Mr. SIKES. What steps do you think the Congress could and should take to help you bring this drug problem under control in the military? Secretary LAIRD. In considering what steps Congress might take on this problem, you must realize that drug abuse control is a problem confronting the entire Nation. It is not much worse in the Armed Forces than it is in society as a whole. The worst problem for the military is in Vietnam, and as we reduce our involvement in that conflict, the scope of this problem should also decline substantially. The administration is now in the process of considering many actions which, taken together, can do much to solve the country's drug problem. Support for the administration's program by the Congress would help greatly both our society as a whole and the armed services.

PRISONERS OF WAR

Mr. TALCOTT. Mr. Secretary, the POW situation is an emotional issue, but it is a real problem that we have to deal with. Could you tell us if there has been any change in the situation since the Sontay attempted rescue? What is the situation today regarding POW's?

Secretary LAIRD. I think we have some indication that the treatment which is being received by our POW's in North Vietnam may have improved. I wish I could make the same statement as far as Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam are concerned, but I have no such information upon which to base such an assessment.

There have been some visits to selected POW's by outside news media, and there will be some more within the next few months. I think that movement is important, but it does not excuse Hanoi for not living up to the Geneva Convention. I don't want to give the impression that there has been any change insofar as their living up to the Convention is concerned.

Mr. TALCOTT. Have we found through any form of intelligence that the prisoners are being badly treated in any respect?

Secretary LAIRD. Quite the opposite. Quite the opposite. All of our sources would indicate that the efforts that have been made-not only by the United States, but also by those governments and individuals that have contacted Hanoi-have had an effect. As a result of the efforts that have been made by other governments, and the support we have had from free world nations as well as from some neutral and a few Communist countries, the indications are that Hanoi is aware of the international problem which they have for not abiding by the provisions of the Geneva Convention.

Mr. MAHON. The Congress is vitally concerned about the release of our prisoners of war. We have passed resolutions and signed letters, and we have done everything we could in this field. It is my feeling that the Secretary of Defense and the administration is doing everything in its power to secure the release of our prisoners of war. Now, am I correct in assuming that you, as Secretary of Defense, and that the administration and the President, are continuing to do everything that may be possible under the circumstances to secure the release of our prisoners of war? I would like a statement from you about this

matter.

Secretary LAIRD. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. We are doing everything we possibly can. We have placed on the table in Paris a most

forthright proposal for the complete and total exchange of all POW's held by the North Vietnamese and the VC-in North Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam-for all of those held by the South Vietnamese, which is a ratio of about 10 to 1. This is in addition to a proposal for the complete and total withdrawal of all outside forces from the conflict in South Vietnam. All of this is on the corference table in Paris. There has not been much movement on it, but in addition to that we are continuing to carry on our efforts with governments throughout the world. We have had tremendous support from citizens' groups throughout the world and in the United States, and we have been calling this matter to the attention of our people. I continue to look for opportunities to carry on rescue missions. When the opportunity presents itself and there is a possibility of a rescue mission-it doesn't even have to be a 50-50 possibility of a successful rescue as far as I am concerned-I will recommend that the mission be carried out. I must be satisfied that the safety and security of the Americans carrying out the mission will be such that they will return to safety, whether they accomplish the mission or not. If that is the case, I have no hesitancy about recommending to the President of the United States that any rescue mission proposed to me by the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs that has a reasonable possibility of success be carried out.

This is not as easy as some people might think. It is not easy to get the kind of information out of North Vietnam that you need.

As I told one committee of this Congress, we have not yet developed a camera that will see through the roofs of buildings. We may dedevelop such a camera at some time in the future, but it is now very difficult to get solid, firm intelligence information on which to base search and rescue missions.

This is no fault of the intelligence community. They are a little touchy about being blamed, but this is no fault of theirs. It is very difficult to get this kind of information.

Perhaps Chairman Moorer would like to comment on it.

Admiral MOORER. The problem is to get what we call real-time information. We can get information, but it is often weeks old; so when you arrive, the situation that did exist a short time before does not exist at that instant.

Secretary LAIRD. Even taking that into consideration, Mr. Chairman, I think this issue is of sufficient importance that you have to be willing to take some risks.

COMMENDATION

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Secretary, I earnestly pray for you with your responsibilities as Secretary of Defense. You have tremendous responsibilities. We wish you every success in carrying out your responsibilities. You have cooperated fully with this committee, and you have been very helpful. Your testimony has been excellent. You have been most cooperative as usual.

With respect to you, Mr. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, it has been a long time since I have heard a presentation which I thought was as good as the one you made this year. I was most impressed with it, and

HƠN. STANLEY 3. 3ESOR. SECRETARY IF THE AREIZ

GEN. WILLIAM : WESTMORELAND. CHIEF OF STAFE, 1.3. ARMY YAZ GEN. LE MAZIJE. JIRECTOR JF ARMY HDGET. IFACE. COMPTROLLER JE MED ARMEN

MAT JAMES I THOMAS JEFICE DEPUTY JHIEF JF STAKE TIK VILUNARY IPERATIONS

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Sir. Secretar ou nav proceed with our statement.

STATEMENT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

I. INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am glad to have the opportunity to appear once more before this Committee to present a summary of the Army's posture and funding requirements. I again want to thank you for your past support of the Army's needs.

1970 was a year of change, not only in the size and deployment of the Army, but in the direction of management as we seek to reduce reliance on the draft, while maintaining and improving the professional quality of our force. I would like to take up briefly three key areas which occupied our attention in the past year and will continue to do so in the year ahead. These are the overall size of the Army; the progress of Vietnamization and the associated reductions in Army troop strength in Southeast Asia; and our support of NATO defense.

The Army continued in the past year the most rapid demobilization since the end of World War II. The reduction can also be measured in overall military personnel. As Table 1 shows, we have cut the Army from a level of 1,511,000 in FY 1969 to 1, 107, 000 at the end of FY 1971. This is a reduction of 27% in two years. In FY 1972 we plan to further reduce our strength to a total force of 942,000. This will bring us to a level of 27, 000 lower than before the Vietnam War, and within 83,000 of the smallest Army we have had since the Korean War.

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