number of whose members shall include, in fair proportion, foreigners as well as Mussulmans, and other subjects of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan.

Eighthly, that the preceding articles shall be made the subject matter of a convention between the Sultan and his Allies, the Mediating Powers; and the effective execution of the same be placed under the superintendence of a mixed, responsible Commission.

*

*

*

*

*

Objections, however, may be taken to a plan of settlement comprising so much sacrifice of habitual thought and departure from rooted practice on the part of Turkey and on that of its Christian allies so much inconvenient trouble and complicated machinery. Doubts may also be entertained as to the right of foreign Governments to carry their interference beyond the line of earnest persuasion or urgent remonstrance. Unquestionably, however, these are means to be employed, if at all, in the first instance. The terms suggested above may be worked into a more practicable shape without ceasing to be efficient. Failure of the experiment would no more close the door against a stronger pressure than the refusal of Austria's terms by the Insurgents has done. Proceedings of a more effective kind might, indeed, be warranted by considerations which can hardly be overlooked with prudence or safety. Their objects would be the maintenance of peace, the correction of pernicious abuses, the rescue of millions from injustice and degrada tion, the retention by Turkey of as much sovereign and national individuality as circumstances originating from itself allow it to enjoy. If something more positive in point of right is required, we must take into account the Porte's unfulfilled engagements, the services attended with much cost of life and treasure which the Allies, or some of them at least, have rendered in recent times to its Empire, and

1876.]

A CHOICE OF EVILS.

19

the sacrifices which they are still eventually bound to make on its behalf. It would surely be a crying scandal for Christendom if the Turks, who effected their conquests in the name of religion, were left to endanger the peace of Europe, and to oppress a numerous population of Christians, deriving their ability to do so from the wealth of Christian countries and the indifference, not to say complicity, of Christian Governments. Apprehensions are entertained by some that the Sultan, if pressed too closely by the Allies, might have recourse to the religious feeling of his Mussulman subjects and thereby get up a fanatical rising of the masses. Such a resistance is, no doubt, possible, but it would be full of danger to the Turks themselves, and the experience of a century, which has been marked by events destructive of Turkish ascendency, encourages a very different expectation.

Let it not be forgotten that the actual position of Turkey is one of dependence amounting virtually to tutelage displayed unmistakably from time to time; that the Powers who have opened a mediation between the Sultan and his insurgent subjects must either give a stronger tone to their interference or fall back into a state of inaction; that such interference ending in smoke would be no less fatal to its objects than inaction itself, and that to join in forcing the Insurgents into submission is an extremity not to be supposed.

It is obvious that where there is only a choice of evils, the adoption of the least is what may be fairly termed a necessity.

If the plan suggested herein, whether modified or not, were deemed after due reflection on any account inadmissible, the great interests involved in the Eastern Ques tion, and those of England in particular, would never cease to engage the attention of Statesmen, and at times to un

settle the most peaceful relations. The command of the Suez Canal may go far to secure our communications with India, but we should have ample reasons for regretting the transfer of Constantinople from its present occupants to those who will have the best chance of being their successors. The vast basin of productive countries, to which the Bosphorus and Dardanelles are open outlets, could not be closed without commensurate injury to our commerce and influence; it could not be held by any Power jealous of its advantages without giving a very precarious character to our positions in the Levant.

A hint of some arrangement, if not more agreeable to the Porte, at least more decidedly remedial, has been thrown out quite recently by the public Press. It was even described as likely to become an object of discussion at Berlin on the occasion of the Russian Emperor's visit to that capital. Herzegovina and Bosnia might, indeed, be put into a state of vassalage to the Sultan, similar to that in which Servia stands. A belt of such principalities, including Moldavia, Walachia, and Montenegro, interposed between Russia and Austria on the one side and Turkey on the other, might operate as a protection to the Ottoman dominion in Europe and a pledge of durable peace in that quarter. In fairness to the Turkish proprietors, facilities would have to be given for the settlement elsewhere of such of them as chose to emigrate and for the sale of their lands and houses. On the other hand, the Sultan's concession would carry with it a just claim for tribute from the emancipated Provinces, and they, while entitled to the Porte's protection, would be secured against the entrance of Turkish troops, except on the request, in due form, of the provincial authorities. Arrangements of this kind are by no means unprecedented even now in the annals of Turkey. To go

1876.]

CESSION OF LAND TO GREECE.

21

no further, Mahomedan Egypt, as every one knows, is tributary to the Sultan; and in Mahmoud's reign, not half a century ago, a very considerable tract of land was ceded to Greece for a sum of money by no means equal to its value.

STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

IV.

THE GREAT POWERS AND THE PORTE.

[This letter was addressed to the Times in September, 1876, when Servia, worsted in her contest with the Porte, had appealed to the Powers for mediation. In this letter also will be found reflections and suggestions which are not less applicable to the state of Turkey now than they were four years ago.]

SEPTEMBER 9TH, 1876.

THE Eastern Question has by degrees assumed such large proportions that no one can be surprised at the space it occupies in all public discussions, whether of the tongue or of the pen. The special interest which circumstances of the past engage me to take in its solution will, I hope, induce you to receive with indulgence some further remarks of mine on that subject; shown, as it now is, to be pregnant with the most perilous consequences. Little more than a year has elapsed since the insurrection in European Turkey was confined to one small province bordering on the Austrian dominions. Those who, like myself, had been personally long mixed up with Levantine affairs could hardly fail to detect in that very limited disturbance a principle of growth. which threatened to give it an extension fatal to the peace of other and distant countries. Even the three Northern Emperors, from whom proceeded the Andrassy Note, and whose chief motive of interference would seem to have been Austrian, gave a general character to the demand of reforms which they addressed to the Ottoman Government. What in the beginning was an impulse of reasonable foresight is now proved to have been a just apprehension of consequences more than probable. It is worth while to bear this in mind