I think it is unrealistic to expect that in an industry such as the water transportation industry, which is not structured in a monolithic fashion, as other industries are, that it would be able to selfpolice itself to the extent necessary to assure safety on the inland waterways.

One of the reasons for this is that in addition to the large operators, both common carrier and contract carrier, there are a large number of the small marginal operators on the inland waterways who must face economic realities and achieve economic and competitive position by cutting costs, and one of the ways in which costs can be cut is by decreasing personnel, decreasing its manning requirements, and decreasing the quality of the boats that are used on the river.

I believe, members of the committee, that it is imperative that we obtain the kind of regulation which these bills require. I would like to point out one remark which was made by the president of the American Waterways Operators at the meeting on March 19 before the Arkansas Development Association.

He stated at that time in expressing the opposition of the industry to the manning requirements of the bill, that our industry works very closely with the Coast Guard, as indeed they do. He then went on to state as follows:

But given the responsibility

And I am quoting him

But given the responsibility to set manning scales for towing vessels, the Coast Guard would become the arbiter between management on the one hand. which is now seeking automation to some degree, and labor on the other hand, which inevitably would seek as many jobs as possible.

Our industry has so far escaped featherbedding. We could get featherbedding with manning scales.

I would like to reject and rebut this argument in its entirety. First of all, I think it is somewhat preposterous to state that the U.S. Coast Guard would become the willing instrumentality of unions to achieve featherbedding.

Secondly, I think it would be obvious that the U.S. Coast Guard is sufficiently aware and aroused by the problem of the manning requirements that it would not expose management to any additional manning costs than are absolutely necessary for the safety of our navigation. To suggest otherwise, I think, is to evade responsibility. It is rather to lapse into irresponsibility.

I believe the Coast Guard, if given this authority under the regulations promulgated by the Secretary, would use it as wisely as it has done in the past to insure that the minimum manning requirements are made.

I would like to state and cite one specific instance where the major requirement and the inspection of a vessel might have averted a serious disaster. So far as I know, the biggest disaster on the inland waterways, to my knowledge, is the one which involved the Norwegian tanker and the Bonnie D in October 1962.

The Coast Guard compiled a most exhaustive inquiry and has published a transcript of that testimony, which indicates that aside from the failure of personnel and a failure to realize the proper signals for passing, there was also a situation where the pilot, a 23-year-old boy,

who was not licensed, who had only a tankerman's license, stated that on previous occasions he could not hear the whistles of oncoming vessels because of the noise from the engineroom. In addition the report pointed out no one was posted on the tow, because there was no one available at that time, partly because the deckhand was not available where the pilot could use his facilities.

That casualty, gentlemen of the committee and Mrs. Sullivan, resulted in the loss of 22 lives, I believe. It is the position of our organization, and it is the philosophy of our organization, the American Trial Lawyers Association, that our principal duty is to rehabilitate economically the victims of industral disaster.

We realize the best way we can do this is to prevent the victim from becoming a victim and we also believe that the dignity of the human individual in this country, in our evaluation of human life, is such that no stone should be left unturned, no steps untaken which would assure the saving of even one human life.

This is the position of the American Trial Lawyers Association and this is why we support the legislation before you.

Thank you very much.

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you.
Mr. DOWNING. No question.

Mrs. SULLIVAN. No questions.

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you.

Mr. COHN. I will submit the written statement. Yes, sir. (The statement follows:)

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH COHN, MEMBER AND REPRESENTATIVE OF THE AMERICAN

TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION

I appear today as a member and representative of the American Trial Lawyers Association. This organization, composed of lawyers principally engaged in the trial of cases involving injuries to workmen and others, now approximates 15,000 members, and is the second largest bar association in the Nation.

The executive committee of the admiralty section of the American Trial Lawyers Association has endorsed the predecessors of the bills now under consideration, and now adds its support for passage of H.R. 723 and H.R. 156. Our interest in this legislation stems from our realization that the preservation of human life and safety requires a relentless, continued campaign. It is apparent to us that the situation on the inland waterways today is such that Federal regulation is required to implement the objective of safer working conditions for the maritime workmen. We believe H.R. 723 accomplishes this purpose. Although our primary duty as trial lawyers is to achieve, as well as possible, the economic rehabilitation of the victim of maritime casualties, we realize the best way to rehabilitate the victim is to prevent him from becoming one. None of us can do more; none of us should do less.

The statistical computations which have, for us, so conclusively demonstrated the necessity of statutory enactments have been ably and thoroughly performed by the U.S. Coast Guard. A recapitulation of that report by me would serve no useful purpose. Several aspects of the report deserve, however, consideration. In the decade 1952-62 vessels documented by the Bureau of Customs for towing increased from 4,302 to 5,363, almost 30 percent. In addition, it may be generally stated the trend has been toward construction of larger towboats, capable of developing far greater horsepower. The result has been to make commonplace movements of barges in tows considerably larger than was true 10 to 15 years ago. Another consequence of the development of more powerful diesel power is the greater speed with which these barges are moved. It would be reasonable, to assume that substantial increases in the number, size, and speed of such transportation would accordingly increase the necessity of some degree of regulation; yet, but, as the Coast Guard has reported, of 5,100 vessels

documented at the end of 1961, only 103 were inspected vessels, and, of the 1,479 vessels on the western rivers, only 12 were inspected. This does not imply, of course, uninspected vessels are, per se, unsafe, but, as we have become only too painfully aware, mass tragedy can result from the action of one unsafe vessel. Furthermore, the statistical incidence between casualties and the element of noninspection impels the conclusion that a relationship does, in fact, exist. (See U.S. Coast Guard study of towing vessel operations, attachment No. 1 to appendix 9, revealing that from July 1, 1961, through June 30, 1962, 530 vessels were involved in casualties, of which 527 were uninspected vessels; for the period July 1, 1963, through June 30, 1964, 599 vessels were involved in casualties, of which 587 were uninspected.)

The argument has been made, and undoubtedly will be advanced again, that the water transportation industry is fully capable of the type of self-policing which obviates the need for Federal regulation. The industry is not structured, however, in the monolithic manner which would encourage such inner discipline. In addition to the large carriers, both common and contract, who operate fleets of larger towboats, a multitude of smaller, marginal operators exists who, because of the inherent economic necessities, are forced or willing to shave the costs required to put them in a competitive position vis-a-vis the larger operators. To expect these operators to voluntarily assume what Federal regulation might impose is to evade the economic realities of our commercial world.

I believe the argument is refuted by history, as well as logic. Since hearings were last conducted by this committee in June 1951, there has been no appreciable decrease, if any, in the number of casualties, so far as I know, and any impetus for industry self-regulation which may have resulted from those hearings has, unfortunately, not been realized. Indeed, the Coast Guard statistics for the period ending June 30, 1962, through June 30, 1964, have indicated an increasing rate of casualties, from 461 for the period ending June 30, 1962, to 547 for the period ending June 30, 1964. An increase of nearly 20 percent.

The section of the bill investing the Secretary with power to prescribe regulations with respect to the manning of towing vessels and the duties of the crews of such vessels is, in my opinion, a key provision necessary to effectuate the purpose of the legislation. A vessel, no matter how stanchly built, no matter how well licensed its crewmembers, can't be safe unless its complement is adequate for the service required. On what basis can objection be made to the proposal that minimum manning requirements be satisfied to assure safe navigation? The principal thrust of the opposition to the mannnig provision is, of course, the economic effects of such a proposal. On March 19, 1965, the president of the American Waterways Operators remarked to the Arkansas Basin Development Association that the Coast Guard, if given the responsibility of setting manning scales, would become the arbiter between management on one hand, which is now seeking to automate its vessels to some degree, and labor on the other hand, which inevitably would seek as many jobs as possible. Our industry has so far escaped featherbedding. We could get featherbedding with manning scales. Can anyone seriously contend that the Coast Guard, by some invidious process, would become the willing instrumentality of the maritime unions to accomplish featherbedding? Or that the Coast Guard is so bereft of experience and knowledge of the industry it cannot recognize what is a legitimate manning requirement for safe navigation? To pose these questions is, of course, to supply the answers. The maritime industry on the western rivers has, I believe, been singularly free from any drive to impose featherbedding, as the president of the American Waterways Operators concedes.

We of the American Trial Lawyers Association believe the greatest asset this country possesses is its people, and the dignity of the individual our most cherished ideal. Because these beliefs are pervasive, America has not hesitated to exert every necessary effort to preserve the life of a single person. If one of our flyers fails to return, we conduct unrelenting searches to rescue him. No effort, no cost is spared. In our space program millions of dollars and thousands of man-hours were devoted to assure the safety of our astronauts. No voice was, nor do we think ever would be raised, against such costs, because the American people believe human life to be sacrosanct. We believe life and safety on the inland waters to be equally important. To further that belief, we will continue to support H.R. 723 and H.R. 156.

Mr. BYRNE. Mr. Fife?

Mr. DOWNING. Mr. Fife, did you want to make a statement?
Mr. FIFE. I am going to ride on my written statement.

Mr. BYRNE. Proceed.

STATEMENT OF ALYN F. FIFE, MARINE SURVEYOR AND CON-
SULTANT, NEWPORT NEWS, VA., ON BEHALF OF THE R. K. DAVIS
TRANSPORTATION CO., AND THE HUNT OIL CO.

Mr. FIFE. I came to speak in opposition to the three bills.
Mr. BYRNE. You are filing a statement?

Mr. FIFE. I am filing a statement. I would just like to point out certain points of this statement to the committee, if I could. ́ I would like to point out on the page, starting at the bottom of page 1.

I ask you please when reading statistics issued by governmental bureaus relative to work they perform or are attempting to perform, to consider that the agency involved is making an effort to expand its authority and number of personnel employed so as to raise the rating of the superiors. This is the greatest fallacy of our civil service and military systems, true to Parkinson's Law.

Did they tell you that from their own statistics from 1951 to 1960 American-flag tankers sustained 287 collisions, 1 exposion and 4 accidents while gas freeing, resulting in 21 deaths and 21 injuries compared to 134 collisions, no explosions and 2 accidents while gas freeing, resulting in 3 deaths and 5 injuries on the much more numerous flag-of-necessity tankers? All of the American ships are manned by Coast Guard licensed or certificated personnel and are inspected by the Coast Guard.

In the same period American tank barges, which far outnumber tankers, sustained 372 collisions, 5 accidents in gas freeing resulting in 6 deaths and no injuries. All of these are inspected by the Coast Guard.

Other explosions on American tankers numbering 17 resulted in 36 deaths and 48 injuries, while on foreign flags 9 explosions resulted in 9 deaths and 16 injuries were sustained.

This is not a pretty picture to illustrate the performance of the Coast Guard and of American seamen, is it? I am sure they will not voluntarily bring such figures to you.

At the bottom of page 2.

It is my opinion that in most cases competent inspection of tugs is being carried out for the underwriters by such organizations as the United States Salvage Association, Inc., and underwriters' surveyors. This inspection is usually carried out on a biannual basis and is to determine the condition of the hull, machinery and equipment. That is the main two items I would like to read from my state

ment.

Mr. BYRNE. Mr. Downing, do you have any questions?

Mr. DOWNING. I am sorry Mr. Fife had to brief his testimony here. Mr. Fife comes from my hometown and we are pleased to have him up here.

Basically it is your opinion that is unnecessary legislation; is that not correct, Mr. Fife?

Mr. FIFE. Yes, sir. What has not been pointed out to the committee is that most of the tugboats on the Mississippi River are built to the classification standards of the American Bureau of Shipping. They are covered by this book here. They are inspected by competent inspectors that have been provided by the Coast Guard.

I would also like to, now that the door has been opened, to read you another statement that I have made relative to this position.

These regulations are formulated by committees composed of shipowners, naval architects, marine engineers, representatives of shipyards, underwriters, national codes, and others. These committees and subcommittees meet often to discuss mutual problems and the voice of any shipowner can be heard. Changes in rules are made once annually.

The Newport News-Norfolk office of the American Bureau employs 5 surveyors and 2 secretaries, while Lloyds has 1 of each, yet due to the lack of redtape and the competence of the staff, they carry out substantially the same work as the 40 employed by the Coast Guard and to even a greater extent, as they are involved in foreign shipping and act in matters handled by the U.S. customs on American vessels.

I would also like to bring to your attention certain things. While the United States is supposedly a nonmilitary country, it is the only one that has placed its merchant marine under the control of a pseudomilitary organization and subject to the whims of so many other governmental agencies. I ask you to make a study of the British, Norwegian, German, and other systems.

Since 1945 the inspection service has been under the authority of the Coast Guard, a division of the Treasury Department, and as the personnel assimilated from the Department of Commerce have retired, the quality of service has deteriorated and at the same time been expanded in an effort to duplicate those carried out by classification societies. At the same time other agencies aforementioned have managed to slip in, covering the same fields.

One can now obtain a license simply by putting in the required amount of time and passing the examination even if fired from every vessel on which he served for drunkenness or incompetence, as no letters of recommendations are now required.

The Coast Guard is divided into 13 districts, each broken down into offices controlled by an officer in charge. The system is strictly "esprit de corps." The interpretation of the rules is carried out as seen fit by the officer in charge. Any appeal from an inspector's interpretation er decision must be made in writing through channels, first to the officer in charge, then to the district, and finally to the Commandant.

This procedure is time consuming and costly, especially if a vessel must be immobilized until the matter has been resolved. Such procedure is also true of other agencies.

I have seen owners forced into spending many thousands of dollars to effect some alteration or repair which was later proven unnecessary when finally brought before the highest authority of the agency.