books which had been kept in Vermont but were at the main office of the company in another state. Held, that for failure to produce the books the company is guilty of contempt. Consolidated Rendering Co. v. State of Vermont, 207 U. S. 541. See NOTES, p. 354. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CLASS LEGISLATION — LEGISLATION Affecting CORPORATIONS EXCLUSIVELY. A state statute provided that on notice a corporation might be compelled to produce its books before a grand jury. Held, that the statute is not invalid as making an arbitrary classification. Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U. S. 541.

For a criticism of this view, see 20 HARV. L. Rev. 634.

CONTEMPT ACTS AND CONDUCT Constituting Contempt PUBLICATION OF INACCURATE REPORT OF COURT DECISION. The respondent, a newspaper company, published an editorial in which it unintentionally misstated the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island in a recent decision. Held, that the respondent is guilty of contempt. In re Providence Journal Co., 68 Atl. 428 (R. Ï.).

Statutes in some states make it a contempt to publish "grossly inaccurate reports of judicial proceedings. It has been suggested that such a statute is merely declaratory of the common law. See In re Chadwick, 109 Mich. 588. On the other hand, where a statute made such a report a contempt if published pending a suit, it has been held that, while the statute does not prevent punishment for any common law contempt, the publication of a "grossly inaccurate account of a past trial is not such contempt. Cheadle v. State, 110 Ind. 301. Even if the respondent in the present case is guilty of a technical contempt, the propriety of the decision seems doubtful. The power to punish contempt is arbitrary, and consequently should not be exercised on slight pretext, but only when it is necessary for the due administration of justice. See Atty.-Gen. v. Circuit Court, 97 Wis. 1. In the present case it is difficult to see such a compelling necessity. Certainly in no prior case has a person been held in contempt solely because he has published an inaccurate report of judicial proceedings or decisions.

CORPORATIONS DIRECTORS DIRECTOR'S RIGHT TO SALARY WHEN QUALIFYING WITH SHARES HELD IN TRUST. - Corporation A purchased stock in corporation B and transferred it to X, a director of A, who made a declaration of trust in favor of A. X was thereafter elected a director in B, which required each director to be a shareholder. It appeared on the records of A that the stock transfer was made to enable X to become a director in B

"to represent the interests of this company." Held, that the A company cannot recover the salary received by X from the B company. In re Dover Coalfield Extension, Ltd., [1908]1 Ch. 65.

This decision affirms the decision of the lower court commented on in 21 HARV. L. REV. 217.

RUPTCY.

CORPORATIONS DISSOLUTION - CORPORATION DISSOLVED BY BANKThe plaintiff brought an action for libel against a publishing company, which was adjudged a bankrupt before the suit came on for trial. Held, that the bankruptcy does not dissolve the corporation or bar the plaintiff's remedy. Nat'l Surety Co. v. Medlock, 58 S. E. 1131 (Ga.).

A libel is a “wilful and malicious injury " which is not released by the defendant's bankruptcy. McDonald v. Brown, 23 R. I. 546; BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1898, § 17 (2). But the abatement of any action by or against a corporation is a necessary consequence of its termination. Nat'l Bank v. Colby, 21 Wall. (U. S.) 609. There is, however, a surprising dearth of authority on the effect of bankruptcy on the existence of corporations. Mere insolvency clearly does not work a dissolution. Boston Glass Mfty. v. Langdon, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 49; Ready v. Smith, 170 Mo. 163. Bankruptcy, however, according to one case, terminates the organization. State Savings Ass'n v. Kellogg, 52 Mo. 583. Cf. also Chamberlin v. Huguenot Mfg. Co., 118 Mass. 532. It may be argued that

it is an implied condition of incorporation that bankruptcy shall revoke the charter. But it is not likely that state legislatures would make the existence of corporations, their own creations, depend upon federal proceedings. As has been suggested, the bankruptcy laws are aimed not at the life of the debtor, but solely at his assets. See Holland v. Hayman, 60 Ga. 174. Possession of assets is not requisite to a corporation's existence, hence the implication of dissolution is not based on necessity. There are, moreover, obvious advantages in the continuation of a corporation which is subject to liabilities. The decision of the present case, therefore, seems correct.

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DAMAGES MEASURE OF DAMAGES - INTEREST UPON DEMURRAGE. Held, that interest is not recoverable upon demurrage awarded to a vessel for the time she was laid up for repairs after an injury by collision. The Sitka, 156 Fed. 427 (Dist. Ct., W. D. N. Y.).

When a vessel is detained for repairs after a collision the owner may recover full compensation in the nature of demurrage for the loss sustained by the detention. The Potomac, 105 U. S. 630. The law as to interest upon such demurrage is entirely unsettled. Of the few cases which give any consideration to the question the majority either allow it or leave it to the discretion of the jury. The America, 11 Blatchf. (U. S.) 485. On general principles, when a tort has deprived the plaintiff of property, interest is due on the claim from the date when the defendant should have reimbursed the plaintiff. Clark v. Miller, 54 N. Y. 528. Interest, therefore, is recoverable upon the cost of repairs from the time the bill became payable. The Mahanoy, 127 Fed. 773. But the date upon which the profits of a vessel would be receivable varies in every case and it is impossible to establish any general principle, as in the case of repairs. Although unscientific, it seems to work substantial justice to leave the question to the discretion of the jury with instructions to fully compensate the libellant for the detention. SPENCER, Marine CollisIONS, § 206.

DAMAGES-MEASURE OF DAMAGES-RECOVERY FOR SUBSIDENCE OF SOIL DUE TO WITHDRAWAL OF SUPPORT. The plaintiffs sought compensation for damages to cotton mills resulting from subsidence caused by the past working of mines. Held, that the depreciation in selling value due to fear of further subsidence cannot be taken into account in estimating damages. West Leigh Colliery Co. v. Tunnicliffe and Hampson, [1908] A. C. 27.

It is well settled in England that the cause of action in cases of subsidence of the soil caused by working of mines is not the withdrawal of support, but the subsidence itself. See 13 HARV. L. REV. 665. The proper measure of damages in such cases is the depreciation in the market value of the premises due to the wrongful act of the defendant. Hosking v. Phillips, 3 Exch. 168. Damage to be caused by possible future subsidence cannot be taken into account in assessing damages for past subsidence, but all damage caused by a single subsidence must be claimed in a single action. Darley Main Colliery Co. v. Mitchell, 11 App. Cas. 127. To allow for present diminution of selling value of an estate arising from fear of further subsidence is, however, not open to the objection that it allows present damages for a future cause of action. But the present decision may well be supported on the ground that such damage is only remotely, and not in a legal sense, caused by the subsidence and is in fact due to the removal of support, which, though it is a present cause, is not a wrongful act. Rust v. Victoria Graving Dock Co., 36 Ch. D. 113.

DEDICATION RESTRICTIONS ON DEDICATION - RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY DEDICATOR.- An owner dedicated land to the public for use as a street on the conditions that it should be graded, and that the abutting property owners should be free from assessment therefor or for other street improvements. The defendant municipality accepted it on behalf of the public subject to these conditions. It graded the street and assessed the abutting property owners for the cost. The plaintiff brought a writ of certiorari to test the validity of the assessment. Held, that the assessment be set aside. Perth Amboy Trust Co. v. Perth Amboy, 68 Atl. 84 (N. J., Sup. Ct.). See NOTES, p. 356.

EXTINGUISHMENT

EASEMENTS UNITY OF POSSESSION. After the tenant for years in possession of the dominant estate had brought suit for an obstruction of the easement of light, the owner of that estate conveyed his reversion in fee to the owner of the servient. The term had not yet expired. Held, that the tenant can recover, as unity of possession is necessary to extinguish the easement. Richardson v. Graham, [1908] 1 K. B. 39. See NOTES, p. 359.

EMINENT DOMAIN - COMPENSATION - Set-Off of Benefits CONFERRED ON LAND REMAINING TO Owner. — C. 16 of the Greater New York charter provided that the dock commissioner might by eminent domain acquire land necessary for the improvement of the water-front, and § 822 provided that where part only of a single tract is taken the compensation to the owner should be the difference between the value of the entire tract and the value of the premises in the condition in which they will be after the part is taken. Held, that § 822 violates the constitutional provision that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Matter of City of New York, 190 N. Y. 350.

There is a settled conflict of authority as to whether benefits to the remaining land may be set off against the value of the part taken. See Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548; 12 HARV. L. REV. 505. It has heretofore been generally supposed that New York allowed such a set-off. See Bauman v. Ross, supra; Rexford v. Knight, 15 Barb. (N. Y.) 627. The principal case settles the law in New York and clearly holds that an award shall in no case be made for less than the value of the property actually taken by condemnation. It is to be noted, however, that this case does not overrule the class of cases in which it has been held that a tax or an assessment for local improvement may be set off against an award for property condemned. Genet v. City of Brooklyn, 99 N. Y. 296.

EQUITY - JURISDICTION— JURISDICTION BY CONSENT OR ESTOPPEL. The defendant received $3000 under an arrangement by which he was to pay $1200 to the plaintiff, who brought an action of assumpsit for his share. By agreement the cause was transferred to the chancery side of the docket. The defendant thereupon demurred on the ground that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law. Held, that equity may take jurisdiction of the cause and that the defendant is estopped from questioning its jurisdiction. Darst v. Kirk, 82 N. E. 862 (Ill.).

Consent or estoppel cannot ordinarily extend a court's powers. Klingelhoefer v. Smith, 171 Mo. 455. The jurisdiction of equity, although not so exactly defined as that of courts of law, is restricted, in general, to cases where there is no adequate legal remedy. Bushnell v. Avery, 121 Mass. 148; but see Mellen v. Moline Works, 131 U. S. 352. Both at law and in equity, however, a party may waive his right to object to the court's lack of authority over his person by mere failure to exercise it. Burnley v. Cook, 13 Tex. 586. This decision goes further in permitting the parties to extend equity's jurisdiction to a suit in which there is an ample remedy at law. Consent to the jurisdiction, however, is stronger than a waiver by failure to object, since allowing the agreement to be recalled is in itself inequitable. The present case is not alone in allowing equity to proceed after such a waiver or estoppel. Champion v. Grand Rapids, etc., Ry., 145 Mich. 676; Mertens v. Roche, 39 N. Y. App. Div. 398. But in cases of this type equity is not bound to take jurisdiction, and does so at the court's discretion. Hoagland v. Supreme Council, 70 N. J. Eq. 607. The adoption of this principle of extending jurisdiction by consent illustrates the tendency to merge the two systems of law and equity.

FRANCHISES-POWER TO REVOKE INDIRECTLY BY GRANTING COMPETING FRANChise. - The defendant, under a permit from the proper authorities, built a highway bridge which diverted the travel from an ancient ferry owned by the plaintiff. Held, that an injunction will not issue. Dibden v. Śkirrow, [1908] i Ch. 41.

The right to maintain a ferry can be acquired only by grant from the sovereign or by prescription, and such a right is ordinarily to be construed with great strictness against the claimant. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. (U. S.) 420. Formerly ferry franchises, however acquired, were held to be exclusive in their nature. See Huzzey v. Field, 2 C. M. & R. 432, 440. Still the franchise did not include all modes of transportation, for the ferry owner himself could not establish a bridge. See Payne v. Partridge, 1 Salk. 12. Hence it is doubtful if even under the early law a ferry franchise would have been infringed by the grant of a bridge franchise. The later authorities, however, so modify the law that unless the franchise is expressly made exclusive, the sovereign does not lose his right to grant a competing ferry. Guen v. Ivy, 45 Fla. 338; Power v. Athens, 99 N. Y. 592. Moreover, a bridge franchise is not infringed by the grant of a ferry privilege. Parrott v. City of Lawrence, 2 Dill. (U. S. C. C.) 332. No reasonable ground appears for distinguishing that case from one where the ferry is first acquired. The present case, therefore, seems correct on principle, and it is supported by the reasoning of a previous English decision. See Hopkins v. Railway, 2 Q. B. D. 224.

GENERAL AVERAGE - NATURE, Cause, and MANNER OF SACRIFICE-EF. FECT OF INHERENT VICE OF CARGO UPON the Right to ContrIBUTION.

Y & Co. shipped coal upon G & Co.'s vessel. The cargo ignited by spontaneous combustion, whereupon water was poured into the hold, damaging the unburned coal. In respect to this damage, Y & Co. claimed a general average contribution from G & Co. Held, that, in the absence of negligence on their part, Y & Co. are entitled to contribution. Greenshields, Cowie & Co. v. Stephens & Sons, [1908] I K. B. 51.

See

Apparently no case decides the shipper's right to contribution in general average where the condition of his goods produced the danger and he was guilty of no negligence. See CARVER, CARRIAGE BY SEA, 4 ed., 443. Formerly, where a sacrifice was necessitated by the negligence of one party to a maritime venture, he could not claim contribution from the other interests. Schloss v. Heriot, 14 C. B. (N. S.) 59; Snow v. Perkins, 39 Fed. 334. It is only equitable that he who caused the damage should bear the burden. Strang v. Scott, 14 App. Cas. 601, 608; Pacific Mail S. S. Co. v. N. Y. H. & R. Min. Co., 74 Fed. 564, 567. Nevertheless, recent English decisions allow contribution to a party free from cross-liability, whether negligent or not. Milburn & Co. v. Jamaica, etc., Co., [1900] 2 Q. B. 540. By this test the shipper loses contribution because of defects in his goods only where the "inherent vice" is actionable. Another exception to the general right of contribution occurs where a deck cargo is jettisoned, such cargo being held a menace to the common interests of the venture. In the absence of special custom, the innocent owner thereof cannot claim contribution from co-shippers ignorant of the deck shipment. See Strang v. Scott, supra. A similar rule might well be applied to below-deck shipments of goods inherently dangerous, but an ordinary commodity like coal can hardly be so considered.

ILLEGAL CONTRACTS - CONTRACTS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY - PROMISE TO MARRY AFTER DEATH OF EXISTING WIFE. - The plaintiff, knowing that the defendant had a wife living, agreed to marry the defendant when his wife died. Held, that the contract is void as against public policy. Spiers v. Hunt, 24 T. L. R. 183 (Eng., K. B. Div., Dec. 12, 1907).

This decision follows the American authorities. For a discussion of a recent English case reaching an opposite result, see 21 HARV. L. REV. 58. The court distinguishes the present case on the ground that here the motive for the promise was illegal.

INFANTS UNBORN CHILDREN-WHEN CHILD EN VENTRE SA MÈRE CONSIDERED BORN. - Legacies were left "to each of my great-nieces born previously to the date of this my will." Five months later a great-niece was born, and five months thereafter the testator died. Held, that the child was entitled to a legacy. In re Salaman, [1908] I Ch. 4. See NOTES, p. 360.

INSURANCE ACCIDENT INSURANCE REQUIREMENT OF IMMEDIATE NOTICE OF ACCIDENT IN EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY INSURANCE. An employers' liability insurance policy required the insured to give immediate notice of an accident. A rule was posted in the office of the insured's stable-foreman requiring drivers to report all accidents immediately. The foreman, learning of an accident caused by one of the drivers, failed to report it. The insured's general manager gave immediate notice to the insurer when he learned of the accident one month later. Held, that the insured cannot recover because of failure to give immediate notice. Woolverton v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 190 N. Y. 41.

Failure to satisfy a requirement of immediate notice in an accident insurance contract is a bar to recovery. Travellers' Ins. Co. v. Myers, 62 Oh. St. 529. Such a requirement, of course, cannot be taken literally. It is satisfied by notice given with due diligence under all the circumstances and without unnecessary delay. Ward v. Maryland Casualty Co., 71 N. H. 262. The insurer's duty in the present case is to exonerate the insured, and it is entitled to every facility for effecting an equitable settlement with the injured party. Since an immediate investigation of the facts is essential to an accurate determination of the existence and extent of liability, it is just to interpret the requirement as imposing upon the employer the duty not only of reporting accidents which have come to his personal attention, but of immediately discovering and reporting all accidents. Since this duty, by its nature, must be partially performed by agents, and the principal is responsible for the negligent performance of a delegated duty, the failure of the foreman to use due diligence in reporting the accident may be imputed to the insured, and the requirement of immediate notice is not satisfied. Northwestern, etc., Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 86 Minn. 467; contra, Mandell v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 170 Mass. 173.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE CONTROL BY CONGRESS NATIONAL ARBITRATION ACT. - The Act of Congress of June 1, 1898, c. 370, § 10, 30 Stat. at L. 424, provided that any common carrier engaged in interstate commerce or any agent thereof who "shall threaten any employee with loss of employment or shall unjustly discriminate against any employee because of his membership ” in a labor organization, "is hereby declared to be guilty of a misdemeanor." Held, that the statute is unconstitutional. Adair v. United States, U. S. Sup. Ct., Jan. 27, 1908.

The decision is primarily based on the ground that the statute, in interfering with freedom of contract, is an unwarranted invasion of the right to personal liberty and property guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. The court further holds that the Act is not a regulation of commerce within the meaning of the Constitution, and distinguishes it from the Safety Appliance and Employers' Liability Acts. Cf. Johnson v. Railroad, 196 U. S. i; Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463. One dissenting justice declares that the purpose of the Act was to promote the freedom and safety of commerce by prevention of strikes, and was therefore within the power of Congress. The other is of opinion that such a limited interference with freedom of contract, when supported by public policy, is not prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. For a criticism of the Act as a regulation of commerce, see 20 HARV. L. Rev. 499.

INTERSTATE Commerce - WHAT CONSTITUTES INTERSTATE COMMERCE – RULE OF ULTIMATE DESTINATION. - One A, wishing to go from X, in Arkansas, to Z, in Texas, tried to purchase a ticket from X to Y, in Arkansas, and then to purchase another ticket from Y to Z. Held, that his attempt to purchase a ticket to Y is a matter of intrastate commerce to which state rate regulations apply. Kansas, etc., Ry. Co. v. Brooks, 105 S. W. 93 (Ark.).

It is well settled that a common carrier, although only carrying goods intrastate, is engaged in interstate commerce if such goods are in transitu_to another state. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 557. By the better view the ultimate destination intended by the shipper is the test of its being an intrastate or interstate shipment. Houston, etc., Co. v. Ins. Co., 89 Tex. 1; see