the expansion of existing deposits and the continual search for new ones, as well as energetically pushing research on the development of new and important uses, provides the proper assurance for future national security that a sterile stockpile can only supplement, never supplant.

The domestic tungsten mining industry now faces extinction unless prompt action is taken by the executive branch.

This program is for executive action and does not require any congressional action at all. There is ample existing law and ample existing appropriations for the executive branch of our Government today to take care of tungsten perfectly within the law.

Mr. BIBLE. You are referring to ODM, is that correct?
Mr. LONG. I will read it to you and you will see.

Public Law 733 of the 84th Congress approved by the President July 19, 1956, established a program under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior for the maintenance of the domestic tungsten mining industry.

Although supported by the administration, this program aborted less than a half year from its start when the Congress failed-not through any failure of this committee or the Senate but the failure of the House-to appropriate the necessary moneys to carry out the law. For awhile the domestic tungsten mining industry was encouraged to believe that the administration would rectify this situation, but no positive results were forthcoming.

The Congress then, in August of 1957, directed the United States Tariff Commission to make a study of the tungsten tariff situation under section 336 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Again the domestic tungsten mining industry was encouraged to believe that some form of positive assistance would be forthcoming.

However, on February 28, 1958, the section 336 investigation aborted, with a majority of the Tariff Commission apparently believing that there did not exist a proper basis for a positive finding primarily because Government programs had largely obscured price relationships in tungsten ever since the start of the Korean war.

It should be noted that no attempt was made to contact domestic tungsten producers in this so-called investigation. No one of us ever heard a word from the Tariff Commission. They just said you could not find any proper price relationship.

Having experienced both of these abortive efforts, the domestic tungsten mining industry faces extinction unless the Department of the Interior moves promptly to develop a proper program to maintain this essential component of the mobilization base.

A PROPER FROGRAM FOR TUNGSTEN

Dry up much of the burdensome foreign surpluses currently overhanging the market and depressing prices on a worldwide basis by acquiring foreign tungsten, particularly of Korean and Bolivian origin for the supplemental stockpile.

As of September 30, 1957, the United States Government has already obligated $1,118 million for aid to Korea and $71 million for aid to Bolivia. From these two countries we can properly require the delivery of a strategic material such as tungsten in part repay

ment of such aid. Barter with other foreign sources should also be undertaken.

It does not take any additional congressional action for the administration to do that if they would. Just last week they gave outright to Korea a total of $50 million of agricultural products. Nothing concrete was required in return. At present 25,000 units a month from Korea and 25,000 units a month from Bolivia on the world market is what has wrecked the world price structure in tungsten.

Mr. BIBLE. Do you feel that in exchange for $50 million in surplus commodities that was given to Korea, we should have taken back $50 million worth of tungsten, is that the point you are making, and frozen it into a supplemental stockpile.

Mr. LONG. Yes, sir.

Mr. BIBLE. What effect would that have?

Mr. LONG. It would just increase the stockpiles in this country and increase our national security and it would take the tungsten pressure off the world market.

Mr. BIBLE, Would it do that or would it stimulate production in the foreign fields even more.

Mr. LONG. This would not stimulate production in the foreign field any more in my opinion.

Mr. BIBLE. Why?

Mr. LONG. Because I do not think you can increase it very much in the foreign fields today. We give Korea $50 million, yet they are selling their tungsten today at $8 a unit.

Mr. BIBLE. Is it that low now in the world market?

Mr. LONG. Yes.

Mr. BIBLE. It carries a duty of $7.90.

Mr. LONG. That is correct. They are producing less than that now. That is what they were producing. That is 300,000 units a year. At $8 a unit you are not talking of $50 million, you are talking $2.5 million. It is just a little handful of money we are talking about in tungsten.

Two, relieve the domestic miners of the material produced in good faith under Public Law 733 that has not yet been purchased by the Government.

This could be done through the use of existing stockpile funds, Defense Production Act funds, or even barter arrangements. There are about 250,000 units left in the hands of the producers in this country that we produced in reliance on Public Law 733.

Mr. BIBLE. I think you should be paid for them, as you well know. Mr. LONG. If that was bought and taken off the market

Mr. BIBLE. How do you suggest we can pay for them? We have tried the appropriation route. As you well know, we failed in securing the appropriation to buy the 250,000.

Mr. LONG. You do it through the Defense Production Act. All ODM has to do is find the fact that the maintenance of a going tungsten mining industry in this country is necessary as an element of national security and then it has all the money it needs to buy the tungsten itself to carry out that policy.

It does not take any action by Congress or anybody else. ODM could make that finding.

Third, institute a quota or higher tariff on tungsten ores, concentrates, and products under section 7 (b) that will enable the domestic tungsten miner to supply a major portion of normal United States industrial demand.

The President of the United States has complete authority today upon a finding that the preservation of a going tungsten mining industry in this country is essential to the national security, to increase by Executive order the tariff to whatever extent he must.

Mr. BIBLE. Will you put me clear as to what ODM has done on this very point? I was under the impression that ODM had specifically stated that defense requirements had been met, that there was a sufficient mobilization base for a wartime emergency.

Mr. LONG. Exactly. What I am asking ODM to do

Mr. BIBLE. What you are asking them to do is reverse their finding. Mr. LONG. That Dr. Flemming made earlier prior to the 1958 recommendation made by their own Advisory Committee that special provision should now be made for the high-temperature materials. If the administration chooses to do so it has this authority to do these things.

Mr. BIBLE. I think I agree with you that they have the authority. The point I am trying to develop is that it seems to me they have ruled adversely to the contention you are making. Is that correct?

Mr. LONG. Last year Dr. Flemming, then Director of ODM, appeared here and said that

We cannot buy any more tungsten with defense money because the military has told me that we have all the tungsten on hand that we need. I, therefore, ask you to take action because I think that this industry should be preserved.

In response to that the committee voted in favor of that and Congress enacted Public Law 733. I say that since then we have had these sputniks flying around the world. We have had many of our missiles fail.

I say they are failing because of the lack of high-temperature materials in them to withstand the heat. I say that as a matter of opinion as an observer with no technical knowledge whatsoever, no access to any secrets. That is my opinion. I know this, that the ODM Special Advisory Committee recommends that special treatment be given to the high temperature materials.

Mr. BIBLE. On what page do they do that in that Advisory Committee report?

Mr. LONG. Pages 8 and 9 of its report. I have read that into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It is already in the record.

Mr. BIBLE. I can read the record if it is already in that.

The CHAIRMAN. I was going to say we have other witnesses to finish this afternoon. I wish you would try to complete your statement

as soon as you can.

Mr. BIBLE. In fairness to the witnesses I think I am responsible for delaying, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LONG (continuing). 4. Sponsor a properly coordinated hightemperature material research and development program which gives adequate emphasis to tungsten, among other materials. At present there are fragmentary and sporadic projects sponsored by the Army, Navy, Air Force, Atomic Energy Commission, Department of the

Interior, Department of Commerce, and the National Science Foundation.

But there is no coordinated high-temperature metallurgical research and developmental program of the magnitude required to provide the high-temperature materials that will be needed for defense and atomic energy programs.

This is particularly true with respect to studies on alloy formation and workability.

AUTHORITY FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE DOMESTIC MOBILIZATION BASE

1. Section 1 of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act of 1946 stated that it was the policy not only to acquire and retain stockpiles of strategic and critical materials, but also to encourage the conservation and development of sources of these materials within the United States.

2. Section 2 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, states that it is the policy to expand productive capacities and supply beyond the levels needed to meet civilian demand in order to reduce the time required for full mobilization.

3. Section 7 (b) of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955 provides that, when the President finds that an article is being imported into the United States in such quantities as to threaten to impair the national security, he shall take such action as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article to a level that will not threaten to impair the national security.

4. The final report of the President's Cabinet Committee on Minerals Policy, dated November 30, 1954, points out the need for maintaining an adequate domestic production component of the mobilization base. The report states that a program involving the best use of all the existing authorities of the Government should be developed to maintain the mobilization base and that if existing authorities are inadequate, appropriate legislative recommendations should be prepared. Pursuant to Defense Mobilization Order I-13, the Secretary of the Interior is responsible for analyzing the problems involved in maintaining an adequate mobilization base for partial or full mobilization conditions and for recommending necessary programs in the case of metals and minerals.

5. The report of the Special Stockpile Advisory Committee to the Director of ODM, dated January 28, 1958, points out that demand for high temperature and other special property could increase sharply and that a mechanism must be established to appraise the possible effects of research and development activities on requirements for high temperature and other special property materials. Instead of relying on past use patterns, possible needs 5 to 10 years hence should be surveyed.

The committee also pointed out the desirability of maintaining the mobilization base, citing that a plan should be developed to make appropriate use of each of the existing authorities of Government including possible tariff adjustments, imposition of quotas, tax concessions, and installation of Government-owned equipment.

The report also pointed out that as existing statutory authorities are inadequate, additional legislation should be requested.

6. The Agricultural Trade Development and Expansion Act of 1954, as amended, provides for the creation of a supplemental stockpile to be additional to the amounts acquired under authority of the Strategic Stockpiling Act. Materials are to be acquired for the supplemental stockpile by purchase with foreign currencies derived from the sale abroad of United States agricultural surpluses or by barter activities.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you have covered the subject very well. Your statement is very important. I am sure the committee will read it with great interest and be greatly influenced by your suggestions and advice.

Mr. LONG. I thank you for the opportunity to appear.

Mr. BIBLE. May I ask just one question. I apologize again for being late. I know of Mr. Long's intense and vigorous interest in this field. I am very well aware of the position that he holds. I am under the impression that ODM has said that they want to hold to a certain level of productivity in order to create an adequate mobilization base.

Would you know whether or not ODM has ever indicated to the tungsten industry what that level of productivity is?

Mr. LONG. No; and I do not know at all that ODM has adopted the view I think should be adopted.

Mr. BIBLE. That is one of the points they make. I wonder if they have ever indicated to you, and you have always been active in the tungsten institute, whether or not they have ever indicated to you or to the other members of the institute as to what that level of productivity is?

Mr. LONG. No, they never have. But this report to the ODM by the Advisory Committee has not been adopted by ODM, it has not been adopted by Mr. Gray as his own. I am hoping it will be adopted. Mr. BIBLE. Mr. Gray is a North Carolinian; is he not?

Mr. LONG. Yes, sir; he is one of our most distinguished citizens. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I think you have presented a very valuable statement.

Mr. LONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clott.

STATEMENT OF HERMAN CLOTT, WASHINGTON REPRESENTATIVE, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF MINE, MILL, AND SMELTER WORKERS

Mr. CLOTT. My name is Herman Clott. My address is room 600, 711 14th Street NW., Washington, D. C. I am Washington representative for International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers on whose behalf I submit the following statement: