much higher nature than it had been originally, and that taxation was but a matter of fecondary confideration, when the fupremacy and legislative authority of this country was at stake. That he would have them therefore perfectly underland, that whatever general terms the minifters might at any time make ufe of, taxation neither is, nor ever was, out of their view. As a further proof of his fincerity upon this fubject he declared, that there was no means by which the legislative authority and commercial controul of this country over the colonies could be infured, but by combining them with taxation.

This explanation gave full content, and after a mixed debate, which lafted till ten o'clock, the queftion being put upon an amendment which had been early moved, That the land-tax fhould be three fhillings inftead of four, it paffed in the negative upon a divifion, by a majority of 182 to 47; the origical motion then paffed of course.

In two days after, the

15th. houfe being in a committee

upon the Militia Bill, a motion was made for an amendment, by inferting words to the following purpofe in the preamble, That the faid power of affembling and embodying the militia, fhall not extend beyond the continuance of the prefent rebellion. This motion brought on fome warm and confiderable debates. The oppofition faid, that if the min fters oppofed this motion, it would convince them beyond a doubt, that the fufpicions they had formed with refpect to this bill-were too well founded, which were, that it was brought in musely as á colourable

pretext to arm the crown with a power hitherto unknown to the conftitution.

They argued, that the bill, from the very frame of it, was taken up on a temporary idea, and directed to temporary purpofes, which would ceafe to be objects of policy, the inftant that the civil war was terminated. That the avowed object and principle of the bill, was to afford a greater fcope to our military operations in America, by making fuch a provifion for internal defence and fecurity, as might enable us to employ the ftanding regular forces upon that fervice. That however neceffary it might be in cafes of real and great emergency, to arm the crown, pro tempore, with extraordinary powers for certain purposes of fafety, it was always, not only in the fpirit, but practice of our government, to recall thofe powers, as foon as the purposes were anfwered, or the motives ceafed, for which they were granted. And that it could not be pretended, that any fair or conflitutional motive would remain after the conclufion of the prefent troubles, for continuing this power in the crown, as it was already enabled by the old law, to call out the militia in all other cafes of real emergency. And they infifted, that the very point meant to be covertly carried by this bill, was what no king of England, even the moft defpotic, had eyer been able to gain; that it was a power at all times retained, and till now, moft jealoufly watched and guarded by the people; and that, on this was grounded the leading conteft between Charles the First and his parliament, long before that affembly had been charged with any factious [G] 3

views,

views or had entertained any idea of the troubles which afterwards took place.

On the other fide, great encomiums were made on the popular and conftitutional defence of a militia, and much wonder expreffed, that a measure which tended fo particularly to the fecurity of the people, and the rendering ftanding armies unneceffary, fhould be oppofed by thofe, who pretended a more than ordinary zeal in the care and protection of their liberties. That the apprehended dangers which it was fuppofed would arife from the powers granted by the bill, and upon which fuch powers of colouring had been beflowed to render them frightful and hideous, were purely vifionary, and mere creatures of the imagination. That no ill ufe could be made of the power, without the concurrence of the people themfelves; for though the prince might affemble the militia, they must be paid by parliament. That preTuming parliament fhould become a party in betraying its own rights and thofe of the people, was fuppofing a cafe which could not exilt, or if it did, which no human prudence or forefight could poffibly guard againft; for fuch a confpiracy of the executive and legilative powers of the flare, fuppofed not an abuse, but an actual fubverfion and diffolution of government. That all reafoning on fuch an hypothefis was abfurd; who could the people truft, if they could not trust themfelves? if they were feized with fuch a madness as to make a furrender of their rights and liberties, no power under heaven could prevent them.

This anfwer feems perfectly fa

tisfactory with regard to the general power of the crown over the militia; but it does not appear of equal force to remove the main objection, and which ftruck directly at the principle of the bill, viz. the rendering a law perpetual, which was framed only for an immediate and temporary purpose, without any apparent motive, or fufficient caufe for fo doing. This was by no means fatisfactorily anfwered, it being only evafively faid, that if the law was a good one, it should always ftand, and if otherwife, fhould not pafs at all. This would prove too much; as it would be a reafon against all temporary bills.

The queftion being put on the amendment, it was rejected on a divifion in the committee, by a majority of 140 to 55. Another amendment was then propofed, "That the militia fhould not be called out of their respective counties, unlefs in cafe of actual invafion." This likewife paffed in the negative. A claufe was then propofed, to impower his Majefty to affemble the parliament in fourteen days, whenever the prefent act, in the event of a war or rebellion in any part of the dominions of the British crown, fhould be called into operation. This claufe was agreed to without a divifion.

Several motions were 15th.

made on the fame day by the Duke of Grafton, which produced confiderable debates in the other houfe. The first of these was to lay before the house, an account of the number of forces ferving in America, previous to the commencement of hoftilities, with their feveral ftations and dif tributions, in order to lay a

ground

ground-work for fuch advice as that houfe, impelled by a fenfe of duty, might think fit to fubmit to his Majesty's confideration. The fecond, for à ftate of the army now in America, according to the latest returns. The third, for laying before them the plans that had been adopted for providing winter quarters for thofe troops; with an account of the number of forces in the provincial army, according to the belt eftimate that could be obtained. The fourth, that an eftimate of the forces now in Great Britain and Ireland fhould be laid before them. And the fifth, that an eftimate of the military force neceffary to be fent againft America, with an account of the number of artillery, fhould alfo be laid before the house.

In fupport of thefe motions, the fame ground was taken, which had been repeatedly trodden in both houfes fince the opening of the feffion, upon the fame fubject. Some new obfervations were however added. It was faid, that they had heard oblique cenfures thrown out upon the commanders both by fea and land. What were they to do, amidst fuch a chaos of charges, denials, blunders, miftakes, imputed negligence, and incapacity? Were they ftill to wander in darkness and uncertainty; to grope their way without a ray of light, or the fmalleft information for their direction? They profeffed, that they did not want cabinet, but parliamentary information; they did not want to know the detail, nor the different means intended to give their meafures fuccefs; they do not defire to fee estimates, with any view of comparing them with the returns; nor do they mean to

encounter,

enter into any enquiry, with an intention of having the wrong information, by which minifters have confeffed themfelves deceived and milled, traced to its fource. They only wanted to know that general ftate of things, and thofe facts, which by warning them of the difficulties they had to would point out the best means of obviating or furmounting them: and that this could not be fo well effected in any other manner, as by learning a true state of the force preparing against us, and comparing it with our own abilities and immediate refources. That there were precedents in favour of fuch motions; and the enemy was fo fituated as to come readily at the account of what was fo anxiously concealed from parliament.

On the other fide, the enquiries propofed, with thofe which they were fuppofed to lead to, were faid to be unprecedented, highly improper and dangerous. That it was contrary to every rule of office, as well as every maxim of war and common fenfe, to furnish our enemies with fuch intelligence, as might be the means of either availing themfelves of our weakness, or refifting our power. That the rebel leaders themfelves could not wifh for any thing more in their favour, than a difclofure of the plans of our military operations, and an exact ftate of our strength or weakness. That fecrecy, whether with respect to deliberation or action, was the effence and life of war, upon which its fuccefs muft for ever in a great degree depend. It was afferted, that the measures determined here, were much fooner known in the rebel camp, than in the King's army. And it was in

[G] 4

fifted,

filed, that the precedent to be eftablished by a compliance with thefe motions, of the legislative forcing itself, and breaking in upon the executive power, would be more dangerous even than the other confequences, as it muft of course, if brought into practice, totally obfruft the meafures of government, and render it impracticable to conduft the public affairs.

The debate, as ufual, wandered from the main fubject, and took in feveral branches of the American bufinefs. Mech warmth appeared, and fome fevere perfonal animadverfion took place, upon different occafions which occurred in the courfe of the debates. The queftion being at length put upon each of the motions feparately, that only, for an eflimate of the forces now in Great Britain and Ireland, was agreed to. The rest were rejected without a divifion.

The oppofition were not fo dejected by their multiplied defeats in both houses of Parliament, as to abandon all hopes of reconciliation; they daily endeavoured to fhew it neceffary in the attempt, and practicable in the execution. On the day fucceeding 16th. the Duke of Grafton's motions, Mr. Burke, notwithstanding the ill fuccefs of his conciliatory propofitions in the preceding year, brought in a bill to answer the fame purposes in the prefent.

fame part of the country, and to prevent, as the petitioners fay, the dreadful effects which might arise, from fimilar mifrepreftations being conveyed to parliament. But what brought it directly home to Mr. Burke's object of conciliation, was the earnest manner in which they deprecated the horrors of a civil war, and conjured the house, by every thing folemn, facred, or dear, to adopt fuch lenient meafures, as might reftore that affectionate intercourfe between this country and the colonies, which, they faid, could alone prevent thofe calamities that they moft patheti cally lamented or defcribed. He therefore wifhed (after observing that the manufacturing part of the petitioners were all men who carried on bufinefs as principals upon their own account, and that, he was authorized to fay, were poffeffed of more than half a million of English property), that the prayer of the petition fhould be confidered as an exordium to the bufinefs which he was going to propofe.

The motion was, "That leave be given to bring in a bill for compofing the prefent troubles, and for quieting the minds of his Majefty's fubjects in America." Its object was to procure conciliation and peace by conceffion; and that great charter from the crown to the people, paffed in the 35th year of Edward the First, and known by the name of Statutum de tallugin non concedendo, was its avowed model.

ject

ject, in the amazing compafs of British and American matter which it included. He complained of the difficulties under which moderate men, who advised lenient and healing measures, lay, in times of civil commotion; that their moderation was imputed to a want of zeal, and their fears for the public fafety to a want of fpirit; but that on the prefent unhappy occafion, there were increafed in an unufual degree, as every thing that was proposed on the fide of lenity, was unfairly construed, and induftriously reprefented, as intend ed to give a countenance to rebellion; and that fuch art, had been practifed, and menaces thrown out, as would, if they had not been oppofed with a great fhare of firmnefs by the friends to the peace of their country, have put an end to all freedom of debate, and indeed to all public deliberation whatever.

He obferved that there were three plans afloat for putting an end to the prefent troubles. The firft, fimple war, in order to a perfeet conqueft. The fecond, a mixture of war and treaty. And the third, peace grounded on conceffion. In the investigation of thefe he obferved, that the firft branched into two parts; the one direct by conqueft, the other indirect by diftrefs. He then examined the means which had been laid before them, for carrying on the enfuing campaign upon the former principle, and found many reafons to fhew that they were infufficient for the purpose. As for the predatory, or war by diftrefs, he placed its nature and confequences in various points of view, and endeavpared to fatisfy his hearers, that

it was calculated to produce the highest degree of irritation and animofity, but never had, nor never could induce any one people. to become fubjects to the government of another. That it was a kind of war adapted to diftrefs an independent people; but not to coerce difobedient fubjects.

He concluded the fubject of conqueft by obferving, that as there appeared no probability of fuccefs in the detail of any of the arrangements that were propofed, neither was there any authority to give them a fanction; not one military or naval officer having given an opinion in their favour, and feveral of the first, in both departments, having decided directly against them. Thus, as no man of mili tary experience would vouch for the fufficiency of the force, neither would any one in the commiffariate answer for its fubfiftence from the moment that it left the fea coast; fo that its fubfiftence and its operation was confeffedly incompatible.

He next examined the mixed fyftem of war and treaty, and expofed with his ufual acuteness and disquifition, its numberless defects, ruinous procraftination, and final inconclufivenefs. He ridiculed the abfurdity of fending out pardons to people who neither applied for, nor would accept of them; as if nothing but an amnelly were wanting to reftore peace in America; and as if the great objects of difpute were totally loft and forgotten. He alfo condemned in the ftrongest terms the arbitrary powers which were to be vefted in the commiffioners of granting general or particular pardons, in fuch manner, and to fuch perfons only, as they

should