They looked at the regular Foreign Service of the Department of State they looked at the personnel authorities of the U.S. Information Agency, and they looked at the personnel authorities of the Agency for International Development, as well as those of other U.S. Government agencies operating abroad.

MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS

Their major recommendation was that the Foreign Service of the State Department-the regular U.S. Foreign Service should be continued approximately as it is. They made a number of detailed recommendations for improvement, but no major overhaul. That provided for Foreign Service officers, Foreign Service Reserve officers, and for Foreign Service Staff officers.

Then they said the USIA should have a similar personnel system and that group should be Foreign Information officers, Foreign Information Reserve officers, and Foreign Information Staff officers, and they should be set up on a parallel basis with similar terms and conditions of employment, similar retirement and pay arrangements, and so on, as the regular Foreign Service.

Thirdly, that the Agency for International Development should have authority to establish a Foreign Development Officer Corps. We would have Foreign Development officers, Foreign Development Reserve officers, and Foreign Development Staff officers.

Now they did not think in our case-I don't know the details on the USIA-they did not think in our case of taking everybody who now works for AID and incorporating them into this new permanent service. They thought instead of a core group, essentially the managers of our present system, the mission directors, the deputies, and the top program officers and their corresponding people here in Washington, so that it would be substantially less than half of the present group working for AID who would come into this new pattern.

But that core group would essentially be converted into a career force which we do not really have today. This was the Herter Committee's essential recommendations, as far as we are concerned.

MEANING OF INTEGRATED FAMILY OF FOREIGN PERSONNEL SYSTEM

Since the Foreign Service of the State Department, the Foreign Service of the U.S. Information Agency, and the Foreign Service of the Development Agency would all be set up, according to their recommendations, on the basis of parallel terms and conditions of employment that is what they meant by this phrase "integrated family of foreign personnel services."

That group of recommendations, as indicated in my statement, is being studied in the executive branch and there are a number of very important complicated issues connected with it.

I do not know what views the Secretary and the President will come to as and when they make any recommendations based on that report. That is the basic idea that they had.

Is that clear, sir?

Senator ALLOTT. That is clear enough.

DURATION OF AMERICAN AID

Senator COTTON. May I interpolate just one question?

Is it your own belief that a system of American foreign aid or mutual assistance as an international activity in which this country participates as a definite practice is going to be permanent, is going to last beyond the lifetime of the younger people in this generation?

Mr. BELL. No, sir; I do not think so. I do not think it will be permanent in that sense but that does not answer the question whether there should be a regular career system for employment. We do have a career system in the Army but the Army changes in size very greatly from time to time.

Senator COTTON. But the Army is perpetual.

Mr. BELL. Maybe it is perpetual, maybe it is not. In any event, it multiplies in numbers at various times and is reduced sharply at various times, but the career system is flexible enough to adapt to those circumstances.

The career system that the Herter Committee was talking about for the Agency for International Development would obviously have to be flexible enough not only to deal with changes in size of the program but for termination of the program, because it seems to me our objective in this effort is to terminate everywhere.

I don't know how soon it is going to happen. I don't think it will happen for 10, 15, 20 years perhaps, but it certainly will terminate in many places before then and it may terminate completely before then. The personnel system that is used must be compatible with the possibility of terminating any part or all of the program at any time. This is clearly one of the points that is being considered by the Secretary and the President. Is it worth while to develop a career system for a program which may not last too long?

POSSIBILITY OF PERMANENT AGENCY

Senator ELLENDER. Is it not a fact that the advocates of the system are saying in effect that the Information Service and AID should be made permanent agencies? We have many people who think that way. If this system is adopted it will be the foot in the door.

I do not care how limited it may be, once it is established it will be more or less permanent. I, for one, do not want to see that.

Mr. BELL. I didn't mean to argue the merits, Senator, because the administration position has not been reached. The President's position has not been reached, so I obviously have no basis for supporting any recommendations here today because they haven't been made.

Senator ELLENDER. But your statement that this program may go on for 10 or 20 years and so forth

Mr. BELL. In some countries and to some degree; yes, sir. It seems to me that is a very likely prospect.

Senator ELLENDER. A very likely prospect? Why should it continue for that period?

ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS

Mr. BELL. In Latin America, sir, we are embarking on something that was intended to take 10 years, the Alliance for Progress. I do not consider that means we will be working with equal intensity in every country. In a number of cases in Latin America I would expect

our involvement will be very brief. In others, I think it may very well be 10 years.

Senator ELLENDER. If our aid program were converted to loans instead of grants, I am sure we could get out sooner.

Mr. BELL. As you know, sir, we have converted very heavily from grants to loans in the last 2 or 3 years and we are in the process of doing it further.

AID TO NIGERIA

Senator ELLENDER. That is true, but the Agency still permits itself to be drawn into financing a program for 5 years or more. Take Nigeria, for example, which I discussed with you the other day. We have promised aid amounting to $225 million and it probably will be $300 million for the next 5 years. I think it is silly to make such a promise. It ought to be revoked at once.

I do not want to go into the details now, but I expect to when the appropriation for Nigeria is considered. I think it is just silly for us to make these commitments. Today we are giving aid to certain countries because of promises we made 4 or 5 years ago.

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir; that is quite right.

Senator ELLENDER. And with no legal sanction but just because somebody in the State Department or somebody in your AgencyMr. BELL. Or the President, sir.

Senator ELLENDER. I believe this may be outside the scope of the President's authority.

Mr. BELL. Well, it would have to be looked at on a case-by-case basis.

U.S. COMMITMENT TO NIGERIA

Senator ELLENDER. Will you insert in the record at this point the legal basis for the Nigerian commitment?

Mr. BELL. I will be glad to do that, sir. (The information referred to follows:)

LEGAL BASIS FOR THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO THE FEDERATION OF NIGERIA OF NOVEMBER 24, 1961

The subject commitment was made to the Government of the Federation of Nigeria by letter from the Secretary of State to the Honorable Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Prime Minister of the Federation of Nigeria pursuant to authorization of the President. The commitment was in support of the provisional development plan of the Government of Nigeria, and expressly provided that "assistance beyond the current fiscal year is subject to the appropriation of funds by the U.S. Congress."

The capacity of the United States as an independent sovereign nation to enter into an agreement such as that involved in the subject commitment cannot be doubted. As stated by Mr. Justice Sutherland in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. (299 U.S. 304, 81 L. Ed. 255 (1946)):

"It results that the investment of the Federal Government with the power of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution *** As a member of the family of nations, the right and power of the United States in that field are equal to the right and power of the other members of the international family. Otherwise, the United States is not completely sovereign. The power to acquire territory by discovery and occupation [cases cited], the power to expel undesirable aliens [cases cited], the power to make such international agreements as do not constitute treaties in the constitutional sense (B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 600, 601, 56 L. Ed. 894, 910, 911) none of which is expressly affirmed by the Constitution, nevertheless exist as inherently inseparable from the concept of nationality" (p. 318). [Emphasis supplied.]

Just as the capacity of the United States to enter into an agreement with the Government of Nigeria is beyond question, it is clear that the President is the one

to act for the United States and that his authority to act is derived from the Constitution (art. II, secs. 1 and 2). In this connection the Supreme Court in the Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. case went on to say:

"Not only, as we have shown, is the Federal power over external affairs in origin and essential character different from that over internal affairs, but participation in the exercise of the power is significantly limited. In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate, and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the Nation.

"It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the Federal Government in the field of international relations a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution." While the Supreme Court has several times, as stated in United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp., confirmed the power of the President to enter into agreements with foreign governments without express legislative authority (United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 86 L. Ed. 796 (1941), United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 81 L. Ed. 1132 (1936)), there was in fact in both the Curtiss-Wright case and in B. Altman v. United States, cited in the Curtiss-Wright decision, express statutory authorization for the agreements and other Presidential actions involved in those cases. Likewise, with regard to the Nigeria commitment, section 635(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended provides:

"The President may make loans, advances, and grants to, make and perform agreements and contracts with, or enter into other transactions with, any individual, corporation, or other body of persons, friendly government or government agency, whether within or without the United States, and international organizations in furtherance of the purposes and within the limitations of this

act.

Further, section 202(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 confers upon the President express authority to make commitments of the type under discussion. Section 202(b) provides as follows:

"Whenever the President determines that it is important to the advancement of U.S. interests and necessary in order to further the purposes of this title, and in recognition of the need for reasonable advance assurances in the interest of orderly and effective execution of long-term plans and programs of development assistance, he is authorized to enter into agreements committing, under the terms and conditions of this title, funds authorized to be appropriated under this title, subject only to the annual appropriations of such funds."

In connection with this section, the managers on the part of the House of the committee of conference on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (H.R. 1088, 87th Cong. 1st. sess.), state as follows:

"The compromise language agreed to by the committee of conference provides recognition by the Congress of the importance of making long-range commitments to the less developed countries as a means of facilitating their economic development while eliminating the necessity for Treasury borrowing to finance such long-range commitments. It is not intended to imply the absence of similar authority under other categories of aid" (p. 48).

To the extent the Nigerian commitment relates to development grant and supporting assistance funds, this statement is express congressional recognition of the President's authority to make such a commitment.

This statement must, in addition, be considered a recognition by Congress of the President's authority to make similar commitments with respect to development loan funds without expressly invoking the authority of section 202(b). The view that the President may, under other categories of aid, commit future years' funds subject only to the appropriation of those funds by Congress, must rest either upon the President's constitutional authority referred to in the CurtissWright and other cases cited above, or must rest on the authority of section 635(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act. If the President's constitutional authority is relied upon, that authority must extend to development loan funds as well as other categories of aid, since the enactment of section 202(b) could not supersede powers conferred upon the President by the Constitution. If on the other hand, section 635(b) is relied upon as the source of the President's authority to commit other categories of funds, that authority extends, by its terms, to agreements and

transactions "in furtherance of the purposes *** of this act," without limitation, including agreements in furtherance of the purposes of the development loan chapter of the act as well as the agreements under other assistance categories. Thus, it appears that section 202(b) does not represent a grant of authority to the President, which he did not otherwise have. Rather, it represents, as stated in the conference report, express recognition by Congress of the importance of longrange commitments to less developed countries as a means of facilitating their development. Viewed in this, its proper perspective, section 202(b) is not only an important provision of the Foreign Assistance Act, but also represents congressional recognition of the authority of the President, apart from that section, to enter into commitments such as the commitment to the Government of Nigeria. Finally, it is pointed out that the commitment to the Government of Nigeria in no way infringes upon the perogatives of Congress with respect to the control of Federal funds. The commitment of the United States to provide funds to Nigeria is expressly subject to the appropriation of funds for this purpose by the Congress.

PERMANENT STATUS PERSONNEL

Senator MCGEE. But it is your judgment, is it, Mr. Bell, that by setting up a permanent status more or less for personnel, that this would be only in the context of the simple fact that we were going to have oversea operations whether it be a State Department or whether it be other kinds of operations as long as the world remains round, and that the flexibility that is there will enable you to determine what numbers of those personnel will be strictly in what we now call foreign aid program, that could be adjusted either upward or downward as the times demand.

This does not, in other words, guarantee this in order to keep these people employed that you are going to keep inventing economic development operations overseas?

HERTER COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS

Mr. BELL. I was not really trying to state my own view but describe what the Herter Committee recommended-a committee of private citizens, very experienced and very distinguished-that there be a distinguishable corps of career service, limited in the number I have indicated, for the developmental kind of things we do, loans, technical assistance programs, and so on.

Obviously, any such program that was set up would have to have exactly the flexibility in it that you are describing so that we may change our programs, and obviously should change them very rapidly, depending on the circumstances in the countries where we work. The Herter Committee's feeling was, as I indicated in response to an earlier question, that the establishment of a career service is an entirely different thing from saying how many people you need at a particular time to carry out your program.

Whether that is so or not is obviously a matter to be debated if and when the recommendations came up.

Senator MCGEE. You drew the analogy with the military that would be more valid than it struck me at the beginning, military tactics and units change as your targets change around the world. We had a lot of cavalry, that dropped out and it was replaced. The permanence of their status in terms of careers is the important thing.

RESERVE PERSONNEL

Mr. BELL. Furthermore, the military uses, as the State Department does, a system of Regular officers and a system of Reserve officers.