followed by summaries of the important or typical cases construing or apply. ing it. There are two indices to each set of rules -a title-and-number index and a subject index. In addition, the addenda contain the judiciary acts from the Act of 1789 to date. We miss only the recent act giving the government a limited right of appeal in criminal cases. Besides some straggling forms there are scattered, here and there, unpretentious and incomplete collections of statutes and decisions on the jurisdiction of federal courts, which (particularly in view of Mr. Rose's recent treatise) are of little use. In so far as Mr. Dewhurst attempted a serviceable edition of the chief body of federal rules of practice, as expressed in rules of courts and not embodied in statutes, he has largely accomplished his purpose. For such an undertaking accuracy, thoroughness, and ease of reference are indispensable. We have had occasion to make practical use of the "Rules " and found it both accurate and complete. Also, after a careful examination, it compares favorably with the treatment of the rules in Rose's Code of Federal Procedure. For instance, the subject indices are even fuller than Rose's. The latter treatise is much wider in scope, welding statutes and rules of court into one comprehensive code; the present book is not therefore displaced by Rose and has an independent usefulness. Yet this compilation is somewhat lacking in scholarliness, arrangement, and analysis. Thus, there might well be a general introductory note on the scope and history of each body of rules. In a future edition, too, the annotations should be topically classified, dealing as they frequently do with different portions of a rule, instead of spreading the cases all in a heap, at times, over ten pages. See pp. 49, 74, 190, 202. We also miss a table of cases, though in a work of this character, particularly in view of the complete indices, it is not indispensable. On the whole, this collection should lighten the irksome drudgery of the federal practitioner. F. F. that THE LAW OF TAXATION BY SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS. By Charles H. Hamilton. Chicago: George I. Jones. 1907. pp. lxxxv, 937. 8vo. The true text-book should not be primarily an index to the decisions is the peculiar function of the digest. The object of the text-book is rather to set forth, as a digest never can, the fundamental principles of the law of the subject and to show the relations of the decisions to these principles. It cannot be said that "Hamilton on Special Assessments" fully meets this test. The author is to be congratulated for having produced a comparatively exhaustive work on an important subject which has seldom received independent treatment. In its order of arrangement the book moves along the logical line of development: the first part is devoted to a consideration of the nature of special assessments and of the power of the state to levy them; then follow several chapters on the proceedings essential to a valid assessment; and finally, come chapters on the "Duties, Rights, and Remedies of the Taxpayer" and on "Reassessments and Proceedings to Validate Void Assessments." But it is a cause for regret that the mass of material which the author has brought together has not been so used as to result in something more than a useful compilation of authorities. The subject is one which peculiarly demands a writer who can speak "as one having authority," and who can extract from the confused and often contradictory decisions the broad principles which underlie the whole. Yet a reading of Mr. Hamilton's book fails to give an impression of power. The author has not so much mastered the cases, apparently, as he has been mastered by them. It is true that he now and then dissents vigorously from some particular decision, but there is little evidence of effort to bring the disconnected authorities into anything like organic unity. As an example of this lack of grasp may be noted the treatment of the two leading cases of Norwood v. Baker (172 U. S. 269), and French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. (181 U. S. 324). Though the former is cited twelve and the latter at least seven times, there is no attempt to show exactly how far the later decision restricts the earlier one. The author evidently sympathizes strongly with the doctrine announced by Mr. Justice Harlan in Norwood v. Baker, and several times refers to that doctrine as if it were unquestioned; yet it is clear that he is aware that it has been a good deal shaken by the later cases. The author's failure to distinguish the general from the particular is also seen in the frequent citing of decisions without anything to indicate how far they rest on local enactments and how far on principles of universal application. The author sometimes speaks of doctrines as having been announced by one court or another, but gives no inkling as to whether or not the rules so laid down are applicable in other jurisdictions. In dealing with a subject like this, in which statutory and constitutional provisions are all-important, this failure may sometimes result in seriously misleading the reader, whether he be a student, or a practitioner interested in the law of his own jurisdiction. A further criticism must be made as to the author's want of discrimination in his citations. A few scattering decisions or even statements of text-writers are often given as the sole support for important propositions. For example, as authority for the statement that "municipal corporations are creatures [of the legislature] and over them it is practically omnipotent," Rosewater on Special Assessments is alone cited (p. 122). So, with reference to the rule that an action will "not lie again [sic] a municipality for consequential damages caused by the lawful change of an established grade," six cases are cited (p. 116), all of them from Wisconsin except one from Minnesota. Callender v. Marsh (1 Pick. (Mass.) 418), commonly cited as the foundation of the whole doctrine, is entirely ignored. Moreover, the same want of finish extends to the purely mechanical aspect of the book. The division of the notes into subheadings and paragraphs is often illogical and confusing, and sometimes a large amount of miscellaneous matter which seems to have been forgotten at its proper place is brought together in a long note. Typographical errors, too, are many. Not only are misprints abundant, but the notes occasionally fail to jibe with the text. On p. 172, in the midst of a collection of authorities on the "front-foot" rule, appears this paragraph with nothing to indicate how it relates to the subject: "This was replevin for a bale of buffalo robes. The question of personal liability was not raised." Again, on p. 228, it is said that "it has been held that a citizen or lot-owner cannot be compelled to keep it [a sidewalk] free from snow at his own expense, even under the police power, or by fine or penalty imposed by ordinance," Gridley v. Bloomington (88 Ill. 554) being cited. This seems a rather summary way of disposing of a difficult question, as to which the weight of authority is probably opposed to the case cited, but, when we turn to the note for some reference to the contrary decisions, we find "But see Pick." and nothing more. No doubt the author has in mind the well-known case of Goddard, Petitioner (16 Pick. (Mass.) 504), but a fuller citation would require less exercise of imagination on the part of the reader. It is to be hoped that these and other mechanical imperfections will be remedied in a second edition, as they impose a serious handicap upon a book which is not without value, though by no means epoch-making. H. S. D. COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA. By Thomas Raeburn White. Philadelphia: T. & J. W. Johnson Co. 1907. pp. xxvii, 618. 8vo. The people of Pennsylvania in the course of their history have had considerable experience in constitution making. William Penn, the proprietor of the Province in colonial times, under his charter from Charles II, had the right to make a form of government by and with the advice and assent of his people. Yet his first plan of government was largely of his own devising, and only in later years were the people able to take an active part. Their final Charter of Privileges, settled upon in the year 1701, was continued until the Revolution, when the patriot party adopted a constitution which was generally regarded as the worst constructed instrument of all the constitutions that were made in the colonies at that period. It had only one house of legislature, a sort of executive committee instead of a governor, and several other defects. Another constitution was prepared in 1790; another in 1838; another in 1873, under which the people of the state are now living. All this experience has given us, in Mr. White's book, a very interesting historical introduction. Since he has been a professor in the law department of the University of Pennsylvania, and has had something of a career in reform politics at Philadelphia, he writes from the point of view of a man long accustomed to dealing with public questions. But at the same time his book is thoroughly technical and intended for the practicing lawyer. The cited cases are numerous and well arranged. The chapters and sections bring into view in a clear way all the questions concerning constitutional construction that have been raised in Pennsylvania during the last century. It is by far the most complete and thorough book of constitutional law in Pennsylvania that has yet appeared, and it is doubtful if any other state has produced a book dealing with its constitution in such detail. S. G. F. HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE. By John Jay McKelvey. Second Edition, Revised. Hornbook Series. St. Paul: West Publishing Company. 1907. pp. xvii, 540. A review of the first edition of this treatise has already appeared in the REVIEW. II HARV. L. REV. 482. It was then pointed out that though the leading original ideas were those of the late Professor Thayer, the writer deserved credit for his power of statement in assembling them in compact form. This second edition is an enlargement of the first. The chief object of this comment is to indicate the additions. In the chapter on “ Judicial Ñotice,” the chapter most extensively revised, the writer inserts a section on the effects produced by the application of the doctrine, in which he discusses to what extent a party will be deemed to have knowledge of a fact judicially noticed. In the same chapter appears a separate section on the right of a party adversely affected to disprove facts which a court may judicially notice. And at the end of this chapter a more exhaustive treatment is made of facts that are required to be noticed. In the chapter on the "Burden of Proof," which so clearly states the correct view that it is the burden of proceeding, not the burden of proof, that shifts, the writer adds a section in which his conclusion that negative allegations have no effect on the burden of proof seems as convincing as his treatment of the general subject in the first edition. The rearrangement of the chapter on "Presumptions" brings out the idea, so well presented in the first edition, that no question of evidence is involved. Also, new examples of presumptions are added. The author shows his sense of proportion in the last chapter on Writings" by devoting several sections to pictorial evidence, in which he discusses its authentication, materiality, and accessibility. 66 The arrangement of the book with a short statement of the rule of law at the beginning of a section, followed by its elaboration, is well adapted for ready reference. The author's statements are uniformly succinct, and his elucidation of the principles is remarkably clear in its brevity. In one instance, however, it is believed that this brevity is responsible for a wrong impression as to the existing law. On page 429 is the statement that "upon cross-examination of a witness, questions may be put as to the contents of writings previously made by. the witness, without the production of the writings themselves." As a statement of what the law ought to be in order to give to cross-examination its proper function, the above is admirable. But such, it would seem, is not the law in the great majority of jurisdictions in this country. It is true that the contrary doctrine, established by "The Queen's Case "(2 B. & B. 284) has been changed in England by statute, but the change has been followed in very few jurisdictions here. The reader is referred to Wigmore for an exhaustive discussion and the cases. 2 Wigmore, Ev., §§ 1259–1264. With the limited space at his command Mr. McKelvey no doubt intended to emphasize the matter as it should be on principle, but some indication of this fact should have been made. Of the general excellence of the book as a means of refreshing the memory on the leading topics of evidence, sufficient was said in the review of the first edition. The rearrangement and additions of the new edition should increase the usefulness of the book. R. T. H. HANDBOOK OF THE Law of SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY. By Frank Hall Childs. Hornbook Series. St. Paul: West Publishing Company. 1907. Pp. x, 572. 8vo. This volume follows out the compact and condensed treatment that is characteristic of the Hornbook Series. It is essentially a summary with a clear statement in many places of what the law is, but with almost no explanation or elucidation of the leading principles. The subject of suretyship lends itself less readily to such handling than almost any other. To this inherent difficulty may doubtless be attributed many of the shortcomings of the work. With due allowances, however, for the enforced brevity of statement the subject in many instances seems to be unnecessarily confused. It is a fundamental proposition that in strict guaranty the party secondarily liable answers only after default by the principal, whereas in the ordinary case of suretyship the creditor has two independent obligations. This distinction seems apparent to the mind of the author, but it is so important that more pains should have been taken to set forth the consequences flowing from it. Again, the origin of the right to contribution as equitable is correctly stated, yet the author without any explanation refers to it in § 163 as resting on an implied contract. This apparent approval, without comment, of the language which is used in many of the cases, results, in this instance as in many others, in an inconsistency in statement, and leaves the reader confused. Where there is less con. flict between the origin of rights and their subsequent development, the subject is generally well handled. The leading principles of the right to subrogation are clearly set forth, and in many other instances the treatment is commendable, especially in view of the small compass allotted to it. It is regrettable that, on a branch of the law so little understood, a writer who is able to state some principles so clearly should be hampered by lack of space. S. ST. F. T. TRIAL EVIDENCE. By Richard Lea Kennedy. St. Paul: The Keefe-Davidson Co. 1906. pp. vii, 49. 8vo. The book consists of succinct statements of the general principles of each head of the law of evidence, with references to text-books containing a discussion of them. The statements are clear, the arrangement is good, and there is an adequate index. The book, however, is merely a good sketch-map of the subject. E. H. A., JR. A SUPPLEMENT TO A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, containing the Statutes and Judicial Decisions, 19041907. By John Henry Wigmore. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1907. pp. xiii, 459. 8vo. A MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Thomas Alfred Walker. Cambridge At the University Press. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1895. pp. xxviii, 244. 8vo. New COLLECTIVE OWNERSHIP, otherwise than by Corporation or by Means of the Die TuberkuloSE, nach ihren juristischen Beziehungen in rechtsvergleichender Darstellung. By B. F. K. Neubecker. Leipzig: Georg Böhme. 1908. pp. 36. 8vo. REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION. Vol. XXXII. AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS. By George Sharswood. Fifth Edition. Phila delphia: T. & J. W. Johnson Company. 1907. pp. 196. 8vo. IN 1 B. IN GENERAL. a former article 1 dealing with unauthorized corporate action, by hypothesis, (1) the associates had made an attempt to incorporate, resulting in a colorable corporate organization; (2) there was a law authorizing the formation of such a corporation as was attempted; (3) there had been user of some of the powers which such a corporation would possess; and (4) the persons seeking to prevent collateral attack had acted in good faith. This article deals with unauthorized corporate action when some one or more of these conditions are lacking. It also, preliminarily, inquires more fully into the nature of the question underlying the whole subject of unauthorized corporate action. The law deals with rights, and the corresponding obligations. Every right belongs to a legal unit or units; every obligation binds a legal unit or units. A human being is, in the nature of things, a unit. A philosopher might entertain a doubt upon this, homo might seem to him merely a convenient word by which to designate a large number of molecules. But the common law judges seem never to have doubted. A human being may be so circumstanced that the courts do not find it proper to recognize him or her as a legal unit for some, or any, purpose. Thus of slaves, monks, aliens, traitors, lunatics, 1 20 HARV. L. REV. 456. |