would expect to find a destroyer or frigate size combatant, we now see cruisers and even KIEV carriers. This reflects the Soviets' growing interest in strengthening their influence with Third World nations, as well as balancing deployed Western naval forces. The December 1982 port visit to Bombay by the carrier MINSK is an example of the kind of Soviet ship visits that we are seeing more and more as a matter of routine.

Soviet ocean surveillance in 1982 was marked by high levels of activity in space based systems. The Soviets launched 107 satellites-the highest yearly total to date. All of these had military application and some were dedicated to ocean surveillance. In addition to the expansion of their own naval capabilities, the Soviets continued in 1982 to export weaponry to Third World countries at the same high levels established in 1981. Weapons deliveries included such relatively sophisticated naval systems as diesel attack submarines, guided missile destroyers, frigates, and missile patrol boats.

For the second year in a row, Cuba remained the principal recipient of Soviet weaponry. In 1981 Cuba received the largest amount of arms since 1962; but the 1982 total was even higher. These massive deliveries allowed Cuban armed forces, and particularly the Cuban Navy, to continue a significant upgrade of their combat capabilities.

Cuba's missile patrol boats are a strong offensive force, especially against undefended shipping. The surface force has been further augmented by the acquisition of a Soviet Koni-class frigate. The two Foxtrot submarines received in 1979 and 1980 give Havana an important long-range attack capability it has not had heretofore. We believe Cuba will receive additional submarines over the next few years. During 1982 the Cubans also received two Soviet Polnocny LSMs, providing them their first true amphibious capability. The upgrade of Cuban naval forces has been accompanied by a major expansion of Cuban naval facilities.

In conjunction with Havana's Air Force-the largest in Latin America after Brazil-the Cuban Navy poses a credible offensive threat to U.S. forces in the Caribbean, a threat that did not exist as recently as four years ago.

In the Far East, North Korea has renewed its naval competition with South Korea, after a pause in the late 1970s to build up its merchant and fishing fleet. North Korea changed this concentration in 1980 in an attempt to widen its edge over the South, primarily in the vital category of surface-to-surface missile combatants. Highlights of this effort include the launching last year of unique missilearmed frigate; new diesel attack submarines; and the addition of antiship cruisemissile launchers. North Korea now has several different classes of combatants under construction or modification.

This development underscores North Korea's intention to improve its capabilities for coastal defense, amphibious raids, and combat against both South Korean and U.S. naval units. Also, the buildup gives the North a greater patrol capability for its extended 200-mile economic zone and 50-mile military zone declared in 1977.

The Chinese Navy made news in 1982 with its first launching at sea of submarinelaunched ballistic missile. This event made China the fifth country to launch a missile from a submarine.

We often forget that China has the world's third largest navy. Most of its major combatants are less than 15 years old, and include an SSBN, two nuclear attack submarines, over 100 conventional submarines, 12 guided missile destroyers (with SSMs), and 23 frigates. As China turns increasingly to the sea for oil and other resources, and as the Soviet naval presence increases in the Western Pacific, the Chinese have stepped up efforts to modernize and expand their naval capabilities. Despite these efforts, China will remain principally a regional naval power for the rest of the century.

Since January 1982 the Libyan Navy has added several new units as part of its expansion program: it acquired another FOXTROT submarine, one additional NANUCHKA missile boat and two more NATYA minesweepers from the Soviets. Seven La Combattante missile boats were also acquired from France. While the Libyan Navy represents a growing and potentially dangerous force in the Mediterranean, it has deficiencies which prevent Qadhafi from exploiting fully its capabilities. Similar problems affect Libya's Air Force.

Returning to a final comment on Soviet Naval developments in 1982, I want to discuss a problem that grows more critical each day. That is the accelerating pace of Soviet acquisition of Western military technology. The Soviets have carried out a massive program to obtain, by legal and illegal means, the most advanced Western technology available. Those of us with specific responsibilities for protecting information are most enthusiastic about the attention the Congress has given to this problem.

Shortly before his death, Chairman Brezhnev emphasized the need to acquire military technology. At an October 1982 gathering of key Soviet military leaders, he stated, "Competition in military technology has sharply intensified, often acquiring a fundamentally new character. Lag in this competition is inadmissible. We expect that our scientists, designers, engineers and technicians will do everything possible to resolve successfully all tasks connected with this." Because of this emphasis, Western technology that has both civilian and military uses almost always finds its way into Soviet military industries first, and civilian industries later. We have seen that take place in everything from microelectronic manufacturing equipment to the Kama Truck Plant, which has produced large numbers of military vehicles now used by the Soviets in Afghanistan.

The means for technology transfer vary. Much information is obtained by the thousands of Soviet researchers and analysts who comb the pages of Western technical journals. Commercial channels, either open or clandestine, provide advanced equipment and know-how. Soviet Bloc intelligence services target defense contractors and high-technology firms. They also target international organizations with access to advanced technology that includes computer data base networks. Visiting Soviet Bloc technical and student delegations consist generally of expert scientists, many of them engaged in military work at home. Soviet candidates in scientific exchange programs routinely request research assignments here for projects that have military applications. Simply attending high-technology trade fairs can help obtain useful information on emerging technologies before security restrictions may shut it off from the Soviet Bloc.

When I said earlier that the pace of technology transfer by the Soviets was accelerating, I had in mind the much shorter length of time it takes before they have our designs in place in their naval equipment. By the mid-decade, they were copying entire families of integrated circuits within two to four years of the time they appeared in U.S. catalogs. By the end of the decade, they would copy and manufacture our newest devices within about two years.

In sum, the transfer of Western technology to the Soviets is a serious and growing problem. It has been a key part of Moscow's efforts to catch up in areas in which it lags, and to widen the gap in areas in which it has the lead. Where we once had an overwhelming qualitative technological edge, that edge is eroding rapidly. If a war ever occurred, we would find ourselves facing Soviet-built weapons at least partly developed with out own technology and tax dollars. Our Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James D. Watkins, has described it as like "being in a tail chase with ourselves."

Overall Soviet naval developments in 1982 lead to several conclusions.

First, while we await more signs of the military policies to be followed by the Andropov regime, I do not anticipate any early changes of direction regarding the Soviet Navy. The Navy has been allocated approximately the same share of the total military budget for a number of years, so its growth has not been at the expense of other services. The Soviet decision just last year to end military draft deferments for all but a few students is only the most recent sign of a continued commitment to devote scarce resources, in this case manpower, to sustain military power. The steady, year-after-year expansion of Soviet Navy capabilities shows no signs of slowing down. I think that the Soviets will probably maintain a fairly constant number of about 60 SSNBs well into the next decade, as the TYPHOON and its successor replace older classes. The overall number of general-purpose submarines will decline as obsolescent diesel submarines are retired, but the number of state-of-theart nuclear-powered ones will increase. The number of principal surface warships will likely decline somewhat, but there will be more of the large, powerful ships.

We expect the Soviets to continue to use our technology and theirs to improve their cruise missiles, air defenses, and naval aviation. These developments will continue the trend of the last decade from a navy designed for a short, intense war toward a navy with a greater endurance, larger weapons loads, and extensive communication and electronic warfare systems. The Soviets seem to have taken to heart what I believe is a key lesson of history, which is that most wars last much longer than they are supposed to.

The primary wartime tasks of the Soviet Navy will continue to be protecting their SSBNs until they can strike, and defending the homeland from Western SSBNs and aircraft carriers. This would entail Soviet attempts to control in war all or part of the Kara, Barents, and Okhotsk Seas, and the Northwest Pacific Basin, and to conduct sea denial operations beyond those areas. As new Western long-range landattack cruise missiles become operational, moreover, we expect the Soviet Navy to expand its sea denial operations.

At the same time, the greater ability to range farther at sea obviously increases the Soviet Navy's ability to operate against Western sea lanes. As the Soviets have thought more seriously about the possibility of a prolonged war, they have emphasized this role more. I might add that cutting off vital sea lanes is a measure that could be threatened for peacetime political leverage as well.

The Soviet Navy is becoming an increasingly valuable peacetime asset to the Soviet leadership. Al Capone reputedly once said, "You can get better results with a kind word and a gun, than with a kind word alone." The Soviets seem to follow this kind of maxim as they practice an aggressive naval diplomacy. We expect them to expand their level of operations in such areas as the Caribbean and Philippine Seas, West Africa and the southwest Indian Ocean islands. Given the likelihood of continued instability in the Third World, the opportunity for use of such naval diplomacy will undoubtedly increase.

This is not to say the Soviet Navy will alter its singular approach to materiel and crew readiness in discharging its assigned tasks. This approach, which is uniform throughout the Soviet armed forces, aims at ensuring maximum materiel availability in times of crisis through minimum day-to-day use. To the Soviets, it is more important to be ready to go to sea than actually to be at sea-a philosophy that explains why, on the average day, only about 15% of the Soviet Navy is deployed beyond home waters. Limiting materiel wear and tear is the rule even while on distant deployments. For example, during the November 1982-January 1983 deployment to the Caribbean, Soviet Navy ships spent 52 of the total 68 days in port.

Although the Soviet Navy's wartime tasks and approach to readiness should remain basically unchanged during the next decade, it capabilities to operate effectively in an expanding variety of circumstances over broader ocean areas will probably increase. We expect the quality of the Navy's materiel, maintenance, and personnel to further improve; its command and control system to become more responsive and survivable; and its ability to sustain combat operations to increase. Expansion of the Navy's support facilities and capabilities, advances in ocean surveillance systems, increasingly realistic training, and greater out-of-area operational experience all portend continuing improvement in the professionalism, maturity, and proficiency of the Soviet Navy.

In short, Admiral Gorshkov's goal of a "balanced fleet" is still being vigorously pursued. The Soviet Navy, which today poses a clear and present challenge to our national interests, will be even more capable tomorrow. The stronger it becomes relative to our own Navy, the less restrained the leaders of the Andropov regime need be in their political and military diplomacy. This is the growing danger we confront.

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. JOHN L. BUTTS, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, ACCOMPANIED BY VICE ADM. LEE BAGGETT, JR., U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR OF NAVAL WARFARE Admiral BUTTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to be here. I certainly agree with your comments about the difficulties of following Admiral Shapiro. I had the great pleasure of working as his deputy for 2 years and watching him up close. He is absolutely one of our very best intelligence officers. Fortunately he is still in the area and I get to talk to him with great regularity.

I don't want to talk very much about numbers this morning, sir, since everyone knows the Soviets do have a lot of ships, but if you

will look at the Brezhnev years, the 18 years, these were the ships that the Soviets built. I might note that as regards nuclear powered submarines, 72 of these were ballistic missile submarines. During the same period, the United States built three SSBN's. A not generally appreciated fact is that it was not until after we had launched the last of our Polaris/Poseidon submarines that the Soviet launched the first of their Yankee class.

A little closer to home, these were the submarines and the major surface ships which the Soviets launched this past year, and this is the forecast for the 1983 additions. Some interesting kinds of ships and submarines, and I will talk more about each of them in more detail.

SOVIET AVIATION AT SEA

Starting first with Soviet aviation at sea, this past year the Soviets launched the fourth, and we believe the last of their Kiev class aircraft carriers. This 38,000 ton ship, unit No. 4, at Nikolayev shipyard in the Black Sea, is like its three predecessors equipped to carry the Forger class V/STOL aircraft and helicopters.

Senator COHEN. How many aircraft would that carry?

Admiral BUTTS. 12 to 13 Forgers, Mr. Chairman, and 14 to 17 helicopters, depending upon the exact configuration, not a large aircraft load.

Senator COHEN. We have this debate many times during the course of the year, and while Senator Hart is not here but Senator Hart's staff member is here, he in fact is a leading proponent of the smaller aircraft carriers of 40,000 tons with a V/STOL capability or even conventional capability, and we hear, of course, from time to time that these ships are quite vulnerable.

What about as compared to a larger aircraft carrier, what would be the relative vulnerability of the Kiev class?

Admiral BUTTS. The Kiev class carrier, with the Forger aircraft, with a maximum radius of about 195 nautical miles, with only 12 to 13 aircraft, would not compare favorably at all with a ship like the U.S.S. Enterprise with 60 aircraft with a combat radius of 500 to 600 nautical miles.

Admiral BAGGETT. They would be weather-limited also. The Kiev class is just about the equivalent of the LHD-1, which is in the budget, and the LHA-1. For example, in a South Atlantic environment, such as south of the Falklands, the weather limitations would be detrimental to that class compared to the larger carriers. Senator COHEN. So you would compare it to the LHB-1 that we are building now to carry the Harrier.

Admiral BAGGETT. Yes, sir.

Admiral BUTTS. Various Soviet activities, including some improvements they have made to their shipyard at Nikolayev [deleted] the acquisition of two very large floating drydocks which are substantially larger than anything that they need for what they have in their inventory, and a lot of verbal and written references to a CTOL carrier program, including comments recently, that is, within the last several months, by Soviet attachés, all point to Soviet construction of a true aircraft carrier.

[Deleted] this direction (indicating).