I will not read the entire statement. I was not trying to outdo predecessor, Secretary McNamara. I was somewhat critical somet: of his reading the entire statement, so I will not make that s mistake.

Mr. MAHON. The entire statement must be read and studied pondered by the committee, of course, but in order that we may more time for the interrogation during this 2-day session, I tl it would be good to follow that procedure.

In view of the conditions which beset the world, Admiral Moo we shall hear you with special interest. Have you any particular th to say at this time?

Admiral MOORER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, but rather than r my statement, I plan to just brief it with the hope that questions follow later.

I have prepared a comprehensive statement of the capabilities the United States in relation to the capabilities of other countries t might be opposed to us. I believe this may be the first time in m years that this committee has had an opportunity to view an ove presentation of the U.S. capabilities as they stand in relation to capabilities of our most probable opponents.

Mr. MAHON. All right.

Do you have anyhing to say at this time, Mr. Minshall?

Mr. MINSHALL. No, I have nothing to add at this time, Mr. Cha

man.

Mr. MAHON. You may proceed, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I am privileged today to present the first comprehensive 5-year I fense program of the Nixon administration and to discuss the as ciated fiscal year 1972 budget, which is presently before this commit for consideration.

Mr. MAHON. I want to commend you, Mr. Secretary, for this 5-ye program in which you try to look at the short- and long-range obj tives. I think this will be very helpful. I want to congratulate y upon this approach to the problem.

Secretary LAIRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This Five-Year Defense Program is keyed to the twin objectives set forth by President Nixon for the last third of the 20th century: achievement for the first time in this century of a generation of peace; and in the process, enhancement of the quality of life for all Americans, while helping to improve it for all peoples of the world.

This 1972 Defense Report to Congress and the American people contains a Five-Year Defense Program which spells out a new National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence. This new strategy is designed to prevent wars by furthering the President's goal of building a viable structure of peace based on adequate strength, true partnership, and meaningful negotiations.

The Strategy of Realistic Deterrence seeks to further the goal of peace by deterrence of armed conflict at all levels. I have always tried to be a realist in fulfilling my responsibilities, whether as a Member of Congress or as Secretary of Defense. I believe the strategy we are advancing is realistic for three

reasons:

First, it is based on a sober and clear view of the multiple threats to peace which exist in today's world. It neither exaggerates nor underestimates those threats.

Second, it provides for the maintenance of a strong Free World military capability as the essential foundation of deterrence. It rejects the view that peace is well served if our military power is unilaterally weakened.

Third, it takes account of the strategic, fiscal, manpower and political realities while steering a prudent middle course between two policy extremes - world policeman or new isolationism.

The Strategy of Realistic Deterrence is new. Those who would dismiss it as a mere continuation of past policies in new packaging would be quite mistaken. Past policy was responsive and reactive.

Our new Strategy is positive and active. Past policy focused on containment and accommodation. The new Strategy emphasizes

measured, meaningful involvement and vigorous negotiation from a position of strength.

The Strategy of Realistic Deterrence will provide through sufficient strength and full partnership the indispensable and realistic basis for effective Free World negotiation. Most importantly, it is designed not to manage crises but to prevent

wars.

The FY 1971 program and budget, which was sent to Congress last year, was the foundation for the transition from an era of confrontation to an era of meaningful negotiation. The fiscal yea 1972 program will move us closer to this goal.

It was clear at the outset of the Nixon Administration that, in order to set the stage and create the conditions for meaningful negotiation and peaceful relations, we had to move the country away from war and toward peace, away from a wartime economy and toward a peacetime economy, away from lopsided national priorities and toward a major reordering of those priorities, away from arms competition and toward arms limitation.

On the basis of the record of the past two years, it is my view that we have made significant -- in some cases unprecedented progress toward the major interim goals we have set for ourselves.

In the war to peace transition: by continuing negotiations
in Paris, by progress in Vietnamization, by reducing U.S.
combat activities, casualties and air sortie levels in
Southeast Asia, and by an orderly, substantial and continuing
troop redeployment program.

In reordering national priorities: by shifting the Defense portion of the Federal Budget and Gross National Product (GNP) to its lowest level in 20 years and by spending more on human needs than on Defense needs.

In our Defense budget: by providing for the first time in this century the full peace dividend before the conclusion of a war. Defense costs in this budget already are back at pre-Vietnam levels in constant dollars.

In implementing the Nixon Doctrine: by withdrawing more than 300,000 American troops from Asia while increasing significantly security assistance levels to our friends and allies.

In NATO: by helping foster a new spirit of meaningful burden sharing and a new awareness of the strategic, fiscal, manpower and political realities we face in common.

In moving toward zero-draft: by obtaining Congressional approval for long-needed draft reform to eliminate many inequities, and by cutting draft calls almost in half from 1968 to 1970 in pursuing our goal of zero-draft by July 1, 1973.

In our program for human goals: by relating it to our
objective of an all-volunteer force, by seeking to instill
a new order of professionalism and dignity in military life,
by seeking to remedy remaining shortcomings in such areas
as housing and education and by continuing to lead the way
toward full equal opportunity.

In taking new initiatives with regard to prisoners of war:
by an unprecedented exchange offer at the Paris peace
table, by search and rescue missions when possible, and by
focusing public attention at home and abroad on their plight.
In chemical warfare and biological research, and in defolia-
tion: by promulgating a major new policy renouncing any use
of biological and toxin weapons and renouncing first use of
lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons, by ending crop
destruction operations in Vietnam and by restricting limited
defoliation still needed for troop safety to the same
regulation applied to herbicide use in the U.S.

In major improvements of defense management: by adopting many of the Blue Ribbon Panel recommendations, by emphasizing a new "fly-before-buy" policy and by increased decentralization in procurement actions.

Mr. Chairman, we are proud of the significant progress we have been able to make in establishing new directions and a steady momentum toward major goals of the American people. As I reported last year in discussing our FY 1971 transitional program, the challenges here at home which we faced upon assuming office in many ways equalled, and in some ways surpassed, the growing challenges abroad.

I will not repeat in detail what I said last year, but it is important, I believe, to repeat a concluding comment I made in last year's Defense Report:

"Transition to a new equiliorium will take time. We made a beginning in 1969 and are continuing the transition into calendar year 1970. We consider our fiscal year 1971 budget another building block in that transition.'

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I readily acknowledged that not all of the challenges we encountered upon assuming office had been met with the submissio of the fiscal year 1971 budget. I would repeat that comment tod with regard to the budget and program contained in this report. We still have a long way to go in all aspects of Defense respons bility. We have never claimed to be instant problem-solvers. we have completed our year of transition with respect to basic Defense planning both with regard to strategy and management. We have completed our basic reviews and have made our fundamental decisions on what needs to be done. The New Strategy and Defens Program presented in this report embody the major elements of the decisions that have flowed from our assessments of the past two years. The Strategy and the Program, of course, cannot succeed without the understanding and support of Congress and the America people.

This report describes the major changes which have been made and which will be made in such areas as defense strategy, the defense budget, research and development, command and control, intelligence, procurement and, most importantly, the need to revamp our concepts about the recruitment and use of military manpower both in active, National Guard and Reserve forces.

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I would like briefly to outline for you some of the major points in the Defense Report. We focus on two fundamental aspect of Defense Planning:

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Effective Implementation of the Strategy of

In Section II Better Management of Human, Material, and Economic Resources in the Department of Defense.

Our Five-Year Defense Plan projects a capability to attain o goal with an efficient and modernized force that, in peacetime, would require no more than seven percent of the Gross National Product and be made up of no more than 2.5 million men and women who are volunteers. This is discussed in the chapter on Strategy Overview, which states, in essence, that a realistic military strategy cannot be an end in itself but must be inseparably linke with a broader national strategy of deterrence and "meaningfully related to our pressing requirements in the domestic field."