3. (C) MISSION: To procure, evaluate, interpret, and disseminate as expeditiously as possible information and intelligence relating to any actual, potential or planned demonstrations or other activities related to civil disturbances within the Continental United States (CONUS) which threaten civil order or military security or which may adversely affect the capability of the Department of the Army to perform its mission.

4. (C) SITUATION:

a.

Possible military action required of the Army may include the commitment of federal forces to restore and maintain law and order, to enforce the laws of the United States, or to protect the rights of citizens within a State. Information required to fulfill assigned missions is obtained through liaison conducted with federal, state, and local agencies by US Army Intelligence Command (USAINTC) personnel and by the collection sources designated in Appendix USAINTC personnel will not be directly used to obtain civil disturbance information unless specific direction to do so has been received from Headquarters

B.

DA. Pre-disturbance information to satisfy Army requirements will be obtained by drawing on other Federal as well as State and local sources which secure such data in the course of carrying out their primary duties and responsibilities.

b. When need for military intervention in a civil disturbance situation appears imminent, the Personal Liaison Officer of the Chief of Staff, US Army (PLOCofS) will be dispatched in advance of the task force to the objective area to ccordinate with municipal and state officials, make an estimate of the situation, and report directly to the Chief of Staff, US Army. To fulfill his responsibilities, it is necessary that the PLOCofS have up-to-date and detailed information on the current situation in the designated arca.

(1) The officer directing the USAINTC operations in the objective area will provide maximum assistance to the PLOCofS in matters of liaison, coordination, information, and other needs of the PLOCOLS in accomplishing his responsibilities.

(2) Upon commitment of Army forces and/or arrival of the Personal Liaison Officer of the Chief of Staff, US Army (PLOCOS) in the objective area, US Army Intelligence Command (USAINTC) personnel are authorized to operate more actively to fulfill intelligence requirements; specifically, intensify or initiate contact with local police and government officials, civil leaders, members of private organizations, and observe demonstrations, riots, and other activities which have a bearing on the situation.

(3) USAINTC personnel will not engage in covert operations pertinent to civil disturbances without prior approval and direction of this Headquarters.

(4) During the execution of civil disturbance control operations, the USAINTC unit covering the civil disturbance responds to the EEI and other support requirements of the Task Force Commander and PLOCofS until they depart the objective area.

c. Dissemination. Information and intelligence will be disseminated without delay to higher, parallel, and subordinate headquarters in accordance with their requirements by the most expeditious means consistent with its importance and security classification.

5. (C) EXECUTION: This plan is directive to DA elements only and is furnished to other agencies for information and coordination purposes.

a. DA Agencies: Those DA agencies indicated are requested to respond to requirements listed in Appendix D. Designated agencies may publish supplemental guidance and procedural instructions consistent with this plan. In the event suct. supplemental instructions are prepared, request that two copies be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI), DA, ATTN: ACSI-DSCD, Washington, 20310, within 30 days after publication.

b. Mutual Support Arrangements. Agencies, offices, and commands from whom mutual support arrangements will be requested are listed in Appendix B. Details of mutual support arrangements, when required, will be outlined in separate correspondence with each agency concerned and will not be made a part of this collection plan.

c. Comments and Recommendations: Users of this plan are invited and encouraged to submit recommended changes or comments to improve it. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph., and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be forwarded directly to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI), DA, ATTN: ACSI-DSCD, Washington, D. C. 20310.

6. (U) PRIORITIES: Civil disturbance information collection priorities are contained in Appendix C.

7. (U) DISTRILUTION:

a. Distribution list is contained in Appendix D.

b. Addressees are requested to make distribution of this plan within their respective agencies and commands. Reproduction of this document in whole or in part is authorized to meet the requirements of individual addressees.

APPENDICES:

Appendix A - Thresholds of Control (Special Distribution)

Appendix B - Collection Requirements

Appendix C - Collection Priorities
Appendix D - Distribution List
Appendix E Map of CONUS Army Areas

APPENDIX A

REPORTING ON "THRESHOLDS OF CONTROL" FACTORS

1. (FOUO) Violence which is beyond the control of local authorities does not exist solely as a function of the number of incidents. Rather it exists as a function of the commitment of those reserves available to local civil commanders, the capabilities of their personnel, the rate at which the reserves are being used up, compared to the "staying power" of the disturbance causers, the trends in the character of the disorder, and the interpretations of those specific incidents which reflect on the moods and possible courses of future action by the groups involved in both sides of the disturbance. For example, an outbreak of incidents far in excess of normal levels may not constitute an emergency if local authorities have not committed all of their reserves. In most large cities, with many reserves such as off-duty personnel and personnel from unaffected areas, and a well ordered system of commitment and shifting of resources, this type of situation could perhaps be handled routinely. Conversely, an outbreak of incidents not greatly above normal levels which was sustained for a prolonged period could prove to be an emergency, if the reserves available to civil commanders were committed and exhausted at a rate greater than that at which they could be relieved and rested. A large outbreak of fires may be handled routinely by a fire department that can draw on the reserves of surrounding areas, but a small outbreak may be disastrous if other factors are considered: for example, in the event firemen refused to answer alarms in areas where snipers were active, it could result in the spreading of fires which under normal circumstances could have been easily controlled. The point at which control by civil authorities can no longer be maintained is considered to be the "threshold of control."

2. (FOUO) Thus, the best collectors and analysts are the civil comanders and experts on the scene: the tire and police chiefs, the city managers and like officials. Such individuals will not be expert at predicting the exact course of future events, as has been proved in past riots, but they will be the authorities on the commitment and capabilities of their reserves, the character of the disorder, and the moods of the hostile minority groups. They will differentitate between normal incidents and incident levels, and disturbance incidents and incident levels, without resorting to numerical manipulation. They will make judgments based on consideration of all of these important numeric and non-numeric factors, and their past experience with all elements involved. A police commissioner may not be able to cite the statistics on arrests, fires, false alarms, or lootings in his area on an hour-to-hour basis. But he may be able to report with reliability, that "if these incidents continue at this level for six more hours, my men just will not be able to handle it without help."

APPENDIX B TO DA CIVIL DISTURBANCE INFORMATION_COLLECTION_PLAN_(ACDP)
COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

1. (U) Headquarters, Department of the Army civil disturbance information collection requirements are stated in this appendix. These requirements reflect the information which DA requires for the effective discharge of its mission.

2. (C) DA collection agencies who are requested to respond to specific requirements are indicated by the symbols listed below and as annotated on pages B-3 thru B-16. DA collectors are also requested to report information pertinent to other requirements that may be obtained as a by-product of their other activities:

D Commander-in-Chief, US Army Forces, Strike (CINCARSTRIKE)

3. (C) Other Department of Defense Agencies, as indicated by symbols below, are requested to report to DA, as soon as obtained, any relevant information which they obtain pertinent to these collection requirements:

4. (C) The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is requested to provide information and reports which are relevant to those collection requirements annotated with the symbol "M."

5. (C) Requests to cooperating agencies for information: The following US Government agencies are requested to furnish to the Department of the Army, as soon as obtained, any information which is pertinent to the collection requirements stated herein: