is required to be posted in all licensed buildings, places of public assembly; private dwellings are exempt for the purpose that traditionally that is a man's castle. In other places, where people are living, which the public frequents, they are endangering people's lives and they have to report it.

Mr. MAZZOLI. Who has the responsibility, under the present law, to report the existence of a fire in other than a personal dwelling? Mr. JEFFREY. It is the owner, manager or any person as stated. Mr. MAZZOLI. If I run down the street, I have a responsibility to report it?

Mr. JEFFREY. You have a responsibility. Of course our responsibility is to prove that you saw it and did not.

Mr. MAZZOLI. What is the fine or penalty for failure to report, if a case is made that one should have?

Mr. JEFFREY. I think it is 10 days or $100, if I remember the general penalties of the Code.

Mr. MAZZOLI. The Commission would narrow that responsibility for reporting in what way with respect to other than personal dwellings?

Mr. JEFFREY. It appears that they would narrow it to the person responsible for starting or witnessing that fire.

Mr. MAZZOLI. Your feeling is that we ought to have the current law of the District of Columbia rather than the Commission's recommendation? Is that your statement?

Mr. JEFFREY. We would like to see it broadened to that.

Mr. MAZZOLI. Thank you. Mr. Danzansky?

Mr. DANZANSKY. You understand that the Criminal Code proposed by the Law Revision Commission does not intend to replace any regulations. The regulations would remain in full force and effect, those we presently have now.

If you are legislating more serious offenses here, to ease your peace of mind, none of that would be replaced by what we are doing. Mr. JEFFREY. Thank you.

Mr. MAZZOLI. Mr. Clarke?

Mr. CLARKE. Did I understand you to say that you read the recklessly and negligent requirements to be similar or to be the same? Mr. JEFFREY. I do not understand.

Mr. CLARKE. Do I understand in your statement you say that you read the reckless and negligent requirements to be the same?

Mr. JEFFREY. They are similar by Webster's definition. They are fairly close.

Mr. CLARKE. Thank you. This is one of my concerns. The technical definitions provided in the Code are not going to be fully appreciated by the public.

Mr. MAZZOLI. It could well be then that when we have our meeting tomorrow, if you will be here, Mr. Clarke?

Mr. CLARKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MAZZOLI. Then we could stress the point that maybe some of the definitions are looking at my staff memo, for a person who is a layman, knowing, reckless, all have gradations. While I am a lawyer, I am not so sure that I would be able to tell you the shade of difference between reckless, negligent or knowing.

It might be well if we talk tomorrow in terms of what these mean and what the net effect is.

I would like to call the panel composed of Ms. Judith Avner, executive director of the Women's Legal Defense Fund, and Ms. Helen Lewis, Executive Director, District of Columbia Commission on the Status of Women.

STATEMENT OF HELEN LEWIS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMISSION ON STATUS OF WOMEN

Ms. LEWIS. Mr. Chairman, I am Helen Lewis, Executive Director of the District of Columbia Commission on the Status of Women. I believe you have copies of the brief statement submitted for today's hearings and I will summarize the statement.

Mr. MAZZOLI. Your statement will be made a part of the record.

Ms. LEWIS. The District of Columbia Commission on the Status of women has been studying the question of needed changes in the sexual assault laws of this jurisdiction over the past 3 years. We have had assistance from many qualified sources.

I wish to emphasize that members of the Commission on the Status of Women have spent much time and thought in putting together our study. We have produced a proposed bill to revise the District of Columbia Code related to sex crimes.

Our proposed law is patterned generally after the act which reformed the sexual assault laws in Michigan. A copy of our proposal is in our 10th annual report. I brought a few copies of that and a few excerpts of our legal status report for you. We can supply additional copies as needed.

At the time we were working on our proposed legislation, we did not have the benefit of the sentencing scheme or any other changes in the Criminal Code proposed by the Law Revision Commission.

However, we urge that you give our proposed legislation serious consideration, realizing it can be altered to fit in with any general pattern of revisions of the code.

LAW REVISION COMMISSION PROPOSALS FAVORED

Turning to the revisions proposed by the Law Revision Commission, some of the aspects of the revisions which we support are as follows. We support the proposed revisions which would change the terminology from emotionally loaded words such as rape to broader more inclusive terms, "sexual assault."

We are pleased that the proposed revisions combine various crimes relating to sexual conduct into one comprehensive statute while recognizing various degrees of severity between acts of sexual violence.

We support the recognition that unconsented sexual contact should be a crime, separate from simple assault. We endorse the proposal that eliminates gender distinctions. We support the definition of force insofar as it has been broadened to include threats, not only of serious bodily injury, but also threats of any bodily injury and abduction. We acknowledge that such threats need not be directed toward the victim alone but possibly at someone else, for example, such as abduction or harm to a person's child.

We support the definition of penetration, insofar as it is broadened to include the use of an object or an instrument.

LRC PROPOSALS OPPOSED

The following are some of the aspects of the sex offense laws proposed by the Law Revision Commission which we do not support.

We urge that these provisions be revised to meet some of the objections which are included in our statement. We question the rationale for making sexual acts against helpless victims a second degree, and therefore, presumably, a less serious offense than acts against other

victims.

We question the reasonable fear concept in the proposed law, which sets a standard of submission because of reasonable fear before coercion can be found. We believe the standard for coercion should be that the victim submitted because he or she was, in fact, afraid.

We believe compulsion by threat is too narrowly defined in the proposal. There should be some criminal sanction against compulsion by threat to employment, to property, or to reputation. It is inaccurate to state, as the rational for leaving out such threats, as is done in the Law Revision Commission's notes, that these areas are not forcible in the traditional sense since they are clearly recognized within other areas of criminal responsibility, such as extortion and blackmail.

The statute should but does not include some sanction against the use of trickery or surprise to obtain submission by a victim. We strongly object to any affirmative defense that the defendant believed that the victim would have consented if the victim would have been capable of giving consent.

We feel this would be an open invitation for everyone accused of second degree sexual assault. We express concern as to the affirmative defense relating to the reasonable belief of the actor as to the victim's age when the victim is age 11 to 15 and the actor is more than 5 years older.

The proposed statute does not provide adequate protection for the victim at trial and is an open invitation to attack the victim in court. We strongly disagree with the evidence sanction proposed in 22610(a) (2) relative to the victim's past sexual history or sexual reputation. As proposed, this section would not aid in eliminating the serious problem related to consideration of the victim's past sexual history.

It would not accomplish the statutory elimination of the special corroboration requirement and leaves too much to the discretion of the individual judge.

We believe that the spousal exclusion, which prohibits a spouse from charging the other with rape, should be eliminated entirely. The Law Revision Commission proposal actually broadens the present spousal exclusion concept and includes any persons living together in such a relationship, regardless of whether they meet all of the standards of common law marriage.

It limits the proposed exceptions to the exclusion of those only under legal decree of separation, not recognizing the more common separation in fact. It makes exception to the rule for first degree sexual assault unless the victim is a minor for which distinction there is no reasonable rationale. It does retain spousal exclusion as to second degree. We urge total exclusion of the spousal exclusion.

In closing, may I say that the Commission on the Status of Women is very pleased that these hearings are being held and we appreciate the opportunity to be heard. We hope that you will give serious attention to the legislative proposal we have worked up and will submit copies for the record.

I am not the Commission's expert in these matters; our experts are unable to testify here, but if there are questions, I would be pleased to relay them and respond in writing.

[Ms. Lewis' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HELEN LEWIS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN

My name is Helen Lewis and I represent the District of Columbia Commission on the Status of Women, on which I serve.

I plan to address solely the changes in the laws relating to "sex crimes" contained in the legislation proposed by the Law Revision Commission.

The D.C. Commission on the Status of Women has been studying the question of needed changes in the sexual assault laws of this jurisdiction for over 3 years. We have had assistance from students of Antioch Law School and George Washington University Law School, including the Rape Law Reform Project of George Washington University, as well as members of the Business and Professional Womens Federation, the D.C. Rape Crisis Center, and an attorney with considerable experience in prosecuting rape cases.

BACKGROUND

I wish to emphasize that we have put much time and thought into our study; and, as a result, we have produced a proposed bill to revise the District of Columbia Code relating to sex crimes. Our proposed law is patterned generally after the Act which reformed the sexual assault laws in Michigan. A copy of our proposal, and comments explaining it, are published in the Legal Status section of our 10th Annual Report, and copies will be attached to the more lengthy written statement which we will submit to this body for the hearing record. At the time we were working on our proposed legislation we did not have the benefit of the sentencing scheme or any other changes in the criminal laws proposed by the Law Revision Commission. However, we urge that you give our proposed legislation serious consideration, recognizing that it could be altered to fit in with any general revisions of the D.C. Criminal Code, relating to sentencing, etc., which might be enacted.

LAW REVISION PROPOSAL FAVORED

Turning now to the revisions proposed by the D.C. Law Revisions Commission, our Legal Status Committee has studied the proposed legislation insofar as sex crimes are concerned. We find that there are some good aspects and some negative aspects to the Law Revision proposals, which I now will briefly summarize. The aspects of the revisions which we view as positive are as follows: Under the proposed revisions there would be a change in terminology from emotionally loaded words such as "rape" to "sexual assault".

The proposed revisions combine various crimes relating to sexual conduct into one comprehensive statute, while recognizing the relative degrees of severity between various acts of sexual violence.

Some distinction is made as to sexual acts between consenting competent adults versus sexual acts or contact imposed on one individual by another.

There is recognition that unconsented sexual contact should be a crime separate from simple assault.

The proposal eliminates "gender" distinctions (for example, eliminates the concept that "rape" is a crime only by a man against a woman).

The definition of force has been broadened to include (a) threats not only of death or serious bodily injury but also threats of bodily injury and abduction, and (b) acknowledgement that such threats need not be directed towards the victim alone but possibly at someone else (for example, threat of abduction or harm to the victim's child).

The accomplishing of sexual participation in acts through unconsented administering to the victim of drugs, hypnosis, etc., is recognized as a serious offense.

There is recognition as an offense, a sexual act with a victim who may not be aware, may not be able to understand the conduct, or be capable of resisting. There is recognition of the need for special protection for inmates, patients, and wards, as well as minors.

The definition of "penetration" is broadened to include the use of an object or an instrument.

Some recognition is given to the concept that spousal exclusion should be eliminated or modified.

LAW REVISION PROPOSALS OPPOSED

We view the following as negative aspects of the sex offense law proposed by the Law Revision Commission:

We question the rationale for making sexual acts against "helpless victims" (those with a physical or mental handicap, making them incapable of either resisting, or understanding) a second degree and, presumably, less serious offense than acts against other victims.

We believe that when a victim is injured or where there are aggravating circumstances (i.e., gang rape or the use of a weapon), the offense should be considered more serious than when there are no such aggravating circumstances. In determining the issue of coercion, it should be sufficient for a jury to find that a victim did in fact submit because of fear, regardless of whether or not others would have similarly submitted because of "reasonable" fear, under the circumstances. In other words, the proposed law sets a standard of submission because of "reasonable" fear before coercion can be found. We believe the standard for coercion should be that the victim submitted because he or she was, in fact, afraid.

The requirement of "imminent harm" is Section 22-601(a)(2) does not take into consideration that threats of death or serious injury to be inflicted in the future may be equally or more compelling than the threat of immediate less serious harm. (We recognize that there should be some provision requiring the future threat of harm to be realizable or able to be carried out, something more than "idle" in nature.)

There should be some criminal sanction against compulsion by threat to employment, property or reputation. It is inaccurate to state as the rationale for leaving out such threats (as is done in the Law Revision Commission notes on Section 22-601) that these areas are not "forcible" in the traditional sense, since they are clearly recognized within other areas of criminal responsibility such as extortion and blackmail.

The use of the word "substantially" in Section 22-601 (3) is unnecessary, too vague, and would cause problems for purposes of criminal prosecution.

The statute should but does not include some sanction against the use of trickery or surprise to obtain submission by a victim.

We strongly object to any affirmative defense that the defendant "believed" that the victim would have consented if the victim had been capable of giving consent. We refer to the Law Revision Commission commentary on this subject, and concur with those members of the Law Revision Commission who felt that this would be an open invitation for every accused.

We recognize the rationale for, but express concern, as to the affirmative defense relating to the reasonable belief of the actor as to the victim's age (when the victim is age 11-15 and the actor is more than 5 years older). The proposed statute does not provide adequate protection for the victim at trial and is an open invitation to attack the victim in court.

We believe that the provisions relating to the individual who has taken advantage of what might be called a "position of authority" to coerce submission (and thus negate consent) should be broader and should not only include wards, inmates and patients. The proposal from the Law Revision Commission is not flexible, and leaves out some of the most important relationships (i.e., teacher, employer, mother's boyfriend, etc.). We refer you to the proposals within the draft from the Commission on the Status of Women which presents a broad and flexible definition of "position of authority".

The use of the word "reckless" relating to abuse of a ward, inmate, or patient does not appear to make sense. Whatever the intention, the term is too vague and appears to add an unnecessary element to the crime.

The definition of "guardian" (in fact or natural) is not clear, and as read is not sufficiently encompassing.

Any "penetration for carnal purposes" should be protected against, not just specified body orifices as stated.

The term "sexual contact" does not include a very common act, that of the actor forcing the victim to touch the actor's intimate parts. We would again refer you to the proposed draft from the Commission on the Status of Women which contains what we consider to be a much preferable definition of "sexual contact".

EVIDENCE

We strongly disagree with the evidence section proposed. It would not aid in eliminating the serious problem related to admission of the victim's past sexual history, does not accomplish the statutory elimination of the special corroboration requirements, and leaves too much to the discretion of an individual judge. It is too vague for a criminal statute, too general and inadequate. Recent court decisions have been encouraging, but these changes as exemplified in the court decisions should be clarified, made uniform, and clearly codified.