Page images
PDF
EPUB

367. The defendant appears, and in the same circumstantial, simple, and concise manner, sets forth, in writing, what he has to say in answer and defence to the suit. This is called an Answer which being signed and sworn to, is also filed with the clerk. The libellant, then, if he desires to dispute the answer, files a general denial. This is called a Replication -and the cause is at issue.

368. If, however, the defendant finds that, on the libel itself, the libellant ought not to have the relief for which he prays, or that the court have not jurisdiction, instead of answering the facts alleged in the libel, he may except to the libel, stating, in written exceptions, the points in which he considers the libellant's case defective. Or, if he have any single fact which should constitute a complete bar to the action, he may set that up alone, in an exceptive allegation, and rely upon it as a bar, or he may unite the whole in an answer-answering as to all the facts in the libel, and setting up others in avoidance or in bar, and stating his exceptions to the libel-and derive the same advantages from them as if he had set them up in separate pleadings. It was formerly held, that objections to the jurisdiction should be set up at the commencement of the proceedings, but it is now well settled, that objection to the jurisdiction may be taken at any stage of the proceedings.

This is true, however, in its full extent only, where the want of jurisdiction springs from the subject matter of the action. Where it is merely a matter of personal exemption or privilege, the court will, if practicable, hold that the appearance and answer of the defendant is a waiver of the exemption or privilege.(a) In like manner, the libellant may, instead of putting in a general replication, put in a special replication, setting up new matter-or he may, before putting in his replication, except to the answer for scandal, impertinence, or insufficiency, and submit its form or its substance to the decision of the court, before incurring the expense of a trial.

(a) Betts' Prac. 52. 7 Jur. 659. 1 Hag. Ec. 185. 3 Hag. 173. Ibid 337. 1 W. Rob. 62. Ibid. 293. 7 Jur. 659. 1 Curties, 481.

Ibid. 340.

Ware, 332.

369. Whenever a party desires the order of the court, regulating, correcting, modifying, or arresting the proceedings in a cause, or where any one desires to institute proceedings of an independent or summary character, without any formal suit or process of which the exercise of Admiralty powers furnish many instances a Petition or Motion is the usual mode of bringing the matter originally before the court, and the matter is carried to its final result, without the introduction of witnesses or the usual forms of a trial.

If, during any stages of the cause, security be required, it is usually given by stipulation, not under seal, instead of by bond or recognizance under seal.

370. The rules of Pleading in Admiralty do not require all the technical precision and accuracy which is necessary in the practice of the courts of common law, but they require that the cause of action should be plainly and explicitly set forth, in clear and intelligible language, so that the adverse party may understand what is the precise charge which he is required to answer and make up an issue directly upon the charge. Since the evidence must be confined to the matters put in issue by the pleadings, and the decree must follow the allegations and proofs, the pleadings cannot fail to be of great importance, and good pleading is nowhere more important, or more charac teristic of the best professional ability than in Admiralty.(a)

371. There are no established or necessary Forms, to which the pleadings or other proceedings or entries must conform-a party is at liberty to adopt such form and such phraseology as may best suit his taste, taking care that, in appropriate language, he bring his matter fully and intelligibly before the

It is, nevertheless, shown by universal experience, that well framed and appropriate forms, for the various steps of judicial proceedings, greatly contribute to the convenience of suitors and proctors, and promote that certainty, regularity, and

(a) Ware, 52. Ibid. 357.

intelligibility, which constitute the perfection of such proceedings, and that uniformity which is so desirable.(a)

There are inserted in the text only such characteristic forms as may be necessary, for the purpose of illustration and direction, and there is added, at the end of this volume, a more complete collection of forms, adapted to American Admiralty practice, than has been before brought together. Reference will be made to them, as the subjects are considered in the course of this work, and they will be referred to in the index.

(a) Betts' Prac. 17, 18.

CHAPTER XXI.

Practice of the District Court.-The Libel.

372. No process can issue from the District Court till the libel is filed in the Clerk's office, from which the process is to issue. The principles of the practice in this respect being, that no process should issue except as the act of the court, and that the court cannot exercise a proper discretion in issuing the process till the cause of action is properly placed before it, under the solemnity of an oath, with a proper prayer for relief. The first proceeding is, therefore, the Libel or Information. It is called a Libel in suits by individuals-an Information or Libel of Information, in suits by the government. Libels on behalf of the government are not required to be sworn to.(a)

§ 373. The Libel is a statement of the case upon which the libellant founds his right to recover, closing with a prayer for the proper relief. It should contain-the address to the Courta statement of the names of the parties-the general nature of the action-the facts which entitle the party to recover-a prayer for the relief which the party seeks-and for the process by which the adverse party or thing is to be brought before the court.(b)

The following is the form of a libel in personam :

§ 374. "To the Honorable Samuel R. Betts, Judge of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York:

"The Libel of Ebenezer N. Hinckley, of the city of New York, Mariner, against David L. Robinson, of the same city,

(a) S. C. Rule I.
(b) Betts' Prac. 18.

Dunlap Prac. 111, 113. Ware R. 385.
Hall's Prac. 121. Dunlap Prac. 112.

Merchant, owner of the ship Majestic, in a cause of contract, civil and maritime, alleges as follows:

§ 375. "First. That said David L. Robinson was, at the time in this article mentioned, owner of the ship Majestic, of New York, and said ship was lying in said port; and being such owner, sometime in the month of December, in the year eighteen hundred and thirty-seven, the said Robinson employed the libellant to take charge of and command said vessel as master, for a voyage from New York to Antwerp in Belgium-thence to such other port or ports as might be deemed expedient, and back to a port of discharge in the United States, at the wages of sixty dollars per month. And that in pursuance thereof, the libellant entered on board, and took charge of said ship as master thereof, on or about the eighth day of the said month of December.

376. "Second. That the said vessel having taken on board a cargo, the libellant as master proceeded with her for the port of Antwerp. That owing to the ice, they were entirely unable to reach Antwerp at that time, but were forced to put into Cowes in England, where they remained until they were enabled by the thawing of the ice, to reach Antwerp. That they safely arrived at Antwerp, and there discharged the cargo, and made freight. That the libellant then proceeded with said vessel in ballast, to the port of Bristol in England, and there took on board a cargo, and returned with said vessel to the port of New York, where she arrived, and discharged her cargo and made freight. And, on the 5th day of December, 1838, the said voyage for which the libellant had so engaged, being duly performed, the libellant was discharged from the said ship by said Robinson.

377. "Third. That during the whole time the libellant was master of said ship, he well and truly performed his duty as such master; whereby he was entitled to receive from the said Robinson, owner as aforesaid, the balance of his wages, amounting to five hundred and ninety-eight dollars and up

« PreviousContinue »