In none of the other accidents were more than three aboard. So. using the case that went through the court of appeals as a comparison where six were aboard it would appear logical to say that in the other cases there was undermanning with respect to personnel.

Mr. GARMATZ. In other words, what you are saying now are facts that were brought out in court at the hearing?

Mr. KING. Yes. On January 27, 1960, at about 1:30 a.m. in dense fog, the diesel-powered tug Claribel, pushing an empty steel barge and navigating by a magnetic compass admittedly 17 degrees in error, struck the bridge with immense force 3.4 miles away from the nearest draw or bascule, causing the collapse of several 56-foot spans.

On this occasion the bridge was closed to traffic 10 days for repair and damage to the structure totaled $138,000. While life was not lost, a Winn-Dixie van truck narrowly escaped going in the lake. The Winn-Dixie truck was on the span at the time the accident occurred and there was only a brief matter of 1 or 2 seconds between the collision and the truck passing over the area. A formal Coast Guard investigation was conducted and report rendered.

Following institution of civil proceedings and trial the U.S. district judge, Robert Ainsworth denied the petition for limitation filed by the Claribel. There was not sufficient insurance in this case. There was limited insurance of $100,000.

The tug filed petition for limitation. The matter was in the courts over 5 years. Judge Ainsworth found that the tug was unseaworthy by reason of its defective compass and by reason of its incompetent and short-handed crew.

He found that the compass had never been checked or calibrated. And the vessel had been purchased and put in use for over 4 years. The captain and pilot of the tug testified that even had they known of the compass error-and these people had been navigating on the lake for years. The captain had been navigating on the lake far in excess of a 10-year period-that even had they known of the error they did not then know or now know how to correct for a compass deviation. I don't pretend to know much about navigation of a vessel but I have learned a little bit. At least some of the shop talk in these cases that I have handled. Correction for deviation as I understand it, at least as it has been explained to me, is a relatively simple procedure of heading the tug for a fixed objective and taking your compass course based on that fixed objective, and determining what the course is to that particular objective and from that simple procedure you can then determine to what extent the compass is in error.

Even if it is in error you can utilize the compass because you know what the course is for a particular fixed object. These men did not know that and there was not anyone on board who did. Yet they were navigating in fog with a visibility of less than 100 feet at the time.

One pertinent observation of the decision is that these men were responsible-this is the court's decision-for the navigation of this vessel and tow:

Although they had worked on Lake Pontchartrain for several years they were completely lacking in ability to use the compass properly. They had never been instructed in the use of the compass. Also they were not licensed by the Coast Guard.

On this trip the vessel was short one crewmember. There were six men aboard. One of them, the captain, considered a green hand. Though in weather of the kind encountered it is necessary that a lookout be posted at the head of the flotilla, none was provided.

This case then went to the court of appeals and a recent decision of the fifth circuit court of appeals agreed with the district court and found that

the evidence generously supports the district court's finding that shortcomings of crew and compass were the approximate cause of the accident and that the record indicates that masters

They are speaking about Lake Pontchartrain now and inland waterways in Louisiana

that masters who understand even rudiments of compass compensation are the exception rather than the rule.

Now after this accident we asked our engineers what we could do in self-defense. We had the navigation lights alongside of the bridge. We knew that these tugs were navigating in Lake Pontchartrain perhaps in greater number than they do in other areas because we have a shell dredging operation in the lake which utilizes this towing operation to a great extent. They recommended that as long as the shortcomings of crew and personnel and vessels were such that there could be no guarantee that we would not have other accidents. But as a measure of self-defense they recommended that we attempt to secure the right to operate AM radio stations on the bridge. Now this is a 24-mile structure, and we have two bascules operated by personnel. We then undertook to attempt to get AM radio licenses and found that the Federal Communications Commission had a rule against that type of operation for bridges. We secured, after about a year, a waiver of the Federal Communications Commission to this rule and we put into operation these stations which are the same type of operation that most of the tugs have.

In connection with that we also placed into operation radar on an experimental basis in the hopes that we could conceivably detect vessels which were off course and by means of AM radio contact the Coast Guard or perhaps the vessels themselves and without attempting to navigate, which we are not in the business of doing, without attempting to navigate these vessels, at least provide some sort of minimum warning to them.

We put this in operation in 1962. On December 2, 1961, the tug Ginger with two men aboard and a large barge made up ahead and another made fast along side the starboard side departed the vicinity of the mouth of the Tchefuncta River which empties in Lake Pontchartrain on the west side of the bridge heading for a location on the south shore which was also west of the bridge.

There was no intention for the tug to come into the bascules or traverse the bridge at that time. During its course of navigating to the south shore a squall developed. Now this is not an unusual thing in Lake Pontchartrain. Squalls develop routinely. Wind came up to 40 miles per hour. The lines on the vessel were insufficient to hold the tow and the barges escaped and collided with the bridge and actually catapulted down the bridge for a mile or so before they were rescued. The bridge was not severed however, even though the barges were at the time loaded, but the bridge had to be closed temporarily for the

repair. These men were not licensed. While they had experience on Lake Pontchartrain they did not have the proper lines to adequately secure the tow.

The barges had no anchoring facilities. There was absolutely nothing to anchor the barges with. So, if they had left the one barge to search for the other it would have been impossible to hold that barge to one spot. I might add that in the tug Claribel case, the first one, in 1960, there was an anchor but no facilities for anchoring, for lowering or raising the anchor on the tug.

So when it met this fog, this deep fog, there was really no way for it to anchor and stop dead. It had to continue with this compass and with the men using a compass. They didn't know the basic fundamentals of it.

Shortly after the Ginger accident which was in 1961, approximately a year after, the tug Idaho took off from a dredge, a shell dredge which was stationed about a mile from the bridge, with the captain asleep, the assistant pilot at the wheel, and the deckhand in the galley making coffee at the time. He thought he was headed west when actually he was headed east.

This was a calm, clear night with the stars shining, visibility at least 5 miles. He mistook the navigational lights on the bridge for an obstacle light for a pipeline and instead of slowing speed, increased his speed to full power, ramming his barge he was pushing a barge—and the tug into the bridge but still did not sever the bridge but caused some $70,000 damage.

Here again there was insufficient insurance. In the tug Idaho case there was also insufficient insurance. Now, although there was a compass aboard the tug he stated that he did not have the slightest idea as to how to use it or the experience to compensate for deviation if it was in error.

The deckhand who was making coffee was a green deckhand and admitted he had never acted as a lookout before and was never used as such. Lookouts are very, very seldom used on Lake Pontchartrain even though the weather conditions require them on many, many

occasions.

On June 16, 1964, the tug Rebel, Jr. was navigating parallel to the causeway approximately three-quarters of a mile to the west, navigating from the south shore to the north shore on a direct north course. At about eight and three-quarters of a mile out, at a location where we have 40 bright fluorescent lights indicating a turnaround where motorists can turn their vehicles around and go back to the south shore. The assistant pilot who was at the wheel either dozed off or passed out, one of the two. The Coast Guard investigation left that conclusion indefinite. It was a hot night. He said he passed out, and he had had a history of having passed out in the service.

The conditions on the tug were such that there was very, very little ventilation and with the conditions, the physical conditions that this man had, medical testimony was to the effect that with the conditions of ventilation aboard the tug and the man's physical condition that the two could have conspired together to cause him to pass out. Now, the captain was asleep and the deckhand was also asleep. So there was one man on duty with a derrick barge ahead and another

barge lashed to its port, making headway at full speed about threequarters of a mile from the bridge on the west side, when it suddenly veered. I imagine that is when he passed out or went to sleep, whatever the cause may be.

It veered to the starboard and crashed into the bridge. At the same time that this accident occurred a Trailways bus was going toward St. Tammany Parish, north, and within 1 or 2 seconds after the collision the bus went into the lake If there was anything at all fortunate about the accident it must have been that only eight people were aboard the bus. Six persons lost their lives. The busdriver was seriously injured and a serviceman was also seriously injured. The Coast Guard conducted a formal investigation of this accident, and I am sure that report has been made a part of their testimony.

These men worked very, very irregular hours, long hours. They had only three on the tug, none of whom was licensed. They displayed a very serious lack of qualification to operate a vessel such as this or any vessel for that matter. The man at the wheel displayed an extraordinary lack of competence.

Two weeks after this in broad daylight, in the early morning, about 6:30 the tug Red Poll, navigating on the other side of the bridge, parallel to the bridge, at about the same distance that the Rebel was navigating 2 weeks before on the west side

Mr. GARMATZ. There was only 2 weeks in time between the two accidents?

Mr. KING. Yes, sir. The accidents occurred June 16, 1964, and July 25, 1964. It was a little over 2 weeks. On this occasion there was another bus carrying workers over to Jefferson Parish on the south shore and they saw the tug veer to the port, got out of the bus and one was up in the bus keeping his hand on the horn, kept his hand consistently on the horn as some sort of warning, saw the tug headed for the bridge, yelled, screamed, did everything possible to attract the attention of the tug, but there was no one in the wheelhouse.

The captain was asleep and so was his assistant pilot. There was no one to tend to this tug. Neither of these men was licensed. However, I imagine the most licensed man in the world could not have done anything with this particular tug as long as he was asleep. In this accident, there was no loss of life fortunately, but four 56-foot spans were knocked out of the bridge. If we learned anything, I guess it was how to fix the bridge. In 5 days the bridge was back in operation. But the damage was in excess of $165,000. Now in this accident there was sufficient insurance and the tug owner did pay for the damage.

Following this Red Poll incident-this was the last accident-Governor McKeithen became very concerned about the situation and appointed a Lake Pontchartrain Safety Committee consisting of various leaders from the two parishes. They met with the Coast Guard, the Corps of Engineers, the different people involved, and they submitted a report to the Governor.

I have attached this report as an exhibit to my statement. Basically what it does is recommend to the Governor that he use whatever authority the State has to compel those operators in the shell-dredging business to have a minimum of appliances and equipment and licensed personnel aboard the tugs that are engaged in that operation.

Of the accidents that I have mentioned since the causeway has been open to the public, all but one involved a shell-dredging operation. At least the tugs that are utilized in that operation.

One was not and that was the last one, the Red Poll.

We are just one facility and we certainly have no intention of accusing an entire industry. Our only concern is the safety of the people who use the bridge on Lake Pontchartrain. Since there are pilots on Lake Pontchartrain who are licensed it does seem more than just a coincidence, that in none of the accidents that have occurred, these major accidents, have licensed personnel been involved.

Also, I do not believe it is a coincidence that in none of these cases was there any systematic method of inspection by the owners or otherwise of the vessel or the personnel involved.

There were no training programs carried on by the particular companies involved in the accidents described. Of those operators who conduct a training program we have not had an accident.

We very strongly recommend the approval by this committee of H.R. 156 or 623 because, if properly implemented-and I don't mean a piece of paper signifying a license, that would not do us any good at all-but if properly implemented and if the tests given were realistic tests designed to assure the Coast Guard that the people operating on a particular body of water were qualified to do so and not that they could sign their names or answer a few questions in writing, but that they actually knew how to operate a particular vessel on a particular body of water, if that is the kind of test that is intended then it is bound to be a good thing.

Anyone who really knows how to operate a tug would have nothing to fear from that. While I believe that there are many, many operators whose tugs would pass Coast Guard inspection, I believe it would be a good thing for Lake Pontchartrain.

I can't speak for any other place, but if there were some systematic method of inspection with penalties for failure to have proper equipment on the tugs and barges that operate in Lake Pontchartrain it would certainly have a good effect.

When we have a situation as we do where vessels are permitted to operate as close as 30 feet from a bridge and can navigate the entire area that the bridge covers, our radar is completely ineffective for those cases. Our radio is only effective where there is someone to listen to it. In a great many of the accidents that have occurred all the radios in the world would not have helped because there was no one to pay attention to it.

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

(The information referred to follows:)

STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF GREATER NEW ORLEANS EXPRESSWAY COMMISSION The Greater New Orleans Expressway Commission, an agency and instrumentality of the parishes of Jefferson and St. Tammany in the State of Louisiana was created on October 20, 1954, to construct, operate, and maintain the 24-mile Lake Pontchartrain causeway, the world's longest bridge. The members are John R. Lambert, Jr., chairman; Angelo Bosco, vice chairman; Marion R. Tucker, secretary; Ivy A. Champagne, treasurer; and Sam J. Altobello. Its general manager is Malcolm T. Stein, Sr.

The causeway was opened to traffic in 1956 and has since provided a vital thruway for the Greater New Orleans area. On many occasions, due to flooded