There will be a meeting in June of the foreign ministers of the NATO countries in Brussels. By that time we should be in a much better position to handle this problem. When I said we wanted to proceed on this cautiously, perhaps I should have said we want to proceed on it deliberately because it is a major issue confronting all of us.

Mr. HAMILTON. You mentioned one of the reasons that you thought De Gaulle acted as he did was the diminishment of the Soviet threat. Do you find a similar attitude at all in any of the other NATO countries?

Mr. LEDDY. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is there sympathy for this point of view?

Mr. LEDDY. Yes, I think there is a strand of thinking in all countries including the United States along this line, that perhaps we are putting too much emphasis on the military and you need to build bridges and that sort of thing. We would agree with the last part, you should do that. We don't agree this is the time to make the West less strong. As a matter of fact, Mr. Shulman, who is an expert on Soviet and Eastern European matters, came out with a book not long ago called "Beyond the Cold War." He made the point I am referring to, if in time you get a really genuine peace, stable peace, with the Soviet Union the best and surest way of doing that is to maintain the cohesion and strength of the West, that if there is a tendency now for the West to split apart and cease to defend itself on a common basis and collective basis, that this will tend to harden the Soviets and not to soften them. In my own judgment, this is quite correct. This is the lesson of history and how to deal with it.

Mr. HAMILTON. Have you had any indication of the Soviet response to this?

Mr. LEDDY. (Security deletion.) I think that the only prudent thing to do in estimating the Soviet Union is to assume that they may take advantage of what they consider as a rather serious division in the West, that if they can find ways to exploit it, they probably will. I have one caveat on that, and that is that they must realize that one possible effect of this action of General de Gaulle's-and I think it is a very real possibility-will be an increase in the relative role of Germany in the West.

Mr. HAMILTON. What kind of support do you find for De Gaulle within France? I speak now of two levels, the second strata of leadership within the Government and then secondly, popular support?

Mr. LEDDY. I think overall as a French leader and a Frenchman for France that he enjoys strong popular support in France for the reasons I stated.

Mr. HAMILTON. I am speaking now of his move on NATO.

Mr. LEDDY. This is a different thing. He had a surprise in the elections partly because of his antagonistic attitude toward the Common Market. He took a strong position attacking certain key features of the Common Market.

He wasn't trying to eliminate the Common Market. He was really trying to eliminate again this integrational aspect of the Common Market. Before the elections in December it was pretty clear that he expected to win on the first ballot and expected to win very substantially. I think the estimates were that he was thinking he would come out of this with something like 75, perhaps 80 percent.

His actions against the Common Market did attract strong domestic opposition. This was mainly because the agricultural part of France and the industrial part of France strongly believe in the Common Market and they are not at all afraid of integration, that is the only way their industries can really grow. Therefore, there was this practical opposition to what he was doing.

Apparently he didn't realize this. On the first ballot, out of the center, Lecanuet, who was quite a good campaigner, went on television and received a surprising 15 percent of the center votes that otherwise would have gone to De Gaulle. So he didn't win on the first ballot, but on the second ballot, when he received something like 54 or 55 percent rather than the large percentage he hoped to receive. On the second ballot you have the Communist vote and some of the Socialist vote which more or less went against him.

Mr. HAYS. Would you yield?

Mr. HAMILTON. Certainly.

Mr. HAYS. Where do you think the Communist and Socialist vote went on the first ballot? It didn't go to De Gaulle.

Mr. LEDDY. Some of it might have because

Mr. HAYS. No

Mr. LEDDY. I think some of it might have.

Mr. HAYS. It would have to make your mathematics come out right and I doubt if it did.

Mr. LEDDY. The NATO problem is different. We just do not know, because the French public really have not focused on this problem of NATO and France over the past 2 years. Now that he has taken a

very strong public stand I think we will begin to see some public reaction. It is a little too early. We are curious to know what the French public reaction to this will be.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you.

Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Whalley.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Mr. Leddy, do you think that any other NATO country is giving De Gaulle support in his views?

Mr. LEDDY. No, sir.

Mr. WHALLEY. Dr. Edward Teller said in 1961 that the United States was in error in its NATO policy by making the decisions and expecting the other NATO countries to help carry them out. He also said at that time that General de Gaulle had made a statement that either France would have a part in making policy and decisions, or it would withdraw from NATO. Do you think there was any truth to that statement?

Mr. LEDDY. I think the problem of making decisions jointly in NATO on matters outside the NATO area are very difficult for the United States. We have worldwide responsibilities. We find it very difficult to go into NATO in advance on a question, for example, of Vietnam, which confronts us. This is a crucial decision and when the Government is faced with it, it may be a matter of a few hours or a few days. It endeavors when possible to consult in advance in NATO as to what should be done. We have been keenly conscious of this. We have been trying to widen the area of consultation.

We have had many discussions in the NATO Council explaining our position, to get a full understanding of what the problem is from our point of view. I will say this is an extremely difficult thing, and

I think the French, back in 1950, also felt the scope of NATO consultation should be worldwide. Someday we may get to that because it is difficult to separate the problems. The commitment in NATO runs to the North Atlantic Treaty area.

Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Hays.

Mr. HAYS. Are you the former ambassador to the OECD?

Mr. LEDDY. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAYS. Was I at a dinner one night in Paris where you were also a guest?

Mr. LEDDY. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAYS. That is all I wanted to know.

Mrs. KELLY. Mrs. Bolton.

Mrs. BOLTON. No questions.

Mrs. KELLY. Mr. McDowell.

Mr. MCDOWELL. Mr. Leddy, it is very clearly revealed now that President De Gaulle has laid down an ultimatum as far as NATO is concerned, and they have had participation, and it hasn't been too great, anyway, they have drawn most of their forces out of NATO at one time or another, and what little they had left would probably stay in Western Germany anyway. Why is it so crucial whether France remains in NATO or whether they don't?

Mr. LEDDY. It is not, in my judgment, essential. We can have NATO continue without France. That isn't to say that France isn't important. I think it is important politically that this major country of Europe has more or less decided that it wants to be alone, out of step with the rest of us. I think this is bound to have political effects.

Secondly, there is a military factor here, notwithstanding the fact, as you say, that France has over a period of years withdrawn various forces from NATO assignment. The French geographic position, while not absolutely essential, is there. It is part of the Continent of Europe, and I think everyone would have to admit that the NATO military system would be better with France in it than outside of it. Our military people feel the NATO system can still be effective without France. These headquarters and facilities can be relocated and you can still have an effective system. It is important but not crucial. Mr. MCDOWELL. From the standpoint of manpower, what would be the most logical country that we might turn to in place of France? Mr. LEDDY. I think the manpower still assigned from France to NATO is relatively small.

Mr. MCDOWELL. If it is a matter of

Mr. LEDDY. The most significant part of their units in Germany are the air units.

Mr. MCDOWELL. As a matter of countering French withdrawal, their strategic position as far as the rest of the European members are concerned, do you think they would favor an increased participation by West Germany?

Mr. LEDDY. You mean in terms of payment?

Mr. MCDOWELL. In whatever terms their contribution might be increased.

Mr. LEDDY. We are going to have, in this process, to readjust the force structure. As a matter of fact, this will tie in with a new system that Secretary McNamara has recently gotten going in a so-called rolling review of force goals. All of that will come about with any reorganization. We will find out what is needed to relocate our

facilities in France, where we should relocate them, to what extent we should relocate them. There may be a possibility in this situation to streamline things and increase their effectiveness with a slimmer structure. All of these matters will have to be looked at.

Mr. McDowELL. Are you suggesting, then, this move in itself might force not only the United States but the other NATO countries to seriously consider a major reorganization in NATO? Perhaps it was overdue, anyway.

Mr. LEDDY. Certainly some reorganization. I think so. Whether or not it is a major one, we are going to have to take a look at the command structure, the force levels, and the relocation problem. In this process where you have to turn things upside down anyway I hope we can come up with a more streamlined organization. I think this might very well result.

Mr. McDOWELL. Do you believe that France deliberately intends to go on with this policy which in effect is somewhat, at least in Western Europe, an isolation policy, tending toward that, or at least a major neutral policy, that if she finds she is out of NATO, and that NATO is going on anyway, that this will have any effect then?

Mr. LEDDY. I think it will have an effect. It may have an effect on public opinion in France. I doubt whether it will have an effect on the policies of General de Gaulle which he has already determined. Mr. McDowELL. Right now the general is the President. I guess he pretty well dictates the policy.

Mr. LEDDY. That is right.

Mr. MCDOWELL. I think he really feels that his participation in the NATO machine detracts from his position on the world stage, that it makes him a sort of an appendage of the United States and if these policies are strengthened his plan to play an independent role in the world will be hurt, but he wants an independent role, one that is French. That is all.

Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Morse.

Mr. MORSE. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I come here as an interloper and not a member of the subcommittee. I am deeply interested in Europe and NATO. I quarrel with the administration because I think that you err in merely treating De Gaulle as a temporary nuisance who will go away upon his death rather than an evidence of the dynamics of a new France, and in a very real sense of a new Europe.

It seems to me that there is a considerable body of thought throughout Europe which supports De Gaulle. We saw Adenauer's statement this morning to the effect that in his view the Soviet Union was no longer a military threat to Western Europe. I disagree with this, but I think that in many countries, in addition to France, this same kind of thinking is prevalent. I think but for the present preoccupation of the United Kingdom with their economic problems there would be a sizable body of British opinion supporting the De Gaulle position on NATO. I think in Belgium, apart from their internal political problems, there might be a solidification of the same kind of support for the De Gaulle position. I think the same might be said of Italy as well.

You said earlier in your statement that we have leaned over backward because we didn't want to provoke the French. I am not one to cry over spilt milk, but I can think of three instances in the last

61-704-66 -3

6 years in which it seems to me, we indeed provoked and encouraged the kind of posture that France has assumed.

The first, and I would like you to comment on these in order, was the speech made by Secretary McNamara at Ann Arbor in April 1962, in which he announced the nuclear policy of the United States to be a "no cities policy."

You said that the second of the two threads of De Gaulle's reasoning was that he wasn't sure about the reliability of the United States' nuclear capability as a device for the defense of Western Europe. It seems to me that the "no cities" policy announced by Mr. McNamara at Ann Arbor almost 5 years ago certainly gave him reasonable cause to make the inference that he has made.

Would you care to comment on that, sir?

Mr. LEDDY. No, sir; I really am not competent to comment on that. I haven't seen any evidence.

Mr. MORSE. Can you tell me, then, Mr. Leddy, what is the nuclear policy of the United States now?

Mr. LEDDY. The nuclear policy is to come to the aid of our allies under the provisions of article 5 of the treaty. We certainly have not subscribed now to a policy that we will use strategic nuclear weapons at the first move from the East. I think our strategy is one of a flexible response and to avoid the nuclear thing until it is clearly necessary. There are disagreements between us and the French on this, I freely admit.

Mr. MORSE. I feel there are disagreements within our own Government as to what our nuclear policy is. It seems to me the "no cities" policy announced by the Secretary of Defense, mind you 4 years ago, which purported to be a definitive statement of U.S. policy, was incredible. I am astonished that with the high responsbility you have you aren't fully familiar with what our U.S. nuclear policy is.

The second question: You recall the instance which occurred after the rather clumsy handling of the Skybolt cancellation in which the then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. MacMillan, was invited to confer with the then President and Mr. McNamara in Nassau. It seems to me that this certainly antagonized De Gaulle. Would you disagree?

Mr. LEDDY. No, sir; I wouldn't disagree to that.

Mr. MORSE. It also seems to me that the MLF, which came out of that meeting, has contributed to this antagonism. Would you agree?

Mr. LEDDY. I agree that he opposed the MLF. I think that this is related to the question of Germany and I am afraid that I would consider his policy vis-a-vis Germany an unhealthy policy for Europe because it has the effect of maintaining Germany essentially in a second-class position. So that while I would agree that he didn't like the MLF policy, I would not agree with his views about it. Mr. MORSE. You would agree it has been an antagonism? Mr. LEDDY. Certainly.

Mr. MORSE. So we have three particular instances in which you, as Assistant Secretary for Europe, admit antagonism has resulted? Mr. LEDDY. Certainly we cannot simply accept any policy that he

wishes.

Mr. MORSE. I agree.

Mr. LEDDY. That is what I am talking about. When I said we leaned over backward, I meant in terms of dealing with him and with