brought against a railroad corporation or the Director General of Railroads, because the question is not one arising in the administration of the Treasury Department. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, May 4, 1921. SIR: This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of February 9, 1921, requesting my opinion upon the following propositions: "1. Has the Bureau of War Risk Insurance the right, or is it the duty of the Director of the Bureau of War Risk Insurance, in making an award to a person entitled to compensation under the provisions of the War Risk Insurance Act who has been injured on a Federal controlled and operated railroad to require as a condition of the award of compensation such person to prosecute his cause of action, if any, in his own name against the Director General of Railroads, United States Railroad Administration, or the corporation upon whose line the injury occurred, or to require such person to assign to the United States any right of action such person may have, if any, so as to enforce a claim for liability against the Director General of Railroads or the railroad corporation? "2. Is a person injured under conditions described in the first question, or his widow or other person to whom the cause of action accrued in the event of his death, barred from maintaining a suit brought against a railroad corporation or the Director General of Railroads, either or both, if the injured person or such other person has applied for and received compensation under the terms of the War Risk Insurance Act?" Section 313 of the War Risk Insurance Act as amended (40 Stat. 613) provides: "(1) That if an injury or death for which compensation is payable under this article is caused under circumstances creating a legal liability upon some person other than the United States or the enemy to pay damages therefor, the director, as a condition to payment of compensation by the United States, may require the beneficiary to assign to the United States any right of action he may have to enforce such liability of such other person, or if it appears to be for the best interests of the beneficiary the director may ro quire him to prosecute the said action in his own name, subject to regulations. The director may require such assignment or prosecution at any time after the injury or death, and the failure on the part of the beneficiary to so assign or to prosecute said cause of action in his own name within a reasonable time, to be fixed by the director, shall bar any right to compensation on account of the same injury or death. The cause of action so assigned to the United States may be prosecuted or compromised by the director, and any money realized or collected thereon, less the reasonable expenses of such realization or collection, shall be placed to the credit of the military and naval compensation appropriation. If the amount placed to the credit of such appropriation in such case is in excess of the amount of the award of compensation, if any, such excess shall be paid to the beneficiary after any compensation award for the same injury or death is made. "If a beneficiary or conditional beneficiary shall have recovered, as a result of a suit brought by him or on his behalf, or as a result of a settlement made by him or on his behalf, any money or other property in satisfaction of the liability of such other person, such money or other property so recovered shall be credited upon any compensation payable, or which may become payable, to such beneficiary, or conditional beneficiary by the United States on account of the same injury or death. "(2) If an injury or death for which compensation may be payable under this article is caused under circumstances creating a legal liability upon some person, other than the United States or the enemy, to pay damages therefor, then, in order to preserve the right of action, the director may require the conditional beneficiary at any time after the injury or death, to assign such right of action to the United States, or, if it appears to be for the best interests of such conditional beneficiary, to prosecute the said cause of action in his own name, subject to regulations. The failure on the part of the beneficiary to so assign or to prosecute the said cause of action in his own name within a reasonable time, to be fixed by the director, shall bar any right to compensation on account of the same injury or death. The cause of action so assigned may be prosecuted or compromised by the director, and any money realized or collected thereon, less the reasonable expenses of such realization or collection, shall be paid to such beneficiary, and be credited upon any future compensation which may become payable to such beneficiary by the United States on account of the same injury or death. "(3) The bureau shall make all necessary regulations for carrying out the purposes of this section. For the purposes of computation only under this section the total amount of compensation due any beneficiary shall be deemed to be equivalent to a lump sum equal to the present value of all future payments of compensation computed as of the date of the award of compensation at four per centum, true discount, compounded annually. The probability of the beneficiary's death before the expiration of the period during which he is entitled to compensation shall be determined according to the American Experience Table of Mortality. "A conditional beneficiary is any person who may become entitled to compensation under this article on or after the death of the injured person. "Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose any administrative duties upon the War or Navy Departments." From the language of this section it appears that it is applicable only to those cases in which the injury or death for which compensation is payable is caused under circumstances creating a legal liability upon some person other than the United States or the enemy. It therefore becomes necessary to determine whether such legal liability incurred by a railroad under Government control is a liability of the United States or of some other person. By virtue of the power granted him by the Act of August 29, 1916 (39 Stat. 645), the President, by proclamation issued December 26, 1917, took possession and assumed control of the railroad systems of the United States, and this possession and control the United States Supreme Court has held was complete and replaced entirely the previous possession and control of the private ownership theretofore existing. (Northern Pacific Railway Company v. North Dakota, 250 U. S. 135.) This proclamation provided that possession, control, operation, and utilization of such transportation systems should be exercised through the Director General of Railroads, and that "suits may be brought by and against said carriers and judgments rendered as hitherto until and except so far as said Director may, by general or special orders, otherwise determine." On March 21, 1918 (40 Stat. 451), Congress enacted the Federal Control Act, by virtue of which all the earnings of the railroads were expressly made the property of the United States; and on October 28, 1918, the Director General, in the administration of Federal control, issued his General Order No. 50, in which he recited that suits were being brought against the carrier corporations on matters based on causes of action arising under Federal control for which the said carrier corporations were not responsible, and directed that actions, including claims for death or injury to persons arising after December 31, 1917, and growing out of the possession, use, control, or operation of the railroads by the Director General, and which but for Federal control might have been brought against the carrier company, should be brought against the Director General. It has been held in many jurisdictions that such actions as above, instituted against the Director General of Railroads, are in effect suits against the United States, and that the carrier companies are not liable. See: Pullman Co. v. Sweeney, 269 Fed. 764; Mardis v. Hines, 267 Fed. 171; Erie Railroad Co. v. Caldwell, 264 Fed. 947; Blevins v. Hines, 264 Fed. 1005; Westbrook v. Director General of Railroads, 263 Fed. 211; Smith v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 260 Fed. 679; The Transportation Act of 1920 provides that actions which accrued during Federal control and which were previously directed to be brought against the Director Gen 89836-22-VOL 32-37 eral are, after the termination of such control, to be brought against an agent designated by the President for that purpose, and judgments, decrees, and awards in such actions are made payable out of a revolving fund created by section 210 of the Act and appropriated from the Treasury of the United States. (41 Stat. 456, 468.) I conclude from the above that the liability incurred by a railroad under Government control for an injury or death is a liability of the United States and not a liability of "some person other than the United States," within the language of section 313 of the War Risk Insurance Act, and your first question is therefore answered in the negative. Your second question does not appear to me to present a proper matter for an opinion by the Attorney General, since it is not one arising in the administration of your department, but rather one for the benefit of claimants; it has always been the policy of the Attorneys General to render opinions to the heads of executive departments only when such questions relate to matters calling for action or decision on their part. 20 Opinions of Attorneys General, 463, 279, 251, 608, 723. 21 Opinions of Attorneys General, 201, 174. The Secretary of the Treasury is not called upon to render legal advice to persons claiming compensation under the War Risk Insurance Act, or for injuries caused by operation of railroads under Federal control, and for these reasons I must decline to answer this question. Respectfully, HARRY M. DAUGHERTY. To the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. TRANSFER OF REGISTERED LIBERTY LOAN BONDS. Under the circumstances herein stated, where a default judgment was rendered in the Circuit Court of Bergen County, New Jersey, against the owner of certain registered Liberty loan bonds and, pursuant to such judgment, the bonds were sold and the sale ap |