1877.] THE ERROR OF TOO MUCH RETICENCE.

157

Present appearances in the political, religious, and commercial departments of our civilised world hang with the gloom of heavy clouds over the dawn of that prospect; but as hope lay under a load of evil in Pandora's box, and as, from our experience of nature's operations, we perceive that extremes are apt to produce their contraries, we may be allowed to hold good against the suggestions of utter discouragement. The reader need not be reminded of the destructive wars which, on a colossal scale and with frequent recurrence, have marked the last thirty years; what mighty changes in the relative condition of states have in consequence taken place, side by side with a series of scientific triumphs for the most part auxiliary to the arts of peace and the brotherhood of human societies. Still less need he be told that the spirit of violence and unscrupulous enmity is now culminating in horrors which render every field of battle the slaughterhouse of an heroic soldiery with no result but that of preparation for other scenes of carnage more hideous still. Exhaustive sacrifices declare the patriotism and religious zeal of either belligerent. There is no visible relaxation of hostility in Turkey or in Russia. The charities of Christendom bend over the sufferers with impartial benevolence. Surgeons and nurses of repute encounter in numbers privation and danger at the call of humanity. Reporters of every description throng the fields of conflict. Voices of sorrow and indignation resound from every quarter. The neutral Governments alone, as it would seem, are mute and motionless. Neither the waste of life in regular armies, nor wanton cruelties of the undisciplined, have called forth any authoritative expression of censure on such astounding excesses. Still less are they known to have made any overture leading to the acceptance of their mediation by the belligerent Powers. Their reticence at such a crisis may be regretted the more as European

interests are concerned in no small degree. Russian ambition and Turkish vengeance are alike to be apprehended, and consequently to be kept in check. Whatever may be thought of their respective lines of conduct, the tributary frontier provinces have claims on the sympathy of all who believe as Christians, and reprobate as men political oppression. Their position, if Russia should prove too weak to stipulate on their behalf, would probably be grievous in the extreme. Should victory declare itself finally in favour of Russia, the sovereign of that country may find himself compelled by the clamour of his subjects to demand concessions injurious to the interests of Europe, and emphatically to those of England. To obtain the concurrence of several independent Powers in the course of action suggested by these remarks would, no doubt, be a task of considerable difficulty. But to overcome the worst difficulties for a great and beneficent purpose is true glory, and well might Englishmen be proud of their government if the attempt were made in good faith and by suitable means, though without any adequate success.

STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

XIV.

RECOLLECTIONS OF THE REVIVAL OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE.

[PART I., AUGUST, 1878.]

SOME papers recently laid on the table of the House of Commons relate to transactions concerning Greece of a somewhat distant date, but closely connected with the interests of that country in its present and prospective state.

It so happened that I was called upon to take an active part in the negotiations which led to the revival of Hellenic independence, nor have I ever ceased to give my earnest attention to the conduct of the Government established at Athens, and the condition of the people submitted constitutionally to its rule. These circumstances concur to flatter me with the hope of rendering some little service to the cause of inquiry by putting into a convenient shape such recollections as I retain of the occurrences in question. In aid of a memory subject to the usual infirmities, I shall have recourse to the surer testimony of correspondence, quotations from which will occasionally find a place in the following pages.

It was not till after my return from America in the autumn of 1823 that I had anything to do with the affairs of Greece. Even then I had first to go through a series of conferences, having for their object the friendly settlement

of all our outstanding differences with the United States. This interesting but fruitless negotiation occupied several months of the following year, and its failure, though much to be regretted, had the consolation of not being attributable to the British Government or its representatives.

The appointment in view was an embassy at the Sultan's court, and consequently an immediate connection with the conflict still raging between the Porte and its Hellenic subjects. Hence it was that I had to visit St. Petersburg before I went to my further destination at Stamboul. The basis of a mediation between the contending parties, to one at least of whom a friendly proposal of that kind was thought likely to prove agreeable, had to be laid down at the former capital, and happy should I have been to share in the accomplishment of so laudable a plan. Mr. Canning was at that time Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and he directed me to draw up a statement of the various points which would probably have to be considered in discussing the range and character of the intended offer. The memorandum, which I wrote in consequence, is too long for insertion here, but parts of it, and those the very first, may be introduced with some degree of advantage. They follow word for word :

It is presumed that the British Government would hail the complete independence of Greece, if effected by the Greeks themselves, as the best solution of the difficulties connected with the present conflict between that country and the Porte; but sentiments of humanity, and the natural sympathy between a people in the possession of liberty and a people struggling to obtain it, must not be allowed to operate to the exclusion of all other considerations. Some views of British policy may perhaps combine with the best feelings of human nature to induce Great Britain to stand forward without reserve in support of the independence of Greece, but there is no denying that to place herself in such an attitude she must act in contradiction to that pacific and comprehensive system of policy which she has adopted for the most beneficial purposes, at the risk of being involved in war without the support of her principal allies, and on very questionable grounds of justice.

1878.]

MEMORANDUM ON GREEK AFFAIRS.

161

The opinions of the leading powers of Europe have been given in favour of an arrangement which, though it holds out important advantages to Greece, would nevertheless have the effect of replacing that country under the sovereignty of the Porte. It is not to be expected that the Sultan would give up so large a portion of his empire without an appeal to arms, especially at the requisition of a single power. The right of Great Britain to make such a requisition under the present circumstances would find but little countenance either in the principles of the law of nations, or in any specific obligations contracted by Turkey.

It is therefore evident that in the conferences at Petersburg there can be no question of the complete independence of Greece, but only of its pacification on terms consistent on one side with the sovereignty of the Porte, and calculated on the other to secure the Greeks in essential points from the violence and misgovernment of their former possessors. If the Sultan cannot be required to relinquish the entire sovereignty of Greece, neither can the Greeks be required to return to their former position under his sway.

Considering the dreadful extremities to which the war in Greece has been carried, and the very great uncertainty of its final issue, the Allied Powers cannot fail to serve both the contending parties by engaging them to sacrifice a part of their respective pretensions for the restoration of peace. But if the same motives which preclude Great Britain and the Allies from insisting on the independence of Greece restrain them also from going to war in support of the plan which they are preparing to urge on the acceptance of the Porte, it is but fair that they should abstain from employing any degree of coercion to bring the Greeks into their measures.

The Greeks may act unwisely in preferring a precarious independence accompanied with war in its worst shape, to any arrangement which the Allied Powers are likely to effect in their behalf, but it would surely be the height of injustice and cruelty to deny them the right of judging for themselves in a case of such vital importance. It thus appears that in attempting the pacification of Greece the Allies are bound to stop short of war.

But it would be a fatal mistake to suppose, while determining not to go the length of hostilities, that any plan of pacification at all acceptable to the Greeks can be pressed with success upon the Porte by other means than those of a virtual compulsion.

The Turks, in shutting their eyes to the most obvious considerations of policy and humanity, might plead the example of nations far superior to them in the arts of government, and enjoying the advantages of a purer religion. But to induce the Porte to recede in any degree from the contest in which she is now engaged, an apprehension of something worse than the continuance of that contest, however sanguinary and impolitic, of some evil more to be dreaded than an insurrection of the

M