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meaning of the phrase under consideration accurately, has also told us, that the primary signification of this verb may be expressed by two other phrases, viz. mediator sum, and mediatorem ago, and has not noticed any other, As, then, the primary signification of this word may be expressed by either of these two phrases, if we can fix on a living inediatorial agent, who either interposed himself, or was interposed by the invisible Jehovah, between two personal extremes, under the circumstance here stated, namely, by an oath, what necessity is there to look for any other mediatorial agent in this case? And do we not several times read of a mediator in this same sacred volume, and even in this same epistle, and as being a mediator for some extraordinary purpose? And are we not therein expressly assured, that there is no other but this one mediator? Why then should any one not care to allow that his intervention is not here spoken of? But between what two parties did this extraordinary mediator, so particularly and so often recommended to our notice in the New Testament, place himself? Was God's promise the creditor that demanded restitution, or the judge or plaintiff that required satisfaction? No-we are expressly told that it was God himself. God, we are moreover told, by the same authority, is but one. And a mediator is not a mediator of one. And who, then, was the other party? If we may believe the same writer, it was men; for we find he has positively asserted, that there is one God, and one mediator between God and men, namely, the Man Christ Jesus. Since, then, we have every circumstance of that extraordinary mediator, mentioned in this epistle, so particularly pointed out to us; and both the principal extreme and the mediatorial agent so clearly ascertained, why should we think it at all likely that TEDGE o ought rather to be understood of God interposing himself with or by an oath, that is, with an oath as a sort of coefficient, or by an oath as his substitute, either between himself and his promise, or between his promise and mankind, than of his having interposed himself as a mediator, conformably to his oath, between himself, instead of his promise, and mankind? especially as we perceive that the former interpretation cannot be made without the assistance of either cum or per, and the latter offers itself to the understanding without the assistance of either? Surely, when we consider further that a mediator is spoken of in this one

epistle

epistle as often as in all the other books of the New Tes tament; and that he is therein said to be " a mediator of the New Testament*," "of a new covenant†,” and even "of a better covenant, founded upon better promises;"

that by means of death, for the redemption of the transgressions that were under the First Testament, they which are called might receive the promise of eternal inheritance;" and, when we consider still farther again, that God had promised even with an oath, that he would bless mankind in the seed of Abraham, in what other sense can the words σITEVσ ogxw be, with propriety, understood (and in this epistle especially), but as declaratory of that mediatorship which the only-begotten, the wellbeloved Son of God so gloriously fulfilled? What can be more likely than that this same sacred writer, who is thought to be the only writer of the New Testament that hath used the word ons, and who, if he be, has used it six times in three epistles, and thrice out of that number in this one epistle, intended to say here that God became a mediator agreeably to his oath, in the person of a descendant of Abraham? Would the two immutable things be less clearly distinguished in that case than they are at present? Or rather, would they not be so accurately defined that no two things in the world can be more distinct? And would not the heirs of promise have one more assurance ofthe immutability of the counsel of God than Abraham had, and an incomparably more abundant assurance? We find it is asserted of these two immutable things, that in them (it was] impossible for God to lie; but was it more certain that God would fulfill his promise before he had done it completely, than it was afterwards? And consequently had not the heirs of pro mise after Christ had attested the oath of the everlasting Father at the expense of his life, a proportionably greater reason to look forward a long way with the most cheerful patience in expectation of a better life? Abraham, we find, had only the promise confirmed by an oath, and by the encouragement which he derived from this assurance only, he rejoiced to see our glorious Mediator's

* ix. 15. † xii. 24. ↑ viii. 6.

|| Beza says, "Græcus scholiastes putat verbo μεσιτεύω designari promissionem istam jam tum interventore Christo conceptam," and then im mediately adds, "quod sane verum est."

§ Viz, Gal, iii 20. 1 Tim, ii. 5, Heb.

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day;

day, and he looking far forward into futurity, saw it and was glad, and thus in contemplation enjoyed the promise, But God, we also find, hath given to the heirs an incomparably more abundant proof of the immutability of his counsel, than he did to Abraham, by fulfilling his promise. But to what end? To the end that they also, being assured, not by one immutable thing as Abraham was, but by two, (and by the latter of which it was clearly put out of all doubt, that God had not forgotten his former covenant with Abraham)" might have a consolation so strong, an anchor of the soul" so "sure and stedfast," as would, if constantly adhered to, finally secure their admission through that veil, within which Jesus as a forerunner is for us entered, being made an high-priest for ever after the order of Melchisedec.

7966

ON STONE'S VISITATION SERMON.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE ORTHODOX CHURCHMAN'S

N

SIR,

MAGAZINE.

strictures on Stone's visitation sermon, in your highly

Your just and proper) you seem to lament the great want of discipline in our Church, and have adduced the pamphlet in question as a striking instance of the same. In reply to this, I must beg leave to observe, that in the present case I trust it will appear that there are no grounds for this charge. If any thing has been wrong indeed, it must be imputed to the Archdeacon, who has certainly been very remiss, if not highly culpable, in neglecting to make a proper report of the sermon to the Bishop of the diocese. The discourse is, indeed, throughout fraught with such impiety and blasphemy, and has such a mischievous tendency, that no time should have been lost in making the matter known to the diocesan. And I cannot but think that the Archdeacon has by no means done justice to his office, nor to the clergy who were present, in being silent on such an occasion. But the worthy Bishop of the diocese, ever attentive as he is to the

duties of his function, as soon as he was apprized of the matter, and had seen the discourse, immediately wrote to the Archdeacon, expostulating with him on the subject. And I can take upon me to say, that he means to proceed against the author in a legal way. For this purpose he has already advised with his Chancellor, Sir William Scott, and with his Commissary, Dr. Swabey, and now waits till he can see the Archbishop of Canterbury, and consult with him further on the business. And it may be presumed that his Grace, as Metropolitan of the province, will find himself interested in the cause, and join with the Bishop in carrying on a prosecution, and bringing the author to condign punishment for this blasphemous discourse, which he had the assurance to deliver before so respectable an audience as generally attend the Visitation at Danbury.

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In the mean time I would suggest to our superiors, that I conceive the author is liable to be indicted at Westminster Hall, on the Statute of the 9th and 10th of William III. for the more effectual suppressing of blasphemy and prophaneness. By this it is enacted, “that if any person educated in, or having made profession of, the Christian Religion in this realm, shall by writing, printing, teaching, or advised speaking, deny any one of the persons of the Holy Trinity to be God; or shall assert or maintain there are more Gods than one; or shall deny the Christian Religion to be true, or the Holy Scriptures to be of Divine authority; and shall be convicted thereof in any of the Courts of Westminster, or at the assizes, on the oaths of two witnesses, he shall for the first offence be rendered incapable to have or to hold any office ecclesiastical, civil, or military (unless he shall renounce such opinion in the court where he was convicted within four months after such conviction ;) and for the second offence he shall be disabled from being plaintiff, guardian, executor, or administrator, to take any gift or legacy, or bear any office, and shall be imprisoned for three years."

As the author of this discourse, therefore, has clearly. offended against several provisions of this act, he is certainly liable to a prosecution in Westminster Hall for the same. And there seems to be a peculiar propriety in proceeding against him under this act; as there were directions from the King and Council in the time of George

the

the I. 1714, and again in the time of George the II. 1721, to the Archbishops and Bishops for the preserving of unity in the Church, and the purity of the Christian Faith. And these directions require them to put in force this act of William III. for the more effectual suppressing of blasphemy and profaneness; and do more especially enjoin," that no preacher whatsoever, in his Sermon or Lecture, do presume to deliver any other doctrine concerning the great and fundamental truths of our most Holy Religion, and particularly concerning the blessed Trinity, than what are contained in the Holy Scriptures, and are agreeable to the three Creeds, and the 39articles of Religion." If the author, therefore, should be convicted under this act, he would either be removed from his office in the Church, which he has so disgraced by this Discourse, or else be made to recant these his wicked errors and heresies publicly in a court of justice.

It is also to be presumed that blasphemy is an offence at common law, as well as under this statute. And on these grounds it should seem that Woolston was prosecuted and convicted in the court of King's Bench on four informations for blasphemous Discourses on the miracles of our Saviour. He was sentenced to pay a fine of twenty-five pounds for each of his four discourses, to suffer one year's imprisonment, and to enter into a recognizance for his good behaviour during life, himself in three thousand pounds, and two others in two thousand pounds. And in this cause the court declared that Christianity was a part of the law of the land, and that to write against it in general was certainly an offence punishable at common law.

On the same ground, it appears that a prosecution was carried on against T. Williams, for publishing the Age of Reason, written by Thomas Paine. The trial came on in the court of King's Bench, June 28th, 1797, when the present Lord Chancellor, then the Hon. Thomas Erskine, delivered an able and eloquent defence of the Christian religion; and Lord Kenyon, then Chief Justice, in his charge to the Jury, declared he was bound to state to them what his predecessor had done in Woolston's case half a century ago, namely, that the Christian Religion is part of the law of the land. The worthy Jadge also delivered his own sentiments on the occasion; that he himself was fully impressed with the great truths of Religion, and which he thanked God he had been

taught

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