about midnight, in feveral places at the fame time. Thus, near a third of that beautiful city was reduced to afhes, and nothing lefs than the courage and activity of the troops, as well as of the failors who were difpatched from the fleet, could have preferved any part of the remainder. Many of the wretches who were, as it is faid, concerned in this atrocious bufinefs, being detected, experienced a fummary juftice, and were precipitated by the fury of the foldiers into thofe flames which they had themselves kindled. The general perceiving that no attempt could be made on the enemy upon the fide of New-York, which would not be attended with great danger, without affording any equal profpect of fuccefs, determined at length upon a plan of operation, which would either oblige them to quit their prefent ftrong fituation, or render their perfeverance in holding it extremely dangerous. For this purpose, the greater part of the oa. 12. army being embarked in flat boats and other fmall craft proper for the fervice, paffed fuccefsfully through the dangerous navigation of Hell Gate, which forms a communication between the Eaft river and the found, and landed on Frog's Neck, near the town of Weft Chefter, which lies on that part of the continent belonging to New-York, upon the fide of Connecticut. Earl Percy, with two brigades of British troops, and one of Heffian, continued in the lines near Harlem to cover New-York. Though this movement was highly judicious in the prefent exact state of things, it feems as if it would have been extremely dangerous if General Washington had commanded a veteran army on whofe performance he could rely, and that the corps under Lord Percy would in that cafe have been in great danger. It is, however, to be obferved, that the powerful fleet which furrounded that narrow island, would have afforded fhelter and protection in almoft any fituation to which they could have been reduced. This fleet was of infinite fervice in all the operations of the campaign. In this the inferiority of the provincials was most felt, being totally deftitute of any force of that nature. The army was detained for fome days at Frog's Neck, waiting for the arrival of the provifions and ftores, and of a reinforcement which was drawn from Staten Inland. They then proceeded through Pelham's Manor to New Rochelle, which lies on the coaft of the Sound, as that channel is called, which feparates the continent from Long Island. At this place they were joined by the greater part of a regiment of light horfe from Ireland, one of the tranfports having been taken in the paffage. They were alfo joined by the fecond divifion of Heffians under General Knyphaufen, with a regiment of Waldeckers, both of which had arrived at New-York fince the departure of the army from thence. The first object of this expedition was to cut off the communications between Washington and the eastern colonies; and then, if this measure did not bring him to an engagement, to enclofe him on all fides in his faftneffes on the north end of York Idland. The King's troops troops were now mafters of the lower road to Connecticut and Bofton; but to gain the upper, it was neceffary to advance to the high grounds called the White Plains; a rough, ftony, and mountainous traft; which, however, is only part of the afcent, to a country ftill higher, rougher, and more diffi. cult. Upon the departure of the army to the higher country, it was deemed neceffary to leave the fecond divifion of Heffians, with the Waldeck regiment, at New Rochelle, as well to preferve the communications, as to fecure the fupplies of provifions and neceffaries that were to arrive at that port. Indeed the army was now fo powerful, that it was enabled to fupport every service. General Washington was not in attentive to the danger of his a. tion. He faw, that if he continued where he was, he would at length be compelled to commit the whole fortune of the war, and the fafety of all the colonies to the hazard of a general engagement; a decifion, of which he had every caufe to apprehend the event, and in which a defeat would be final, as there could fcarcely be a poffibility of retreat. His army likewife, which had been difheartened by their late misfortunes, was then much reduced by fickness, which the feverity of the fervices, indif. ferent quarters, infufficient cloathing, the want of falt and other neceffaries, joined to a flovenlinefs generally prevalent in America, had rendered general, and very fatal in his camp. A grand movement was accordingly made, by which the army was formed into a line of ímall, detached, and entrenched VOL. XIX. camps, which occupied every height and ftrong ground from Va lentine's Hill, not far from Kingf bridge, on the right, to the White Plains, and the upper road to Connecticut, on the left. In this pofition they faced the whole line of march of the King's troops at a moderate diftance, the deep river Brunx covering their front, and, the North river at fome diftance in their rear, whilft the open ground to the laft afforded a fecure paffage for their flores and baggage to the upper country. A garrifon was left for the protection of Fort Washington,. the lines of Harlem and Kingf bridge. In this, fituation of the enemy, General Howe thought it neceffary to proceed with great circum-] fpection. The progrefs was flow. the march of the army clofe, the encampments compact, and well guarded with artillery, and the moft foldier-like caution ufed in every refpect. This did not reftrain the enemy from fending parties over the Brunx to impede their, march, which occafioned feveral fkirmishes, in which the royal army were generally fuccefsful. Upon the approach of the army to the White Plains, the enemy quitted their detached camps along the Brunx, and joining their left, took a ftrong ground of encampment before the British on the former. Every thing being prepa- 28th. red for bringing the enemy to action, the army marched early in the morning in two columns towards the White Plains, the left being commanded by General Heifter. Before noon, all the enemy's advanced parties being drove back to their works by the light infantry and Heffian Chaffeurs, the [*M] army army formed, with the right upon the road from Mamoroneck, at about a mile's distance from their centre, and the left to the Brunx, at about the fame distance from the right flank of their entrenchments. A body of the enemy poffeffed an advantageous ground, that was separated from their right flank by the Brunx, and which alfo, by its windings, covered that corps in front from the left of our army. As this poft would have been of great confequence in attacking that flank of the entrenchments, Brigadier General Leflie, with the fecond brigade of British troops, the Heffian grenadiers under Colonel Donop, and a battalion of that corps, were ordered to diflodge the enemy. Previous to their attack, Colonel Ralle, who commanded a brigade of Heffians on the left, had paffed the Brunx, and gained a poft, which enabled him to annoy the enemy's flank, we they were engaged with the other forces in front. Though the paffage of the river was difficult, it was performed with the greatest fpirit, and the 28th and 35th regiments, being the firft that paffed, formed with thể greatest steadiness, under the enemy's fire on the oppofite fide; they then afcended a iteep hill, in defiance of all oppofition, and rufhing on the enemy, foon routed, and drove them from their works. No lefs alacrity was fhewn by the other troops in fupporting thefe two regiments. The gaining of this important poft took up a confiderable time, which was prolonged by the enemy's ftill fupporting a broken and fcattered engagement, in defence of the adjoining walls and hedges. In the evening, the Heffian grenadiers were ordered forward upon the heights within cannot fhot of the entrenchments, the 2d brigade of British formed in their rear, and the two Heffian brigades, on the left of the fecond. The right and centre of the army did not remove from the ground upon which they had formed. In that pofition the whole army lay upon their arms during the night, with a full intention, and in the highest expectation, of attacking the enemy's camp next morning. It was perceived in the morning that the enemy had drawn back their encampment in the night, and had greatly ftrengthened their lines by additional works. Upon this account the attack was deferred, and it was thought necessary to wait for the arrival of the 4th brigade, and of two battalions of the 6th, which had been left with Lord Percy at New-York. Upon the arrival of thefe troops, the neceflary difpofitions were made in the evening, for attacking the enemy early on the last of October; but an extreme wet night and morning prevented this defign from being carried into execution. In the mean time, General Washington had not the fmallest intention of venturing an engagement, whilft there was a poffibility of its being avoided. He knew that delay was in fome fort victory to him. That small actions, which could not in the least affect the public fafety, would more effectually train his men to fervice, and inure them to danger, than a general action, which might in one day decide their own, and the fate of America. It must be acknowledged, that in the courfe of this campaign, and more particularly in this part of it, he fully performed the part of no mean commander. The American accounts fay, that upon our covering four or five batteries with a powerful artillery, preparatory to an attack, together with the General's knowledge that by turning his camp, the British might become poffefied of hills at his back which totally commanded it, he found it neceffary to change his pofition. He accordingly quit ted his camp on the night of the 1ft of November, and took higher ground towards the North Caftle district, having first fet fire to the town or village of White Plains, as well as to all the houfes and forage near the lines. The British army on the next day took poffef. fiou of their entrenchment. heavy artillery; and it was by no means of a fufficient extent for any other purpose than the ftrengthening of lines. But the fituation was extremely ftrong, and the approaches difficult. The army having Nov. 13th. returned flowly by the North River, encamped on the heights of Fordham, at a moderate diftance from King's-Bridge, with that river on its right, and the Brunx on the left. Every thing being prepared for attacking the Fort, and the commander, Colo nel Magaw, refufing a fummons to furrender, and declaring he would defend it to the laft extremity, a general affault was determined upon, as faving the time that would be loft in regular approaches. The garrifon confifted of near 3000 men, and the ftrong grounds round the Fort were covered 16th. with lines and works. Four attacks were made at the fame time. The firft, on the north fide, was conducted by General Knyphaufen, at the head of two columns of Heffians and Waldeckers. The fecond, on the eaft, was led on by Brigadier General Matthew, at the head of the 1st and 2d bat talions of light infantry, and two battalions of guards, fupported by Lord Cornwallis with the ft and 2d battalions of grenadiers, and the 33d regiment. Thefe forces General Howe seeing that the enemy could not be enticed to an engagement, and that the nature of the country did not admit of their being forced to it, determined not to lofe time in a fruitlefs purfuit, and to take this opportunity of driving them out of their frong holds in York Island; an operation which their army could not now poffibly prevent. For this purpofe, General Knyphaufen croffed the country from New Rochelle, and having taken poffef fion of King's Bridge without oppofition, entered York-Ifland, and took his ftation to the north of Fort Washington, to which the ene-croffed the Eaft River in flat boats, my had retired at his approach. Fort Washington lay on the weft fide of New York liland, not far from King's Bridge, near Jeffery's Hook, and almoft facing Fort Lee on the Jerfey fide, from which it was feparated by the North River. This work, though not contemptible, was not fufficient to refift and as the enemy's works there extended the breadth of the ifland, redoubts and batteries were erected on the oppofite fhore, as well to cover the landing of the troops, as to annoy thofe works which were near the water. The third attack, which was principally intended as a feint to distract the enemy, was [M] 2 con conducted by Lt. Colonel Sterling, with the 42d regiment, who paffed the East River lower down, between the zd and 4th attacks, The laft attack was made by Lord Percy, with the corps which he command. ed on the fouth of the island. All the attacks were fupported with a numerous, powerful, and well served artillery. The Hefans under Gen. Knyphaufen had a thick wood to pafs, where the enemy were very advantageously pofted, and a warm engagement was continued for a confiderable time, in which the former were much expofed, and be haved with great firmnefs and bravery. In the mean time the light infantry landed, and were expofed both before and after to a very brisk and continual fire from the enemy, who were themfelves covered by the rocks and trees among which they were polled. The former, however, with their ufual alertness and activity, extricated themselves by clambering up a very fteep and rough mountain, when they foon difperfed the enemy, and made way for the landing of the reft of the troops without oppofition. During thefe tranfactions, Lord Percy having carried an advanced work on his fide, Col. Sterling was ordered to attempt a landing, and two battalions of the 2d brigade to fupport him. This fervice was effected by the Colonel with great bravery. He advanced his boats through a very heavy fire, which they bore with the greatest firmness and perfeverance, and forcing his way up a fteep height, gained the fummit, and took 170 prifoners, notwithstanding a bold and good defence made by the enemy. In the mean time Colonel Ralfe, who led the right column of General Knyphaufen's attack, having forced the enemy, after a confiderable oppofition, from their ftrong pofts in his line, pufhed forward to their works, and lodged his column within an hundred yards of the fort; and being foon after joined by the General with the left column, who had at length overcome the impediments which he met with in the wood, the garrifon furrendered prifoners of war. The lofs on either fide was not in any degree proportioned to the warmth, length, and variety of the action. The quantity of gunpowder found in the Fort was utterly inadequate to the purpofe of almoft the fhorteft defence. How fo large a body was left with fo poor a provifion, is extremely unaccountable. But the narrative of all thefe tranfactions is hitherto very imperfect. Upon this acquifition, a ftrong body of forces under the command of Lord Cornwallis was paffed over the North River, in order to take Fort Lee, and make a further impreffion in the Jerfeys. The garrifon of zooo men, had a narrow efcape, by abandoning the 18th. Fort juft before his lordfhip's arrival, leaving their artillery, fores, tents, and every thing behind. Our troops afterwards overrun the greater part of both the Jerfeys without oppofition, the enemy flying every where before them; and at length extended their winter cantonments from New Brunswick to the Delaware. If they had had any means of paffing that river upon their first arrival in its neighbourhood, there feems lit tle doubt, confidering the confternation and difmay which then prei |