the author points out, in a later case he changed his mind when the precedents were brought to his attention, his earlier decision was followed by Mr. Justice Gibbs in a case 6 which is generally said to have settled the law for England. Various reasons have been given for refusing to allow recovery in these cases. (1) The maxim ignorantia juris non excusat is quoted as the basis of the doctrine. But the meaning of this maxim is that one who has done a wrong cannot excuse himself on account of his ignorance of the law it applies to cases in which one has committed a crime, or a tort, or a breach of contractual or other obligation. In the cases under discussion the plaintiff has done no wrong; he is merely seeking that to which in conscience he is entitled. (2) It is said that every one is presumed to know the law. This is probably the same maxim put into terms of fiction. There is no such presumption in fact or in law.8 (3) It is said that there is no means of trying a man's knowledge of the law. But the existence of such knowledge is an issuable fact even in criminal cases where a specific intent is of the essence of the crime. (4) It is said that mistake of law would be urged in every case. The danger is equally great in the case of mistake of fact. But here, as in such cases, it should not be enough merely to allege mistake; the burden of proof should be on the plaintiff. (5) It is said that allowing a recovery would put a premium on ignorance. But this argument applies equally to mistake of fact. Besides, it is no great inducement to a man to pay money because he knows that if he can successfully prove a mistake he can get it back again. (6) Lastly, it is said that if a recovery is allowed litigation will be multiplied. This argument applies as strongly to cases of mistake of fact. Moreover, it is not the object of the law to prevent the litigation of just claims. On the whole it would seem that if there is a mistake either of fact or of law there should be a recovery unless there is a legal or moral obligation to pay, as in the case of a debt barred by the statute of limitations, or unless the defendant acts in such a way in reliance on the payment that the parties can no longer be put in statu quo. Furthermore, aside from all arguments on principle, Mr. Stadden asserts, after making a pretty thorough analysis of the English cases, that in England the law has by degrees returned to the older view. It is true that it has been held that money paid under a mistake of law to an officer of the court may be recovered. 10 And a distinction has been taken between mistake of private rights and of general law,11 though Sir Frederick Pollock maintains that this distinction does not apply to cases of money paid. 12 But in spite of these encroachments and of one or two decisions 18 and a few dicta 14 to the effect that equity may give relief against mistake of law, the general rule does not appear to have been changed. There is no case where a recovery has been allowed of money paid under mistake of law, except when paid to an officer of the court. On the contrary the modern English cases, like those in this country, seem still to cling to the distinction between mistake of law and of fact.15 W. Harrison Moore. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION, THE PRIVY COUNCIL AND THE. Adversely criticizing a recent holding that the salary of an Australian officer is subject to taxation by Victoria. 494. 5 Perrott v. Perrott, 14 East 423. 6 Brisbane v. Dacres, 5 Taunt. 143. 7 Keener, Quasi-Contracts, 90. 23 L. Quar. Rev. 373. See 20 HARV. L. REV. 8 Queen v. Mayor of Tewkesbury, L. R. 3 Q. B. 629. Regina v. Twose, 14 Cox C. C. 327. 10 Ex parte James, L. R. 9 Ch. 609. 12 Pollock, Contracts, 7 ed., 457. 13 Daniell v. Sinclair, 6 App. Cas. 457. 14 See Stone v. Godfrey, 5 De G. M. & G. 76; Rogers v. Ingham, L. R. 3 Ch. 351. 15 Midland, etc., Ry. v. Johnson, 6 H. L. Cas. 798; Eaglesfield v. Marquis of Londonderry, 4 Ch. D. 693; Henderson v. Folkestone W. W. Co., 1 T. L. R. 329. COMMON LAW JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, THE. Alton B. Parker. 17 Yale L. J. 1. CONSTITUTION AND THE CORPORATIONS, THE. Charles F. Amidon. Contending that the Constitution can and should be so interpreted as to allow federal control of corporations of national scope. 14 The Bar 19. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION SUGGESTED BY THE TRIAL OF WILLIAM D. HAYWOOD, A. Charles P. McCarthy. 19 Green Bag 636. See supra. CONTEMPT OF Court, StatEMENTS BY ATTORNEYS IN ARGUMENTS, PLEADINGS, CORPORATE DIRECTORS, LIABILITY OF. Frederick Dwight. Showing how lax the DEBENTURE-HOLDERS AND EXECUTION CREDITORS. Anon. Collecting the recent English authorities. 29 L. Stud. J. 240. Gaston de Leval. DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD (Continued). Suggesting a system to ensure protection. 42 L. J. 617. EIGHT-HOUR LAW WITH RESPECT TO GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS. Anon. Adversely criticizing a recent case holding the federal eight-hour law constitutional. 35 Nat. Corp Rep. 301. EQUITY JURISDICTION, WORD "NOT" AS A TEST OF, TO ENJOIN A BREACH OF CONTRACT. Henry Schofield. Reviewing the authority on implied negative contracts and arguing that the distinction made in recent Illinois cases between express and implied contracts is not to be supported. 2 Ill. L. Rev. 217. See 19 HARV. L. REV. 476. Espe ERROR OF LAW. Corry Montague Stadden. 7 Colum. L. Rev. 476. See supra. HAGUE CONFERENCE, THE LEGAL RESULTS OF THE. Norman Bentwich. cially considering the possible adoption of an international prize court. 42 L. J. 664. INTERNATIONAL PRIZE COURT, AN. Amos S. Hershey. Discussing the advantages of such a court and the difficulties in the way of its establishment. 19 Green Bag 652. INTERSTATE COMMERCE, STATE INTERFERENCE WITH. H. P. Burnett. A careful analysis of the subject with citation of authority. 13 Va. L. Reg. 497. "JUDGE-MADE" LAW, A Century of. William B. Hornblower. 7 Colum. L. Rev. 453. JUDICIAL LIABILITY. W. W. Lucas. A clear statement of the English law on liability of judicial officers for negligence, mala fides, etc. 32 L. Mag. Rev. 417. JUDICIARY, THE FUNCTION OF THE (Continued). Percy Bordwell. Arguing that the Supreme Court should not declare political laws unconstitutional. 7 Colum. L. Rev. 520. LETTERS, THE RIGHT TO USE. Anon. A general discussion based upon the authorities. 52 Sol. J. 5. MUNICIPAL SECurities, The BETTER PROTECTION OF. Giving reports of two commissions recommending methods for further protection. 24 Bank. L. J. 785. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT, THE NEW. Julian W. Mack. Pointing out the most recent changes in the Illinois Negotiable Instruments Law. 2 Ill. L. Rev. 265. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT, THE NEW ILLINOIS. Louis M. Greeley. 2 Ill. L. Rev. 145. PARTIAL PERFORMANCE OF ENTIRE CONTRACTS, Right of RECOVERY FOR. Graham B. Smedley. A good collection of authority. 65 Cent. L. J. 292. STOCK, WATERED, AT COMMON LAW. Wm. C. White. Contending that stockholders who have received paid up stock without full payment, should be made liable only by legislation. 5 The Law 81, 103. TREATIES, EFFECT OF "MOST-FAVOURED-NATION" CLAUSE IN COMMERCIAL. Sir Thomas Barclay. 17 Yale L. J. 26. WAIVER OF EXEMPTION FROM SERVICE OF PROCESS BY REASON OF ATTENDANCE UPON COURT BY NON-RESIDENT PARTY OR WITNESS. Anon. Enumerating the methods by which waiver may be made. 35 Nat. Corp. Rep. 304. YOUNG v. GROTE. Thomas Beven. Contending that the drawer of a check who negligently gives opportunity for raising it should be liable. 23 L. Quar. Rev. 390. See 20 HARV. L. REV. 139. II. BOOK REVIEWS. A CODE OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE. By Walter Malins Rose. In three volumes. San Francisco: Bancroft-Whitney Company. 1907. pp. xxx, 3186. 24cm. In this work Mr. Rose has produced a book of unusual value to the practicing lawyer. The mere statement that more than six hundred closely printed pages in the third volume are devoted to approved forms relating to nearly every sort of procedure in the federal courts is sufficient to show the practical character of this treatise. The text itself, which occupies slightly more than one-half of the whole number of pages, presents the principles of federal practice in the form of a code, the greater number of the sections of which are quoted directly from the Constitution, the federal statutes, or the rules of court. Where, however, principles are found in the law which are stated only in the decisions, the author has summarized them in sections containing his own statement of the established rules. The sources of both the author's sections and those quoted from the Constitution, the statutes, or the court rules, are clearly indicated. The book contains very complete cross-references, and also tables of parallel references by means of which the sections of the code in which any section of the Revised Statutes or of the Statutes at Large is discussed may be readily found. The work also contains the Bankruptcy Act and the General Orders in Bankruptcy, the rules of the Supreme Court and of all the circuit courts of appeals, and the rules of the circuit courts of the more important jurisdictions. The whole is made readily accessible by an index of more than one hundred and thirty pages. Ordinarily the treatment of a complicated subject within the somewhat rigid limits of a code is a task of the greatest difficulty. The rules of federal procedure, however, are so largely derived from positive enactments rather than from common-law principles or customary practice, that the subject lends itself to codification more readlly than almost any other. One disadvantage of a treatise in code form is that the principles with which it deals must be stated in the form of established propositions, thus leaving less chance for a discussion of doubtful or disputed points. While this defect will be felt at times by the critical reader of Mr. Rose's work, it has been avoided for the most part by the use of full annotations. These annotations make up the greater part of the text of the book. They contain a complete exposition and discussion of the rules laid down in the various sections of the code, arranged in ordinary text-book form, with full references to the decisions upon which the notes are based. No doubt Mr. Rose's experience in collecting federal cases for his former works has been of great value to him in the preparation of these volumes. At any rate, the collection of cases seems to be very complete. The treatment of the various topics is clear and logically arranged. One may with some confidence express the hope that the work will meet with the cordial welcome from the profession which its merits warrant. H. LEB. S. THE PRINCIPLES AND FORMS OF PRACTICE. By Austin Abbott. Second Edition by Carlos C. Alden. In two volumes. New York: Baker, Voorhis and Company. 1907. pp. xiv, 1170; xi, 1171-2317. 8vo. Outside of the code itself no book is used more by the practicing attorney in New York than Abbott's Practice and Forms. A new edition of this work will therefore be welcomed by all lawyers in that state. Twenty years have passed since the first edition was published, yet in spite of the changes in the code and the many decisions of the court, the editor of the present edition has found very little to change in the first edition. His work has consisted almost entirely in noting the amendments to the code in the past twenty years, and the decisions of the courts during that period. These amendments and decisions are collected annually in the New York Annual Digest under the title "Code of Civil Procedure." This digest should render the task of one editing a book on code practice easy, and should make it possible for him to attain the highest degree of accuracy. use. The actual merits of the editor's work can, perhaps, be ascertained only by However, to test the accuracy of the present work we have examined all the cases on the code decided during 1905 and 1906, and the amendments to the code in those years. We have found many errors, both of omission and commission, of which the limits of this review will not permit any extended statement. For example, the editor states that a motion to discharge an attachment must be made before final judgment, and he cites § 687 of the code in support of that proposition (p. 1258). That section was amended by the Laws of 1906, c. 507, so that such a motion is allowed after judgment. Again, he states that an action may be discontinued without the consent of the attorney (p. 1588); he fails to note in that connection that § 55 of the code provides that a party can act only through his attorney, nor does he cite the case of Kuehn v. Syracuse Rapid Transit Co. (104 App. Div. 580, 587) which so held on a question of discontinuance. The following cases which have an important bearing on some of the subjects treated by the editor were not noticed. Davids v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co. (104 App. Div. 23; aff. 182 N. Y. 526), on the liability of a master for arrest under § 849 for assault committed by servant; Carlisle v. Barnes (183 N. Y. 272), holding that where the chief judge of the Court of Appeals has denied leave to appeal to that court, the party cannot get such leave from another judge; People ex rel. Jerome v. Court of General Sessions (185 N. Y. 504), holding that prohibition is the proper remedy where the Court of General Sessions is about to exceed its powers by granting a new trial; Matter of Sherril v. O'Brien (186 N. Y. 1), holding that an order denying a writ of mandamus to be appealable to the Court of Appeals must recite that the writ was not refused by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its discretion; Matter of Schroeder (113 App. Div. 221), holding that objections as to form of referee's report cannot be raised on appeal; Lawton v. Partridge (111 App. Div. 8), holding in an action against joint defendants a judgment against one is authorized; Lederer v. Lederer (108 App. Div. 228), holding that reference may be terminated when the referee files an invalid report (this case is cited by the editor (p. 1878), but not for this proposition); Jones v. Fuchs (106 App. Div. 260), holding that a court has no power to extend the time to serve summons in a case where an attachment is made; Ross v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. (104 App. Div. 378), on the motion for a new trial; Frick v. Freudenthal (45 Misc. 348), holding that an allegation as to fraud cannot be regarded as surplusage. The editor would have added greatly to the value of the present edition if he had indicated in an introductory chapter the changes in the code in the past twenty years. He has, moreover, failed to add a table of cases; an unpardonable omission in a modern law book. Nor has he stated that he has not continued Mr. Abbott's plan of citing the cases in other states than New York. S. J. R. SUITS IN CHANCERY. By Henry R. Gibson. Second Edition. Knoxville, Tenn. Gaut-Ogden Company. 1907. pp. xx, 1203. 8vo. : The title of this volume is not only descriptive of its scope, but is highly characteristic in its conciseness and comprehensiveness of the work itself and of the author. In 1891 Judge Gibson, with a mind enriched with learning and ripened with years of experience in the practice and upon the bench of the chancery courts of Tennessee, appreciating the needs of a guide to chancery practice for use by Tennessee lawyers, put forth his first edition of this work. The volume was promptly accepted according to its real worth as an authority, has continued to hold its rank, and has become, more than a mere convenience, an absolute necessity to every Tennessee lawyer. If it were possible to improve upon the perfect it might well be said that Judge Gibson has accomplished this impossible task in preparing his second edition. He has made many substantial changes, has eliminated the few errors, if such there were, that crept into the work as it was first published, has rewritten many portions thereof, and has added many chapters and sections to cover such points as, in his desire to limit as far as possible the size of the volume, were omitted from the first edition. He has practically rewritten, with many amplifications, the chapters pertaining to injunction and attachment proceedings, and has added sections upon the subjects of reforming or rescinding written contracts, winding up partnerships, subrogation, exoneration and contribution, quo warranto, quia timet and mandamus, and relief under bills of discovery. The mere suggestion of these titles discloses the scope of the work, particularly if it be borne in mind that while the author has intended primarily to publish a book of practice, in order to present properly the forms and proceedings, he has found himself compelled to present and has presented in a condensed but very accurate manner many of the questions of substantive law pertaining thereto. The volume now stands before the legal public as a concise, comprehensive, and accurate discussion of the laws, and a presentation of the rules and forms of practice of substantially every phase of the many possible sorts of chancery proceedings. While the book is framed and intended primarily as a guide to the Tennessee lawyer, with special reference to the Tennessee code, statutes, and decisions, it is nevertheless copious in its references to the works of Pomeroy, Story, Daniel, and Barbour, and by reason thereof it could not but be of value to the profession at large in its discussion of general subjects, and in the almost innumerable forms of bills, answers, motions, decrees, etc., prepared by the author. The work is in no sense intended only for the beginner, although it is of incalculable value to him, but is intended for and is accepted by the profession from the youngest to the oldest as an indispensable article of office furniture, and it fully merits this consideration. H. H. THE PUBLIC RECORDS AND THE CONSTITUTION. By Luke Owen Pike. London: Henry Frowde. 1907. pp. 39. 8vo. In this essay the author has traced, by a short history of the Public Records, the evolution of the form of the present English government from the Council of William the Conqueror. Its striking feature is the manner in which the parallel between development of institutions and the creation of Records is emphasized. To Mr. Pike the Records are at once the evidence and the result of growth. Thus he traces to the great survey of England made by the Commission created by William I and the Council of Gloucester, recorded in the Domesday Book, the centralization of the English Revenue. From the justices sent throughout England by Henry I he derives the present courts, and from the records of these justices in Eyre, the present Law Reports. From the great Council of Edward I he traces the present Privy Council, and the present Parliament — with their corresponding chain of records; and from the principal secretary of the King, to whom the Privy Seal was eventually confided, he derives the Principal Secretaries of State, who form such an important part of the Cabinet. At the end is an admirable diagram, in the nature of a genealogical tree, which shortly and clearly summarizes the whole. E. H. A., JR. THE LAW OF PRIVATE PROPERTY IN WAR. By Norman Bentwich. London: Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd. Boston: The Boston Book Company. 1907. pp. xii, 151. 8vo. "This book," the preface begins, "is based upon the essay which won the Yorke Prize at Cambridge University in 1906". a fact which is perhaps the keynote to its character. The work is not of the "exhaustive" type: the author's aim is rather to present broadly the general principles governing his subject, sketching with extreme brevity their history, discussing the extent of present |