It does seem fair, however, to point out that when one committee receives approximately one-third of the bills there exists, at least partially, some kind of jurisdictional maladjustment.

4. It is contemplated that the number of so-called private claims bills coming to Congress will undoubtedly be reduced materially by the operation of the Federal Tort Claims Act. We do not yet have conclusive evidence as to the extent to which these Private Tort Claims bills will be reduced, but we may perhaps safely conclude that in the normal course of events, the operation of the act will reduce the number of bills in this category.

It is possible that at some future date, if the number of so-called claims bills sent to the Senate is not materially reduced, it might be necessary to study the possibility of either transferring a larger jurisdiction to the courts or of establishing a separate claims committee in the Senate.

5. As an immediate step to reduce the number of private claims bills and to eliminate wasted time spent in considering bills which have no chance of passage, it is recommended that your committee consider the possibility of preparing for Senate adoption such rules as would preclude the introduction of private claims bills in certain categories.

The staff of the Committee on the Judiciary some time ago transmitted to the staff of this committee a copy of the rules which have been adopted by the Claims Subcommittee of the House Judiciary. These rules preclude the introduction of bills which have been the subject of Presidential veto (unless substantial new evidence has been introduced) and preclude the introduction of bills which have been the subject of previous adverse committee reports (unless new evidence is introduced) and preclude the introduction of bills relating to an event which occurred over a specified number of years ago. The defect in having these rules adopted at the committee level, however, is that as a practical matter the committee is then subjected to appeals from proponents of bills falling into these categories. The adoption of a set of rules of this character by the Senate itself, would actually bar the introduction of bills of this nature and would be much more desirable. It also would tend to decrease the number of claims bills particularly those which are unlikely to pass in any event.

6. I understand it is presently contemplated that your committee will have created in its jurisdiction an investigational subcommittee to handle matters of investigation for all of the standing committees. This move is in accord with with the recommendation previously made by me and I should like to observe that this appears to be a business-like step since most of the standing committees, including the Judiciary Committee, are unequipped to conduct investigations. I merely wish to add for the record at this point that it should be contemplated that this new subcommittee of yours would also undertake such investigations as may be necessitated in the cases of contested nominations. In the Judiciary Committee we have a large volume of nominations and occasionally it appears desirable to make some investigation but because of our lack of investigative personnel, our committee finds it very difficult to make such an investigation. Your new group should be empowered to act for the standing committees with respect to nomination investigations as well as legislative investigations. Of the 13 categories assigned to the Committee on the Judiciary under the terms of Public Law 601, I should like to suggest the possibility of transferring jurisdiction to some committee with a smaller jurisdiction of item No. 8, "Holidays and celebrations."

7. As a purely mechanical problem the Committee on the Judiciary has experienced the same difficulty which I understand almost all of the standing committees have experienced, namely, a great conflict in a number of other meetings scheduled for our membership. The Judiciary Committee meets on a regularly assigned, regularly announced day but apparently that does not preclude other meetings being conducted at the same time and invariably this has the effect of decreasing our attendance. I feel that with a reduced membership it is absolutely imperative that there be no conflicting meetings and I am sure that this is true of every standing committee.

I strongly urge your committee to prepare a Senate rule which would require that all scheduling of meetings be cleared with one central office which probably should be the Office of the Secretary of the Senate whose duty it would then be to withhold permission from any meetings which would be scheduled at a conflicting time. I believe that in the absence of such a rule, we will continue to encounter the confusion which has consistently resulted in the first session of the Eightieth Congress from the conflicting scheduling of meetings.

8. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, section 133 (d) states that "No measure or recommendation shall be reported from any such committee unless a majority of the committee were actually present." This provision apparently precludes any proxy voting--at least up to the point where a majority of a committee are present. It is my understanding that almost all of the standing committees have experienced the same difficulty which the Judiciary Committee has in connection with securing an attendance of a majority of the members, and, consequently, I respectfully recommend that your committee explore the possibility of some alternative procedure which would permit the standing committees to report out legislation with less than a majority of the committee present. Probably this could be accomplished by a specific process authorized by individual members with respect to individual specified bills. A similar latitude should be allowed to the committee with respect to nominations.

The CHAIRMAN. Also without objection, there will be inserted in the record a statement from Senator C. Douglass Buck, Chairman of the Senate District of Columbia Committee.

(The statement above referred to is as follows:)

Hon. GEORGE D. AIKEN,

UNITED STATES SENATE, Washington, D. C., February 3, 1948.

Chairman, Senate Committee on Expenditures in

the Executive Departments, United States Senate.

MY DEAR SENATOR: I was unable to get to the meeting this afternoon of the Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. However, nothing is lost, as I have few, if any, worth while recommendations to make of amendments to the Legislative Reorganization Act.

I would say, however, it does seem to me that if during the first 2 months of a session, the Senate met not more than twice a week, it would be a great help to committee work. Also, it might be well to give consideration to limiting the services of each Member to one committee, unless it be the District of Columbia Committee, and the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. Whatever is done about committee assignments, the fact remains that there is a certain amount of work to be done, and only a certain number of Senators to do it. Speaking for myself, since this session began, there has been more conflict in committee meetings than in previous years.

Very truly yours,

C. D. BUCK.

The CHAIRMAN. Also without objection, there will be inserted in the record a statement from Senator Chan Gurney, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

(The statement above referred to is as follows:)

Hon. GEORGE D. AIKEN,

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, January 29, 1948.

Chairman, Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

To me,

MY DEAR SENATOR AIKEN: The Legislative Reoganization Act of 1946 has had a full session of Congress in which to show its strength and its weaknesses. as a committee chairman, obliged in the operation of the committee and in the conduct of meetings to conform to the act, certain faults in the legislation have become obvious.

First, it is virtually impossible to get the quorum for meetings as presently required. The present figure of five is too high. Although the membership of the Armed Services Committee is 13, the normal absences due to illness, travel, other committee assignments, necessary work for the constituency, etc., have consistently made difficult the assembling of a quorum. On many occasions during the past year, with only three or four present, our meetings had to adjourn for want of a quorum. This was so even though on occasions I made personal telephone appeals to absent members.

To remedy this difficulty, my suggestion is that the quorum for starting a meeting should be reduced to four, or even to three members of the committee.

Second, in the conduct of a meeting, the requirement of seven members present and voting in order to report a bill is a great hindrance to the facile handling of legislation. I do agree that a majority of the committee should know about, and concur in, any legislation to be reported. Experience has proved, however, that we must make an alteration in this present demand of his physical presence before we can record a member's opinion. Many is the meeting I have seen disintegrate because seven Senators couldn't be found, and often, too, is the time when four, five, or six Senators have waited an hour or longer for the necessary quorum in order to transact business.

For this problem I offer the simple solution of the proxy. It is agreed that, as once used in committees, the proxy vote was an evil, but it seems to me reasonable to permit its use for specific purposes. I do not believe that its use should be so free as to allow it to be prepared ahead of time and used when a member is ill or out of city. Rather, I visualize it only as a means of saving the member a trip to the committee room when urgent business elsewhere in the city complicates his day. If so used, I believe it would be a great help to efficient committee functioning.

I presume that Senator Bridges, as chairman of the Appropriations Committee, will remark about the shortcomings of section 138, concerning the legislative budget, so my remarks concerning that section are made only as one member of the Appropriations Committee. To me it seems necessary that the deadline date of February 15 for submission of the budget be either eliminated or set back to a day many weeks later in the session. I say this because I think that our experiences of today and of last year conclusively prove the impossibility of being ready with the report by February 15 as is now required.

I make these recommendations only with the thought that when considered together with all of the other suggestions you will receive, your committee may discover a solution to improve a certain aspect of the operation of the Senate. Sincerely yours,

CHAN GURNEY,

Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Styles Bridges of the Senate Appropriations Committee was expected to testify this morning, but was prevented from doing so by illness.

I also have a statement here from Congressman Kefauver, but it is possible that Congressman Kefauver may appear before this committee, along with a few remaining witnesses, in the near future. We shall delay inserting his statement in the record until we find whether it is possible for him to appear personally or not.

The session is now adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 11:50 o'clock a. m., Wednesday, February 25, 1948, the committee adjourned.)

(Subsequently, it was decided to hold no further hearings due to the pressure of other congressional business.)

(The statement submitted by Senator Styles Bridges, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee is as follows:)

STATEMENT OF HON. STYLES BRIDGES, CHAIRMAN, SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON EXPENDITURES IN THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS

STRENGTHENING THE FISCAL CONTROLS OF THE CONGRESS

One of the most important objectives of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 was to strengthen the fiscal controls of the Congress. Advocates of the reorganization proposal stressed the fact that Congress would, for the first time, establish a budget or expenditure ceiling that would prevent the executive agencies from free and untrammeled spending of the appropriations placed at their disposal. It was thought that such a ceiling on expenditures could rather easily be determined by the Congress within the first 6 weeks of the session and that a recommendation could be made to the two Houses in the form of a resolution that, when enacted, would set the pattern of spending for the succeeding fiscal year.

PROPOSAL FOR A LEGISLATIVE BUDGET

The Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress was impressed by the number of witnesses who expressed themselves forcibly on this point and concluded that "primary responsibility rests with Congress to improve legislative control over governmental expenditures and that means must be provided to permit a closer scrutiny of them, not only by the committees charged with this duty, but also by the individual Members and Congress itself."

The purport of the recommendation that revenues and expenditures be matched is that a "ceiling" would be placed on estimated expenditures when estimated revenues were insufficient to support a larger spending program and that only the specific action of Congress would permit the creation of additional public debt when revenues were insufficient and when it was decided that additional expenditures were needed.

AMENDMENTS TO APPROPRIATIONS ACTS

In addition to the section providing for a Legislative Budget, the new act also provided for a rather comprehensive change in the making of amendments to appropriations bills. Section 103 of the act provides that (1) all general appropriations bills shall be referred to the Committee on Appropriations and no amendments shall be received to such bills which would increase an appropriation already contained in a bill or add a new appropriation unless to carry out an existing law, treaty, or act, or unless moved by direction of a standing or select committee of the Senate, or unless proposed in pursuance of an estimate submitted in accordance with law; (2) the Appropriations Committee is prohibited from reporting an appropriation bill containing amendments which propose new or general legislation or which impose a restriction on the expenditure of the funds appropriated which are not in accordance with law or hinge on a contingency, and a point of order against a bill so submitted will result in its being recommitted to the Appropriations Committee; (3) any amendments to general appropriations bills properly moved, if increasing the appropriation, at least one day before they are considered, shall be referred to the Appropriations Committee; (4) no legislation not germane to any general appropriation bill shall be considered by the Senate; (5) no amendment providing for a private claim shall be considered in any general appropriation bill unless to carry out a provision of existing law or a treaty stipulation; (6) three members of the following committees shall be ex-officio members of the Committee on Appropriations when considering appropriations for the purposes indicated in parentheses: Committee on Agriculture and Forestry (Department of Agriculture); Committee on Post Office and Civil Service (Post Office Department); Committee on Armed Services (Department of War and Department of the Navy); Committee on the District of Columbia (District of Columbia); Committee on Public Works (Rivers and Harbors); Committee on Foreign Relations (Diplomatic and Consular Service). At least one member of each such committee shall be appointed to the conference committee in connection with any of the bills containing the appropriations for the departments noted; and (7) when a point of order is made against any restriction on the expenditure of funds appropriated in any general appropriations bill on the ground that the restriction violates this rule, the rule should be construed strictly, and in case of doubt, in favor of the point of order.

RESTRICTIONS AND DUTIES IN CONNECTION WITH APPROPRIATIONS

The new Act also provides in section 139 two restrictions and two new duties upon the Appropriations Committees of both Houses. In the first category, it is provided that there should be a 3-day period between the actual reporting of an appropriations measure and its consideration by either House and that the appropriations measures cannot provide for reappropriation of unexpended balances except in the case of public works on which work has actually commenced. In the second category, the Appropriations Committees, acting jointly, were directed to "develop a standard appropriations classification schedule which will clearly define in concise and uniform accounts the subtotals of appropriations asked for by agencies in the executive branch of the Government." Likewise, the Appropriations Committees were directed to make a study of existing permanent appropriations and the disposition and control of funds arising from sales of Government property or services in the executive branch. In the first instance, the committees are to determine which permanent appropriations can be eliminated. The second duty involves a recommendation to the two Houses of a uniform system of control over such funds as are received.

APPRAISAL OF THE VARIOUS FISCAL PROVISIONS

Only one year of operation under the Reorganization Act is too short a period for positive declaration regarding the exactments or demerits of most of these provisions. By and large, I am satisfied that the provisions regarding amendments to appropriations measures should be continued in their present form if the Congress is to maintain good order in its financial house. The attachment of "riders", that is, legislation not pertinent to appropriations, is a practice that should not be resumed and the payment of private claims in appropriations measures is likewise an undesirable method of meeting the Government's obligations to its citizens.

The duties imposed by the act on the Appropriations Committees are continuing ones and are of the nature that require looking to a more fundamental change in our manner of granting appropriations and accounting for the financial actions of the executive branch. I am not prepared at this time to evaluate the effectiveness of such provisions, and I prefer, therefore, that there be no change until we have had a further opportunity to work out the complete details of a uniform classification of accounts and a system for controlling sales of Government property and services.

I am prepared, however, to discuss with you the legislative budget provisions which require (1) an estimate of total Federal receipts for the fiscal year; (2) an estimate of total Federal expenditures for the fiscal year; (3) a maximum amount of appropriations for expenditure in the fiscal year, including a reserve for deficiencies; and (4) a recommendation concerning the reduction of the Federal debt if there will be an excess of receipts, or a recommendation for an increase in the public debt if expenditures will exceed receipts.

From the standpoint of the appropriations procedure, the experience that we had last year with the legislative budget clearly indicates that there is no assurance that appropriation reductions will necessarily result in the desired expenditure cuts. To be specific, the six billions of recommended expenditure reduction for 1948, although never finally acted upon by the Congress, was predicated on a 5.2-billion-dollar reduction in appropriations. The actual reduction in all appropriations effected by the Eightieth Congress, first session, was slightly in excess of 3.1 billions. The President's August budget review, however, showed a revision in expenditures for the fiscal year 1948 of slightly better than one-half billion dollars, thus indicating that appropriations reductions affected expenditures reductions in a ratio of 1 to 6; that is, for every dollar of appropriations reduction, only about 163 cents expenditure reduction resulted. The answer to this situation, of course, lies in the fact that the executive branch generally has at its disposal large sums from previous years' appropriations available for expenditure. It was a simple matter for the agencies to accelerate spending from these accumulations of previously unused funds.

It is with these observations in mind that I respectfully suggest the desirability of directing your energies toward strengthening the legislative budget provision of the Reorganization Act so that Congress will be better able to discharge its fiscal responsibilities.

In the first place, your committee might well consider a reduction in the size of the present 102-member Joint Committee on the Legislative Budget, since, in actual practice, the size of the present committee is too unwieldy and it has been found necessary to appoint a smaller subcommittee of 20 members to do the spadework. Such a grouping has worked admirably over the years in the case of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation. Secondly, it might be well to consider the advisability of amending section 138 of the act so as to provide for a later reporting date for the legislative budget which would give the committee an opportunity to scrutinize more thoroughly the needs of the executive branch. Finally, it might be helpful for the joint committee to be provided with a modest staff which would have no other duty than to study continuously the relationship of appropriations, expenditures, and revenues and to make appropriate recommendations regarding a budget ceiling to the joint committee for its consideration.

This should not be interpreted, however, as indicating that the present Joint Committee on the Legislative Budget, of which I have the honor to be chairman, will not now perform its duties as required by section 138.