Hence a single "switch" also becomes more important in determining the outcome of an issue being voted on. No specific suggestions have been made to remedy this situation, but presumably it would be done by changing the size of all or certain committees.

I am opposed to such a change for several fundamental reasons. First of all, it would be of no substantial benefit if the committee size were increased by two members and the ratio became 8 to 7. Furthermore, such a change would require, for all practical purposes the abandonment of the attempt to confine Senators to two standing committee assignments. This is so because it would create 28 new committee assignments and require 39 Senators to hold assignments on three standing committees.

Two other possibilities which would strengthen majority control in the committee would be by increasing the committee size by one seat, and giving that to the majority, or by decreasing the committee size by one seat, and taking that away from the minority. Hence, the minimum committee ratio would be 8 to 6 under the former and 7 to 5 under the latter. Both of these would be disadvantageous from the standpoint of containing an even number of members in total, and hence easily susceptible to a tie vote. In my view, this would be an objection despite the precedent from past composition of standing committees in the Senate for an even number of members. The major objection, however, lies in the inequity of treatment this would produce as between the majority and minority, and in the disproportionate division of the committee work load.

For example, with a 49-47 division of the Senate between the majority and the minority and with a minimum 8 to 6 ratio on the committees with the 21-member Appropriations Committee remaining the same as now-the majority would hold 123 committee seats as against 94 for the minority. The minority would have exactly two assignments per Senator, while the majority would have 25 Senators with three committee assignments or an average of more than 2.5 assignments for each of the majority Senators.

With a similar Senate division and a 7 to 5 ratio the majority would hold 109 committee seats as against 80 held by the minority. Here the effect would be to confine 14 minority Senators to only one standing committee assignment. The over-all averages for assignments would be 2.2 per Senator for the majority and 1.7 for the minority.

The present arrangement seems to be much more equitable, both in sharing the burdens of committee work and in the representation of party strength. At present, under a 49-47 division of the Senate, the majority will hold 109 committee seats and the minority 94. The present structure is built around the composition of two committee assignments per Senator, plus 11 additional committee seats for the majority to insure a working majority on each committee. Actually, of course, a 7 to 6 ratio is better than the 49 to 47 ratio which the majority would have in the full Senate under the closest possible division of the Senate, when and only when all the committees would have a bare majority. With a wider margin in the Senate as a whole, the majority rapidly gains a better ratio. It can be seen from the accompanying table, for example, that with a 53-43 division in the Senate, seven of the 13-member committees will be controlled by an 8 to 5 ratio; and with a 57-39 division all committees will be controlled by an 8 to 5 ratio.

I ask to have incorporated the accompanying tableThe CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that will be done. (The table referred to follows:)

Table showing the division of committee seats in the U. S. Senate under various divisions of the Senate, from a bare majority 49-47 to an extreme division of 73-23 between the majority and the minority

1

Some committees would then become 11-2.

1 The table could be extended further. Since the Reorganization Act of 1946 did not specify any particular order in which the majority party assumed the larger committee ratios as between committees, i. e., whether the Appropriations Committee came first or elsewhere down the list, it is possible to have some slight variations from the above. The above is an "idealized" distribution, maintaining as far as possible equal ratios. Also, it should be noted, there is no fixed method under the present rules for determining which committees among the 13-member committees should enjoy the higher ratio when mathematically committees of two different ratios are necessary.

Mr. LA FOLLETTE. Still another alternative, previously mentioned, would be to alter the size only of certain "major" committees. This would be less objectionable in line with the previous analysis, but would reintroduce the unbalance in committees which the 1946 act sought to remove and would be the first step, in my judgment, toward the reestablishment of another "jerry-built" committee structure.

In this connection, however, I call attention to a situation in committee organization which needs study. The question is what to do, in case the Senate is evenly divided 48 to 48. This is not a remote possibility because close divisions are not uncommon. In fact, nine times in the last 28 Congresses the margin of the majority party organizing the Senate has been three or less members. I have not made a study of the possibilities for handling such a deadlock if it came, but one method which I throw out for consideration and which might be explored, would be to grant the prerogatives of the majority to that party which controlled the executive branch of the Government, that is, the Presidency. This would necessitate some minor changes in the two-committee-assignment rule.

I shall not attempt to pass judgment on the quality and character of the new staffing of experts and assistants provided under the Reorganization Act. Such comments as I have heard have generally been favorable. I have noted with interest the comment of Senator Taft before this committee 2 weeks ago, to the effect that good staffing was one of the major reasons why the act was working well. The fact that few of the standing committees have as yet completed their authorized complement of staff personnel seems to be indicative of the careful and deliberate choice of such personnel. I am still of the opinion that a personnel office on Capitol Hill could perform a useful function in personnel matters both for the committees and for Members of Congress. Furthermore, if the professional staff members of the committees are to give the kind of nonpartisan service that is expected, it is desirable to establish certain personnel safeguards both in their hiring and firing.

As for the jobs of administrative assistants to Senators, some complaints have been raised in the press that many Senators have promoted their former secretaries to this new and better-paying position. It may be that in some instances the new position has meant nothing more than a pay raise to an old employee, which may be warranted or unwarranted, depending upon the capabilities of the individual and the duties performed.

It is however, wholly unfair to suggest that none of the former secretaries possessed qualifications which would entitle them to appointment as administrative assistants. Whatever the caliber may be of the present incumbents in the top jobs, both on the committee staffs and as administrative assistants, this is certain, in my opinion, the general level in the long run will be fixed to a large extent by the salary paid for the job, and by the continuity of service during good behavior.

It should be noted that no explicit statutory authority exists for the administrative assistants or for the policy committees in the Senate. These features were contained in the Reorganization Act as it passed the Senate, but were eliminated without a conference with the House when the parliamentary situation just before the close of the Seventy-ninth Congress necessitated the acceptance of the House version. Because the Senate had approved these features, and because of the usual comity between the two Houses of Congress, I was able nevertheless to obtain concurrence in the inclusion of appropriations for these items, notwithstanding the lack of specific statutory authorization. A similar appropriation for this year was made by the Eightieth Congress in the first session.

From the standpoint of orderly legislative procedure, it would seem to be desirable to include such authorizations when revisions of the act are considered. More than that, I am still of the belief that the House could profitably make use of the majority and minority policy committees and staffs. If the House could be persuaded to accept the proposal, it would be possible to carry through one of our original recommendations, namely, the establishment of a Joint Legislative-Executive Council, which would formalize a working arrangement of the top leaders in the Congress with the Chief Executive and his Cabinet.

The provisions of the act relating to the regulation of lobbying have recently received considerable attention. Two viewpoints have prevailed, both justified to some extent.

First, that the lobbying section involves many questions of application and definition which must sometime be defined more clearly, either by the Congress or the courts. Unlike other regulatory acts of this nature, the lobbying act contains no provisions empowering an administrator to issue regulations thereunder.

The second prevalent view is that the act has not been entirely effective in providing full and complete disclosures.

Unfortunately, the administration of the Lobbying Act is hindered both by the lack of precedents and by a prejudicial stigma in the public mind. Lobbying can be either good or bad and these provisions were aimed not necessarily at curbing, but at disclosing sources and sponsorships, such as has been done for many years by many State legislatures under various laws of the States.

The action of the Department of Justice recently indicates that it has some evidence, presumably, that persons and organizations who might be considered to fall within the terms of the act have deemed themselves to be exempt or for other reasons have failed to comply with its terms.

Whatever the defects of the section, it has provided the general public and the Members of Congress with more information about Federal lobbying activities than has been known heretofore.

In contrast with some of the sections of the act which have aroused controversy or comment, many important sections have been applied with little or no fanfare. Title IV, the Federal Tort Claims Act, is a far-reaching revision under which Federal agencies are empowered to adjust certain tort claims, to relieve Congress of numerous special bills, which were often ill-considered for lack of time. Title V enacted the General Bridge Act delegating certain congressional powers to the War Department and Public Roads Administration.

A new system has been set up for the preservation of congressional papers and records at the National Archives. The Congressional Record has been improved with an excellent daily digest of important events. The expanded activities of the Legislative Reference Service and the Office of the Legislative Counsel have provided an increased service, which, their records show, has been widely used by Members of Congress.

On the subject of congressional salaries, I am sure all Members are aware that the salary increases granted under the Reorganization Act have been largely dissipated by the inflationary trends since that time. The problem is not peculiar to Members of Congress. It strikes with equal force on all fixed-salaried employees and has created a serious situation with respect to high Government positions. This statement is evidently correct when some of the most capable of public servants, both in the Congress and the executive departments, entertain doubts whether they can afford to continue to work for the Government and the people. I have no specific recommendations on this point at this time, but I do feel that the Congress should not be hesitant about reviewing its own status when it considers the general subject of Government salary scales.

Another section of the bill which needs careful review are the provisions for the legislative budget. These are the provisions whereby it had been hoped to strengthen fiscal control through a better coordination of receipts and expenditures. The provisions went completely awry last year and the failure to complete a legislative budget constituted a conspicuous failure of the Congress last year insofar as the Reorganization Act is concerned.

Unquestionably, the failure was due in large part to the inability to get such a program under way in the limited time available to do so. Seemingly, better progress is being made this year, although it has been necessary already to amend the February 1 date which was contemplated in the Reorganization Act as the time of reporting for the Joint Committee on the Economic Report.

I am aware of the fact that funadmental objections have been raised to the legislative budget and that some sentiment exists to abolish these provisions entirely. One source of such sentiment is from those who feel the whole scheme is impractical and simply enmeshes the Congress in meaningless, but potentially embarrassing, limitations. The other source of such sentiment is from those who fear a legislative budget somehow entails the concept that expenditures, no matter what the situation, would never be allowed to exceed receipts, no matter what the circumstances. Actually, of course, the provisions of the law do not necessarily contemplate a year-to-year balance.

The principle of a legislative budget is sound, in my judgment, and I can see no inherent reason why it can't be made to work. The technical problems in accounting methods are essentially the same as those which face the Budget Bureau and surely are not insurmountable. In fact, the staff members serving the Congress on this activity should be required to follow closely the budget-making in the executive department. I, for one, would not be willing to admit defeat on the proposition of the legislative budget without exploring thoroughly what steps could be taken to make the procedure work better. this end, I believe there is some merit in a greater consolidation of appropriation bills, even if the consolidation does not go as far as a single bill.

To

A move in that direction would simplify the making of a legislative budget. In that event, the time for reporting a budget could well be shifted to a later date, because the dead line need not be set at any appreciable time before the consideration of appropriations in the House.

Concerning the size of the budget committee, it is evident from the experience to date that a committee consisting of the full membership of the revenue-raising and appropriating committees of both houses, totaling 102 members, is too large to operate effectively. Furthermore, it is an unbalanced representation of the two Houses, since the House representation consists of 68 members as against 34 members from the Senate. This size, incidentally, is larger than was originally contemplated because, except for the Senate Finance Committee, each of the committees was made larger than was originally provided in the process of enacting the reorganization bill. Section 138 of the act does specifically authorize the use of subcommittees from each of the four committees involved; but it may be desirable to provide specifically for a smaller size budget committee, of about five members for each of the four standing committees involved.