fertile soil for some of the Gaullist initiatives. In the initial wake of any Gaullist initiative on the European problem, I think we will find the Germans being driven into a closer American-German relationship. But we ought not to be deceived by this because in the long run it seems to me that Gaullism is going to reinforce the case of those Germans who believed that the restoration of Germany and particularly the reunification of Germany can only be achieved on the basis of an independent German approach to Moscow. Thus without joining De Gaulle, there is I think increasing pressure in Germany for an imitation of Gaullism in Germany.

Gaullism is also finding a fertile soil in East Europe. We tend to view the fragmentation of the Soviet bloc as an inherent advantage to ourselves. In the short run this may be true. But we should not overlook the fact that in the longer run this is contributing to the Balkanization of Europe and a restoration of a Europe which has twice committed political suicide in the course of 50 years.

The East European political elites are becoming nationalistic. I fear that our policy of so-called building bridges, which focuses almost entirely on establishing bilateral relations with individual East European Communist states may in fact be contributing to the re-creation of a Europe of states precisely of the kind that General de Gaulle is seeking.

Moreover, Gaullism, I think revitalizes the otherwise waning Soviet ideological expectations of Western fragmentation. Thus, any possibility of American-Soviet detente are undermined by the temptation, which I think the Soviets will find irresistible, to play havoc with Western unity. Thus, they, too, are attracted to playing De Gaulle's game, even though obviously being a world power, they do not take his posturing seriously.

Given all these considerations, it seems to me that we now need a broader policy addressed to the East-West relationship if we are to be effective in defending NATO and in revitalizing the Atlantic concept. We have to provide the Europeans with a new sense of purpose and a new sense of American relevance to the future of Europe which increasingly more and more Europeans construe as involving the problem of East-West European relationship.

Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that it would be in the American interest to link our current efforts to defend the Atlantic Alliance and NATO, which is of course highly desirable in itself, to a broader initiative on the subject of the overall European relationship.

In my mind such an initiative ought to have for its purpose the promotion of German-East European reconciliation on the basis of the existing territorial status quo. It should have as its purpose the minimization of some real, and many imagined, Russian security concerns with Germany.

Above all else, it ought to have as its purpose the transformation of largely bilateral economic relationships into multilateral economic ties involving all of Europe. For only in such a large multilateral and more binding setting can we begin to eliminate the legacy of the cold war and create stable relationship between the East and West.

It may accordingly be useful for the United States to propose that the Western powers, as an initial modest step, join together with the Common Market in a conference for the purpose of drafting a joint proposal to be addressed to the Communist governments of East

Europe and the Soviet Union concerning the future development of multilateral economic relationships in Europe.

The purpose of such an initiative would be to create the necessary climate for the eventual resolution of existing security problems and above all else the division of Germany. In my view an initiative of this sort would reassert America's constructive and vital interest in Europe's future. It would stimulate among many Europeans a larger sense of enthusiasm for a common Atlantic effort, thereby seizing the initiative from De Gaulle.

I have particularly in mind the neutralist tendencies in Scandinavia and England. It would certainly undo the increasingly widespread European feeling that currently the United States has only a policy for Asia, but in Europe it is relying purely on the legacy of the past.

Finally, it would dissipate the allegation that American policy is based entirely on anti-Communist premises and thereby would give some Communist States and some Communist elites an alternative to their own doctrinaire policy of hostility to the West.

To conclude, Mr. Chairman, President Johnson today has an opportunity similar to that facing President Truman in 1947-48, to chart a new course for American policy in Europe. Moreover, this he can do, not by negating the past but by building on the constructive legacy of the Marshall plan and the impetus originally provided by the United States to greater European integration.

Thank you.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you very much, Professor, for that very enlightening statement, very interesting and, at times, provocative statement.

Before you leave, Mr. Frelinghuysen, would you care to ask any questions?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I would like to thank Dr. Brzezinski for a provocative statement. I wish I had the time to ask him questions, but I assume he wouldn't have time to answer them even if I had the time to ask them.

If the subcommittee should still be in session after I get back from my picture taking, I will come back. My apologies.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Dr. Brzezinski, would you care to define for the record, or give your definition of Gaullism?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I think Gaullism in the French setting means a policy designed to recreate France's prestige and standing in the community of nations. It means a definition of a new political system for France which does away with the 19th century legacy of splintered ideological politics, and as such I may add is a positive thing.

It means a broader concept of a Europe, divorced from immediate and direct American participation in European affairs. It means the concept of an international settlement based first of all on a European equilibrium designed to contain and control Germany largely by French-Russian cooperation.

It means more globally a concept of a world demarcated into spheres of influence, and finally it seems to me to be a concept based on a deep commitment to the traditional and, in my view, old-fashioned European legacy of nationalism.

This more or less, and pretty much off the top of my head, would be my definition of Gaullism.

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Mr. GALLAGHER. Doctor, can we not find in this definition of Gaullism a change from what was the original strategy or tactics of General de Gaulle, which was to make certain that the economic, political, and social ties of Germany and France were such that these two ancient rivals would never fight another war? Are we not now going in the opposite direction?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I think General de Gaulle is still committed to the notion of Franco-German reconciliation. Of course, that involved in itself a certain change in his attitude. You remember back in 1945 he was very much in favor of the partition of Germany and even in favor of the absorption of a large slice of Germany by France and others.

However, I think he has become committed and converted to the notion of Franco-German reconciliation. This I think he considers to be a basic and continuing element in his policy. However, on the tactical level I think its immediate policy implications have changed for him.

Back in 1960, I think he envisaged a Franco-German constellation in which he would be a leader and this constellation would shape a new policy for the West. That was more anti-Soviet than our own position, particularly in relationship to the Berlin crisis. I think he feels betrayed and rebuffed by the German Government and its clear preference for an American relationship if a choice has to be made, and feeling so rebuffed, he feels he has to reach out to the Soviet Union for a Franco-Russian relationship, one purpose of which, among others, will be to control Germany.

However, you will recall that about a year ago in a press conference he spoke almost wistfully of what could have been done if his policy had been adopted by the Germans and if there had been a FrancoGerman constellation of which he would have been the leader, and which would have undertaken the job of formulating a policy for the West.

I think his attitude has changed because he realizes he couldn't get the German Government to go along with him.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Do you think this is a realistic policy?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. You mean his present policy?

Mr. GALLAGHER. Yes.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Realistic in the sense that it can come eventually into being?

Mr. GALLAGHER. Yes.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. No, I do not think it is. This is why I am critical of it. It seems to me that its long-range danger is indeed a restoration of European instability, which I called earlier a Balkanized Europe. But it is not unrealistic in that it does not have any support. What we tend to underestimate here on this side of the ocean is the extent to which, to a great many Europeans, East and West, there is a great deal of instinctive appeal in what De Gaulle says.

It corresponds with their traditions. It is easier to look at the future from the perspective of the past. I am struck in my own travels in Europe by the degree of which, among the neutralists in England and Scandinavia, there is sympathy for Gaullism, by the number of future German politicians who are emulating De Gaulle's style in the formulation of German policy. I am impressed by the appeal of Gaullism to some of the younger Italians who see in this again a

greater possibility of Italy playing an independent role, and last, but not least, I am impressed by the way in which the ruling elites in East Europe, which are nationalistic and Communist at the same time, and which are primarily interested in maintaining their power position, see in Gaullism a good way of reducing Soviet control, but not involving themselves in domestic pressures and thereby being able to have their cake and eat it, too.

While I do not think that in the final analysis his image of the future Europe can be a very stable and constructive one, I would warn very strongly against underestimating the degree of real support he has in Europe. To put it in a nutshell, I would say that in the forties, and particularly the fifties, our policy in Europe was so constructive and effective because we had both power and influence. We were obviously the military and economic power, we had influence because we had a concept and idea that fitted the times, and now we are being pushed into the position of having power, but less and less influence in Europe.

In my view we haven't adjusted our perspective sufficiently to the new European mood. General de Gaulle has practically no power, but in a curious and perhaps even negative way, he has a great deal of influence. I think if we wish to checkmate him we ought to add influence to our power, and we can only do that if we formulate a policy for Europe which addresses itself more and more to what more and more Europeans think is important, and that is the future of Europe in its larger East-West dimensions.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Doctor, most people that come before our committee seem to think that Gaullism will not go beyond General de Gaulle in France. You have indicated while Gaullism may not have a chance of going beyond the lifespan of General de Gaulle in France, Gaullism as such will continue in Europe beyond the lifespan of General de Gaulle.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Gaullism sort of defined in a vaguer sense and not so specifically French as my own definition of Gaullism, I think that is infectious. As far as France is concerned, obviously a different French Government would not be so preemptory, so brutal, so unilateral in its policies toward us. I would be inclined to feel if General de Gaulle lives long enough to translate his present demands into reality, gets us out of France, changes the French relationship to NATO, a future post-Gaullist government, which will not be based on the Gaullist government will not just unfurl its banners and march back into NATO.

I think they will find it convenient and useful to maintain a distinct relationship. They will find a certain amount of advantage then to maintain their special autonomy and it will not be easy to pull them back in. The empty chair which we are going to leave for them is not going to be occupied the same way it has been occupied in the past. I think the French would insist perhaps on a somewhat separate status and in any case will make us pay a high price for any concession to restore the status quo ante which I doubt very much can be restored. I don't think it is possible to turn history back.

Mr. GALLAGHER. It is possible for any future French Government to take the position that De Gaulle has taken?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I think the real difference will be much more in style than content. I think there will be some difference in content.

In politics, style is important. Sometimes it is more important than content. There will be that difference. I don't believe there will be a restoration of the present French relationship to NATO after De Gaulle goes, assuming he lives for a year or two, assuming he remains President for a year or two.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Monagan.

Mr. MONAGAN. He will live. I think you can be sure of that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Professor Brzezinski, you said that we should have a concept of Europe that we can inspire them with, or something of that sort. Haven't we in fact had such a concept? First of all we had the concept of NATO, which was directed to a very definite military threat from the Stalinist Russia and its associates, but we also had the concept of a community, a European community that would be economically united and in fact it has worked out remarkably well in the Common Market, which also had subsequent political possibilities although those have not been worked out.

Unfortunately, one aspect of Gaullism prevented the Common Market from being as inclusive as we might like to see it. Wasn't that an appropriate concept for the changing Europe that you speak about?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I think it was an excellent and a very creative concept. This is why the late forties and fifties are the period which was the most constructive period with Europe. For reasons beyond our control, forces have now arisen that impede the concept. The question then arises what is the most efficacious way of restoring the validity of that concept and giving it new vitality.

My argument is that merely reemphasizing and recommitting ourselves to the Atlantic community and to NATO by itself will not suffice to restore the enthusiasm of the Europeans for these concepts. The Europeans' enthusiasm for these concepts was a product of many things. First, and certainly not least of all, their feeling of a Soviet threat. That feeling has declined. They may be wrong on this. Our statesmen feel there is a major threat. Most Europeans do not feel that way.

The point is, irrespective of who is right or who is wrong, this particular factor in stimulating European enthusiasm has declined. Moreover, Europe to some extent has been economically restored. It has been restored economically before it became economically integrated.

Had it been the other way around, perhaps the problem would not have arisen. Had Europe become economically integrated before it was restored, there would be a different story. Again because we were so successful-as in the case of deterring Soviet aggression so in the restoration of Europe economically-we now have a problem with the Common Market. Beyond that we have a new generation of Europeans growing up who don't have the same feeling for a purely West European-American relationship that their fathers did, who both shared the toils of battle with us and who had an acute sense of dependency on us.

The younger people do not. They do increasingly think of a Europe perhaps going beyond the confines of the Iron Curtain on the Elbe. They have a greater affinity for the changes going on in East Europe. Last but not least, the Germans themselves have achieved