settlement, of that question which now, with few exceptions, agitates alike the feeling and the thinking world.

Our national hatred of cruelty is now finding vent in various effusions of writing and speech. Crimes that shock human feeling are always liable to be stated with exaggeration, and acts of brutality are but too likely to lie at the door of each party engaged in extreme contention. Even the present burst of indignation may easily run into excess. But official reports show that there is really matter enough for general reprobation. The public expression of it, however, to prove remedial, should be temperate, the offspring of reason rather than of passion.

I do not wish to pass my opinions for more than they are worth; what I have at heart is to make them clear. The sum of them is to close the war in Turkey by a peace which would leave the Turks at Constantinople under terms of agreement with the great Powers of Christendom-terms confirming the autonomy of the tributary Principalities, extending to the Empire at large the reforms recognized as necessary for its government on sounder principles of administration, together with the equitable treatment of all classes of its subjects, and, lastly, establishing securities for a faithful execution of the settlement in all its parts. I must conclude with a word of regret that the confidence which to all appearances we are now placing in the other parties to our mediation was not employed from the beginning to put England in her right position at their side.

STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE,

V.

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE EASTERN DIFFICULTY,

[The following memorandum was written about the same time as the preceding letter, and is therefore inserted here. It has not hitherto been published.]

NOVEMBER, 1876.

As it has come to my knowledge that persons, who approve my opinions on the Eastern Question, entertain serious doubts of their practicability, I hold it a duty at the present momentous crisis to draw up a fuller statement of the proceedings which seem to me best calculated to effect the desired settlement. The difficulties are great, but not, I trust, insuperable. The results in view are certainly far greater still. The first essential step is obviously a conference with, or which might be better, without the Porte. Equally indispensable is a Formal Convention between the Six Christian Powers signataries of the general treaty concluded at Paris in 1856. The Powers should declare by such instrument the reasons of their interference, its ultimate objects, and the principal measures required to realize them. The objects in question are these: 1. Restoration of peace on durable grounds in the disturbed Turkish Provinces; 2. The territorial status quo of Turkey under the Sultan's sovereignty, and 3. The reform, with efficient securities, of its administrative system on sound and equitable principles.

The next progressive move should be a Capitulation or Treaty between the Porte and the Six Powers, each and all, the Porte thereby agreeing in definite, binding terms to

establish forthwith a Commission, composed, in certain proportions, of the Sultan's Mussulman and non-Mussulman subjects, together with foreigners, and empowered to frame and carry into lasting effect the prescribed reforms.

Let the President of the Commission be appointed by the Sultan, and have two lateral advisers named, or at least approved by the Christian Powers in some manner previously agreed upon.

Foreign Members of the Commission to be appointed and replaced when necessary by the several Christian Powers, to whom they would have to report and to be entirely amenable.

Cases of difference when arising among the members of the Commission to be referred to the High Contracting Parties.

Provision to be made against unnecessary delays by rendering those who are convicted of causing them personally responsible. A special committee might be charged with this judicial duty.

The local application of reforms can only be effected by joint special agents, Turk and Christian, under the supervision of an officer (consul or agent) representing the Christian Powers, and authorised to act in concert with local councils, or other recognised parties immediately concerned.

These requirements, though meant to be temporary, must of course be allowed sufficient time for planting and taking root.

Some mode of meeting the requisite outlay must be settled by previous agreement.

In some districts local peculiarities will require a modification of general rules.

Agents at a distance from the capital will have need of armed protection by a police or military force.

1876.]

REFORMS MUST BE COMPULSORY.

31

Any indispensable occupation of Turkish territory by foreigners must be strictly limited as to force, time, and duty.

N.B.-The terms proposed by Lord Derby, and accepted with some point of difference by Russia, are supposed to form the basis of settlement in the five disturbed provinces of European Turkey.

Of those reforms which extend throughout the Empire my suggestions, as published from time to time, may be borne in mind as an approximate, if not a complete, summary.

The Porte can hardly be expected to consent to the preceding stipulations, unless a sense of necessity is made to pervade her counsels in virtue of settled resolutions from without.

VI.

TERMS OF PEACE.

[After the capture of the Schipka Pass by the Russian army, the terms on which a peace between Russia and Turkey might be based, were thus considered in a letter to the Times.]

JANUARY 15, 1878.

THE great question which has occupied Europe so long is now approaching, if it has not already reached, a point at which all mystery and reserve must be thrown aside. Fact must take the place of conjecture, and Cabinets must open their doors to the rush of public anxiety. After much discouragement, the Russians are riding on the tide of victory; the Turks are preparing to sue for peace; the neutral Powers, with the exception of England, show no inclination to move; and England, as far as we know, confines herself to a faint overture which finds no favour with the Russian authorities. Russia has declared herself willing to make peace, but only by direct and separate negotiation with the Turks. In these circumstances the question which presses for solution on the parties to the Treaty of Paris, and more particularly, perhaps, on England, is this:-Which of two courses is preferable-namely, by some diplomatic declaration, single or combined, to draw the line which Russia will not be allowed to pass without remonstrance, or to wait in silent but watchful neutrality until the Russian conditions of peace are brought unmistakably to light?

A direct negotiation between the belligerents has necessarily the effect of giving the stronger of the two parties