removal of a suit from a state court to a federal court seems properly construed in the present case in the same way. A rather ambiguous dictum in a recent Supreme Court decision implied that under these facts jurisdiction could not be obtained by a circuit court even by consent of the parties. In re Wisner, 203 U. S. 449. Accordingly the decisions of several of the lower federal courts have reached that result. See Yellow Aster, etc., Co. v. Crane Co., 150 Fed. 580. The dictum, however, was not universally accepted. Proctor Coal Co. v. U. S. Fidelity, etc., Co., 158 Fed. 211.

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HUSBAND AND WIFE LIABILITIES OF HUSBAND AS TO THIRD PARTIES EFFECT OF MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACTS ON HUSBAND'S LIABILITY for Torts oF WIFE. A former act provided that in actions of tort against a husband and a wife for the tort of the wife, execution should first be levied on the lands of the wife. A later statute repealed this act, and provided that a wife might sue and be sued in all matters as if she were sole. Held, that this statute abolishes by implication the common law liability of the husband for the torts of his wife. Schuler v. Henry, 94 Pac. 360 (Colo., Sup. Ct.).

At common law a wife was liable for her torts. Hall v. White, 27 Conn. 488. But, as she was not sui juris, it was necessary to join her husband in order to have a proper party defendant. Capel v. Powell, 17 C. B. (N. s.) 744. Once joined, the law did not consider it unfair, in view of his control over the person and property of his wife, to subject his property to execution. BACON, ABR., Baron & Feme, F. Also, since a debtor's person could be taken on execution, a judgment against the wife as a feme sole so endangered the husband's legal right to her society without hearing him in defense, that he could bring error. Haydon v. Miller, 2 Rolle 53; Hayward v. Williams, Style 254, 280. But, since his liability arose only from the wife's legal disability, it ceased on her death. Previous statutes had abolished the husband's right over his wife's person and property and the right to take a debtor's person on execution. The present statute, by abolishing the last relics of the wife's disability, removed the necessity which caused the husband's liability. Though married women's property acts vary greatly and the decisions under them are consequently in great conflict, the modern tendency of the law as to married women seems to favor this result. Martin v. Robson, 65 Ill. 129.

HUSBAND AND WIFE-WIFE'S SEPARATE ESTATE LIABILITY OF SEPARATE ESTATE ON CONTRACT OF SURETYSHIP. A statute provided that married women might contract with reference to their legal separate property as if unmarried. The defendant, a married woman, signed a note as surety. Held, that she is not liable. Bank of Commerce v. Baldwin, 93 Pac 504 (Idaho). See NOTES, p. 619.

INSANE PERSONS CONVEYANCES - How Avoided. - In an action of ejectment the defendants claimed title under a deed from the plaintiffs' ancestor to a bona fide purchaser. The plaintiffs offered evidence to show that the grantor was insane when he made the deed. The evidence was excluded on the ground that such deed can only be avoided in equity. Held, that the exclusion of this evidence was error. Smith v. Ryan, 191 N. Y. 452.

For a criticism of the decision in the lower court, see 20 HARV. L. REV. 419.

INSURANCE AMOUNT OF RECOVERY - DESTRUCTION BY FIRE OF BUILDING CONDEMNED AS A NUISANCE. The defendant corporation insured the plaintiff's building knowing, through its agent, that the city authorities had condemned the building as a nuisance. The authorities were on the point of tearing it down, when it was destroyed by fire. Held, that the plaintiff may recover full damages. Irvin v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 109 N. Y. Supp. 612 (Sup. Ct.).

The court rightly found that the plaintiff had an insurable interest in the condemned building; for any interest in property the loss of which will occasion a pecuniary injury to the insured may be the subject of an insurance contract. Riggs v. Commercial Mut. Ins. Co., 125 N. Y. 7. But the question is sug

gested, whether the case is within the rule that where the insured premises are used for an unlawful purpose, an insurance contract covering them is void as against public policy. Johnson v. Union, etc., Ins. Co., 127 Mass. 555. This rule is frequently applied where liquor is illegally sold on the insured premises, on the ground that the insurance encourages violations of the law. Kelly v. Worcester Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 97 Mass. 284. In Michigan, Iowa, and Kansas, however, the rule is rejected on the ground that the insurance is too remotely connected with the illegal transactions. De Graff v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 12 Mich. 124. In the present case it seems clear that maintaining the nuisance was too remote a consideration to avoid the contract within the rule. See Loehner v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 17 Mo. 247. But it is submitted that the proper indemnity for the loss would have been the actual value of the building as about to be torn down. See Huckins v. People's Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 31 N. H. 238.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE CONTROL BY STATES - PEDDLERS Subject tO STATE LICENSE TAX. The defendant was the agent of a foreign corporation which sold portraits on advance orders. The contract specified that a buyer was to have the privilege of purchasing a suitable frame at a low price at the time of the delivery of the portrait. The defendant was indicted for selling picture-frames without the license required by statute of peddlers. It was conceded that he could rot be punished for delivering the pictures. Held, that the sale of the frames was intrastate commerce and the conviction proper. Dozier v. State, 46 So. 9 (Ala.).

If the business of selling frames had been carried on by a separate person who accompanied the picture-seller, the occupation would clearly be that of a peddler. As such it would be subject to state control. The courts avoid a conflict between the Commerce Clause and the state police power by saying that the frames have become part of the general property of the seller in the state and that no part of the sale itself involves an interstate transaction. Emert v. Missouri, 156 U. S. 296. And when the two occupations are carried on by the same man, the direct sales may properly be regulated. Kehrer v. Stewart, 197 U. S. 60. Upon the business of taking or filling orders it is settled that a license cannot be imposed. Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289. The decisions opposed to the present case rest on the ground that selling frames is a mere incident to delivering the pictures. Chicago Portrait Co. v. Macon, 147 Fed. 967. But it is believed that the transactions are separable and that this part at least calls for police regulation. And though the authority on the direct question involved is divided, the present case has respectable support. State v. Montgomery, 92 Me. 433.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS ACCRUAL OF RIGHT-CONVEYANCE BEFORE MARRIAGE IN FRAUD OF DOWER. Two days before his marriage, and without the knowledge of his prospective bride, one W. gratuitously conveyed lands to the defendants. Held, that it is against public policy to compel a wife, on peril of the bar of the statute of limitations, to institute an action in which her husband will be a defendant, and therefore the statute does not begin to run against the right of the wife until the death of the husband. Wallace v. Wallace, 114

N. W. 913 (Ia.).

The right of a husband to have set aside fraudulent antenuptial conveyances made by his wife was early established. See Countess of Strathmore v. Bowes, I Ves. fr. 22. It appears to be settled in America that the wife has a similar right to attack antenuptial conveyances by the husband in so far as such transfers operate to deprive her of that inchoate dower interest which otherwise would have accrued to her upon marriage. Chandler v. Hollingsworth, 3 Del. Ch. 99; Arnegaard v. Arnegaard, 7 N. Dak. 475. It is evident, however, that the wife has only an equitable right to have a dower interest secured to her by one who holds a perfect legal title. Since such an equitable interest is always subject to extinction by a transfer of the legal title to a bona fide purchaser, the wife will not be adequately protected unless there be conceded to her a right to prosecute the claim at any time after marriage. Babcock v. Babcock, 53 How.

Pr. (N. Y.) 97; see Waterhouse v. Waterhouse, 206 Pa. St. 433. As the Iowa statute provides quite absolutely that such an action on the ground of fraud must be brought within five years after the cause accrues, the principle of the present case seems insupportable. IOWA CODE, §§ 3447, 3448, 3453.

MARRIAGE

CREATION OF THE RELATION COMMON LAW MARRIAGE AS AFFECTING BIGAMY.-The defendant, having entered into a common law marriage, was later married to another woman. Held, that the common law marriage supports an indictment for bigamy. State v. Thompson, 68 Atl. 1068 (N. J., Sup. Ct.).

For a discussion of the principles involved, see 20 HARV. L. REV. 576.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — Governmental PowerS AND FUNCTIONS Tax Levied to ReimburSE OFFICERS FOR EXPENSES OF PRIVATE LITIGATION. A petition was brought to restrain the payment of money by a town to reimburse its officers, who had been subjected to suits for damages by reason of arrests made for violation of the liquor law. Held, that the town is impliedly authorized to appropriate money for this purpose. Leonard v. Inhabitants of Middleborough, 84 N. E. 323 (Mass.). See NOTES, p. 625.

NUISANCE RECOVERY OF DAMAGES RECOVERY BY ONE HAVING NO RIGHTS IN PROPERTY AFFECTED. Through the negligence of the defendant the water supply used in the plaintiff's hospital became infected and the plaintiff paid damages to patients injured thereby. The plaintiff, who had neither proprietary interest in, nor license to use, the water, sued the defendant for reimbursement. Held, that the plaintiff can recover. Fergusson v. Malvern Urban District Council, 72 J. P. 101 (Eng., K. B. D., Jan. 1908).

The authorities are divided on the question whether the plaintiff. to maintain an action on the case for nuisance affecting property rights, must himself have a proprietary interest in the property. But since all admit that if one has such an interest he can recover for an injury to his health alone, it seems more logical to allow an action irrespective of the property rights of the plaintiff. Fort Worth Ry. Co. v. Glenn, 97 Tex. 586; contra, Ellis v. Kansas City R. R. Co., 63 Mo. 131. Though the plaintiff here had no right to have the flow of water continued, yet he was wronging no one in using it. It is true that he has not suffered physically, but only financially. But a man has been held liable for damages suffered by loss of custom to a boarding-house caused by his introducing contagious disease. Smith v. Baker, 20 Fed. 709. It seems, then, that the present case is right; for the plaintiff acting legally has been greatly injured through the negligence of the defendant in causing the spread of a dangerous disease, and there appears to be no just ground for refusing relief.

PAYMENT - APPLICATION - APPLICATION OF PAYMENT BY CREDITOR TO DEBT BARRED BY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. A creditor holding two claims against a debtor, one of which was barred by the statute of limitations, applied payment to the barred claim. Held, that the payment must be considered to have been made on the enforceable claim. Charles v. Stewart, 11 Ont. Wkly. Rep. 421 (Ont., Fifth Div. Ct., Jan. 2, 1908). See NOTES, p. 623.

RESTRAINT OF TRADE- - STATE ANTI-TRUST LEGISLATION - COMBINATION OF PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANIES. The New York Stock Corporation Law provides that "no corporation shall combine with any corporation or person for the creation of a monopoly or the unlawful restraint of trade or for the prevention of competition in any necessity of life." Under the Code of Civil Procedure, § 1798, the attorney-general applied to the court for leave to bring an action against the Consolidated Gas Company which, for the purpose of securing a monopoly, had purchased a controlling interest in the other companies supplying gas and electric light to the city of New York. Held, that permission is denied. In the Matter of the Application of the Attorney-General, 39 N. Y. L. J. 19 (N. Y., App. Div., Feb. 1908).

The court reasoned that this consolidation did not constitute an illegal mo

nopoly, since the company was a public service corporation and therefore could not arbitrarily regulate the production or the price of its product. The decision involves a comparatively new and important limitation on the force of antitrust legislation. In the interpretation of the Sherman Act the courts have strictly forbidden the substitution of monopoly for competition whether by public service or by private corporations, and regardless of the effect of the monopoly upon prices or rates. United States v. Freight Ass'n, 166 U. S. 290; see United States v. Swift & Co., 122 Fed. 529. State legislation has been similarly construed, and a consolidation of gas companies has been declared illegal. People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 Ill. 268. And it was recently decided that the New York law precluded the consolidation of the street railways of the city of New York. Burrows v. Interborough, etc., Co., 156 Fed. 389. The result of the present decision, however, is reached by a few courts which construe similar legislation as applicable only to combinations inimical to public welfare. Yazoo, etc., Ry. Co. v. Searles, 85 Miss. 520; see State v. Central, etc., Ry. Co., 109 Ga. 716. But the case would seem to involve a questionable interpretation of legislation which specifies no exceptions to its clear mandate against monopoly.

SALVAGE SERVICES RENDERED TO SHIP IN DRY DOCK. The libellants rendered services to a vessel in dry dock by extinguishing a fire communicated to it from buildings on the land. Held, that they are not entitled to salvage. The Jefferson, 158 Fed. 358 (Dist. Ct., Va.).

The court maintained that fire from the land is not such a danger as to bring the libellants' services under the head of salvage, and that a ship in dry dock is not within the admiralty jurisdiction. In order to entitle rescuers to salvage the danger need not be a peril of the sea. It is well settled that if a ship tied to a wharf is in danger from fire on land, its rescue makes it liable for salvage. The Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, 106 Fed. 963. On the second point, however, the present case is one of novel impression. An ordinary dry dock is probably not the subject of admiralty jurisdiction, because not capable of navigation. Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co., 119 U. S. 625. And it has been held that a ship in dry dock is not subject to a maritime lien for a tort. The Warfield, 120 Fed. 847. But the Supreme Court has decided, in an opinion broad enough to cover all maritime claims, that repairs furnished such a vessel are recoverable in admiralty. Perry v. Haines, 191 U. S. 17; see 17 HARV. L. REV. 186. This seems the better view, as the ship itself, though temporarily not in process of navigation, may readily be navigated.

TAXATION - EXEMPTIONS - TAXATION OF LESSEE OF COLLEGE PROPERTY. By the provisions of the charter of a university, certain lands were to be exempt from taxation "as long as said lands belong to said university." The university granted portions of these lands to lessees, whose interests were taxed under a subsequent statute. Held, that such taxation is not a violation of the exemption granted by the original charter. Jetton v. University of the South, 208 U. S. 489. See NOTES, p. 617.

TAXATION GENERAL LIMITATIONS ON THE TAXING POWER - STATE TAXATION ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE. - The plaintiff, a New York company, delivered goods in a New Jersey town in its own wagons. An ordinance required a license fee for all vehicles engaged in the transportation of merchandise. Held, that the plaintiff's wagons are engaged in interstate commerce and the ordinance is inapplicable. Simpson-Crawford Co. v. Borough of Atlantic Highlands, 158 Fed. 372 (Circ. Ct., D. N. J.). See NOTES, p. 618.

TITLE, OWNERSHIP, AND POSSESSION ARTICLES SUBJECT TO OWNERSHIP- RIGHT TO ARTISTIC CREATIONS. — The plaintiff had several pictorial designs which he intended to copyright and sell for use in advertising. R secretly copied the designs and sold the copies to the defendant, who used them in ignorance of the plaintiff's claims. Held, that the defendant is liable in damages as well as subject to injunction. Mansell v. Valley Printing Co., [1908]1 Ch. 567.

The nature of an inventor's right in his abstract scientific or artistic conception has been the subject of much dispute, but the accepted view is that even before it has been made public in concrete form, he has no absolute property in it. See 20 HARV. L. REV. 143; Bristol v. Equitable Society, 52 Hun (N. Y.) 161. A copyright or patent is required to give the originator a legally enforceable right. The communication of the mere idea or design to another deprives the discoverer of nothing which the law can return to him; hence he must enforce his claims in equity. See 17 HARV. L. Rev. 206. The protection available in equity is to restrain the disclosure of his secret, or its use, if already disclosed. Use in breach of faith is properly enjoined. Morison v. Moat, 9 Hare 241. But when the defendant acquires the knowledge honestly and for value, his conscience cannot be charged, and he should be allowed to enjoy what he has obtained. Chadwick v. Covell, 151 Mass. 190. There seems, therefore, no legal or equitable principle upon which to support the present decision. See Watkins v. Landon, 52 Minn. 389.

TRADE UNIONS-STRIKES COMPELLING ACQUIESCENCE TO A UNION BY-LAW. - Six unions of workmen in branches of building trades, affiliated with a central union, ordered out their members on strike because their employers announced an intention to run open shops. There was a by-law of the central union by which grievances of a member of a local union against his employer were to be investigated by the central union, and if the employer did not comply with its decision, his union workmen were not to be allowed to continue at work with him, until he agreed to its demand. The employers of the striking workmen sought to enjoin all the unions from interfering with their business. Held, that they are entitled to an injunction. Reynolds v. Davis, 84 N. E. 457 (Mass.).

In this case there were probably threats of temporal disadvantage by each union forcing its members to strike. Such action requires a justification. 20 HARV. L. REV. 253, 345, 429. The purpose of this strike was to establish the strength of the central union. If that union aimed simply to advance the ordinary principles of unionism, the strike by a single union should be justified. Ibid. 434. That this union aimed also to maintain a by-law for the arbitration of disputes by the central union should not destroy the justification if this bylaw merely declares the formalities to be gone through before a strike is ordered. The justification fails, however, if damage is intended to be done each employer, not only by the defection of his own employees, but also through his relations with other employers in allied trades. Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572. While probably this was the situation in the principal case, it is not quite clear that there was more than a merely concurrent attempt by various unions each to advance its own individual interest. Previous Massachusetts cases, however, have not held strikes merely to strengthen the ordinary principles of unionism justified. Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353.

VESTED, CONTINGENT, AND FUTURE INTERESTS - FUTURE INTERESTS IN PERSONALTY MACHINERY AS A CONSUMABLE CHATTEL. A general bequest to A for life and at A's death to B absolutely, included presses, type, and an engine, used in a printing establishment. Held, that A owns the machinery absolutely, since it is perishable. Seabrook v. Grimes, 68 Atl. 883 (Md.).

That a specific bequest of consumable chattels - household provisions, growing and severed crops for life gives the life tenant the absolute ownership is an established restriction on the creation of future limitations in personalty. Ackerman v. Vreeland, 14 N. J. Eq. 23. But when they are included in a general or residuary bequest, the testator's intention that the life tenant shall enjoy the specific consumable chattels is not expressed. Consequently the interest of the remainderman controls; the consumable chattels must be converted and the proceeds invested in permanent securities for the remainderman, leaving to the life tenant only the income. This distinction between a specific and a general or residuary bequest, first drawn by the English courts of chancery, is generally accepted in this country. Healey v. Toppan, 45 N. H. 243; Burnett v. Lester, 53 III. 325. The courts of Maryland, however, consistently refuse to