once more became the prominent feature in the history of European politics. Selections have necessarily been made, as many passages referred solely to events passing at the time, and could have no permanent interest. The volume concludes with several articles published during the last five years, and reprinted from the Nineteenth Century Review by kind permission of the Editor. December, 1880. THE EASTERN QUESTION. I. TURKISH FINANCE. [The following is a memorandum, now published for the first time, on the financial state of Turkey before she repudiated her debt.] WRITTEN IN THE AUTUMN OF 1874. THE financial state of the Turkish Empire is not alone interesting to those who have dividends to receive out of the Porte's revenue. The Governments of Christendom, the allied Powers, as the strongest of them are called, have no slight motives for keeping a watchful eye over it. England, in particular, is deeply concerned in its prosperity. It is very desirable for all that Turkey should not become the occasion of another European war. If there be any exception to this, it would be of one whose successes would be generally unpopular, and whose reverses could only be effected at a considerable cost of life and treasure. Three of the Allies have entered into a treaty by which they are engaged to maintain the integrity of the Turkish territory. This treaty bears the signatures of France and Austria, joined with that of England. Guarantees of this general kind are always open to criticism, and applied to the Turkish dominions, the policy of binding any country to a principle so eventually embarrassing is more than questionable. B However, be that as it may, we are thus bound; and a contingency may occur which may oblige us either to shake off our responsibility in no very creditable manner, or to incur, without choice, an amount of sacrifice, equal at least, to that which attended the Crimean War. Supposing Russia, or Germany, or both, to attack or seriously to menace the independence of Turkey, we might not be able to achieve the same success, which twenty years ago, raised us to so commanding a position in the Conference at Paris. Instead of dictating, we might have to sue. Now, weakness, whatever may be its cause, whether it spring from internal discord, or from a deficiency in the means of defence, is that condition of a state which especially provokes differences and invites hostility. Turkey has always, unhappily, the former source of weakness in her bosom. Greeks, Servians, Roumanians, Bulgarians, Armenians, Albanians, Bosnians and Montenegrins, whether subjects or recognizing the Sultan as their suzerain, look to some opportunity for asserting their independence. They can be easily kept down by the Ottoman authorities when the Porte is on terms of amity with the greater Powers, but they are dangerously explosive when they can hope for support from without. Add to this cause of weakness a state of finance unequal to the requirements of defence, and it is evident that the independence of Turkey must either be sacrificed, or rescued from ruin at the cost of one or all of its guaranteeing allies. Such being the case, it is equally manifest that England has a very deep interest in the healthy condition of Turkish finance. Let us see how this matter stands at the present time. Anything but satisfactory in point of facts, anything but encouraging in point of opinion. The Turkish Budget presents a deficit of several millions sterling. The interest of loans and sinking funds together absorb the half or |