APPENDIX THE ROLE OF MATS IN PEACE AND WAR Introduction This report answers the President's request for a study of the military role performed by the Military Air Transport Service (MATS) in peace and war. It sets forth a proposal for improving materially national airlift readiness. This proposal is based on investigations, analyses, and considerations of factors relating to the establishment and operation of MATS in its present form; the relationship of commercial carriers to the military airlift support operations; and, most importantly, the military requirement for maintaining a ready airlift force. The report is based on a comprehensive review and analysis of data pertinent to airlift requirements and operations of interest to the Department of Defense. It relies heavily on data made available to the Office of the Secretary of Defense by the various elements of the Department of Defense, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It takes into account Congressional views as well as views formally presented by the representatives of the air transportation industry of the United States. While recognizing that a sizeable amount of military airlift capability is maintained outside of MATS, this report deals almost exclusively with MATS, its operations, its practices and its augmentation by commercial carriers. Considered in the report are the reasons for establishing MATS under the Single Manager concept. The ideal airlift situation from a military point of view is discussed as is the present operation of MATS. Because of its importance to the military role of MATS, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program is also analyzed. Conclusions Military Airlift Requirements.-The size of MATS and the extent and nature of its operations are keyed to approved military wartime airlift requirements. These requirements break down into (1) critical or hardcore1 requirements which because of their nature or the nature of the mission to be supported must move in military operated aircraft, and (2) other essential or civil eligible requirements which can move in either military or civil operated aircraft. Hard-core requirements are applicable in general war situations as well as situations short of general war. Satisfaction of hard-core requirements (general or limited war) is vital to the successful implementation of military strategy. Therefore MATS must possess adequate capability at all times to meet these requirements on an effective and timely basis. Commercial carriers do not now have adequate air cargo capability to accommodate those approved military airlift requirements which could move during emergencies in commercially operated transport aircraft.2 MATS—Present Size and Operations.--MATS should consist of a modern military air transport nucleus (hard-core) capable of meeting effectively those airlift requirements which by nature and timing must be moved by military aircraft. Its present airlift capability is considered quantitatively adequate to meet all planned (hard-core) requirements. There are qualitative deficiencies in military Airlift requirements which must move in military aircraft, manned and operated by military crews because of special military considerations, security, or because of limiting physical characteristics such as size or dangerous properties. Included in this category are special military deployments involving nuclear retaliatory forces, the SAC post strike recovery mission, tactical deployments, movement of missiles, special munitions, etc. These are the so-called "civil eligible" requirements. airlift capability however which can be overcome only through modernization. This modernization is essential and urgently required to (1) improve airlift effectiveness, and (2) reduce the cost of operation of the MATS portion of the total required airlift. In order to maintain a proper state of readiness, the MATS over-all system including the functions of loading, unloading and maintenance, must be exercised at an appropriate rate. It is in the national interest to use productively the airlift necessarily generated in maintaining a ready D-Day airlift force. MATS now has to plan to meet sizeable volumes of military airlift requirements which are beyond the present capability of commercial carriers. However, as commercial carriers equip with modern long-range economical cargo aircraft, the situation will change and adjustment in the size of MATS can and should be made insofar as the increased civil lift can be available with certainty to meet emergency military requirements that can be handled by civil aircraft. The savings from such adjustments and reductions in commercial rates made possible by modern economical cargo aircraft should largely offset any additional cost that may he involved initially in making progressively greater use of commercial carriers for the movement of routine logistical supply. Military Readiness.—Existing deficiencies in cargo airlift capability adversely affect military readiness. There is not sufficient commercial cargo capability to accommodate the military wartime traffic which could otherwise move in commercial aircraft. The quantitative deficits in commercial capability to meet wartime needs are such that the continuity of the overseas pipeline cannot be gssured in cases of emergency and forces whose operations are geared to airlift support may be deprived of airlift at a time of urgent need. To the degree praeticable, therefore, regular resupply service and routine personnel movements should be to an increasing degree contracted to commercial carriers to encourage the buildup of commercial cargo capability. MATS Versus Commercial Airlift Utilization.-The MATS versus commercial airlift utilization disagreement stems from adherence to normal procurement policies and practices in obtaining commercial augmentation airlift, as well as MATS operations over routes parallel to those of commercial carriers. This problem involves CAB policy and small business considerations as well as Defense Department procurement policies. Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF).—The CRAF program has been rapidly maturing during the past 18 months and it appears that the basic groundwork: has been done and more rapid progress is now assured. Major shortcomings remain, however, in that no provision is made for partial mobilization or use in conditions short of general war and some of the aircraft are not yet modified to CRAF standards. Orientation of MATS.-MATS should withdraw from routine channel operations to the extent that this function can be performed effectively and at reasonable cost by commercial carriers without detriment to the hard-core mission or unnecessary duplication of expenditures for airlift service. MATS is presently reducing its opeartions by the elimination of three C-97 squadrons during the coming year. Further reductions and adjustments in the size and operations of MATS should be tied to (1) approved hard-core requirements; (2) a program for the replacement of MATS present piston aircraft with modern turbine-powered aircraft: and (3) the guaranteed availability at reasonable rates of modern. economical long-range civil cargo aircraft to support defense requirements. Procurement of Commercial Augmentation Airlift.-Current airlift procurement policies and practices are not accomplishing the desired results in promoting a healthy growth of United States overseas commercial cargo airlift capability. With Congressional approval, if necessary, they should be better adapted to reflect the long-term interest of the Department of Defense in commercial airlift capability and provide the continuity and stability required for effective and economical support of military forces. Policies and practices should (1) encourage modernization and growth of commercial cargo capability; (2) insure uninterrupted commercial airlift service to the Department of Defense at all times; and (3) require that those carriers providing augmentation airlift provide on request during emergencies a fixed percentage increase in airlift capability over their normal commitment to MATS. PRESIDENTIALLY APPROVED COURSES OF ACTION 1 1. That MATS be equipped and operated in peacetime to insure its capability to meet approved military hard-core requirements in a general war and in situations short of general war, and such other military requirements as cannot be met adequately by commercial carriers on an effective and timely basis. 2. That the modernization of MATS hard-core military airlift capability be undertaken in an orderly manner consistent with other military requirements and in keeping with the objectives of paragraph 1 above. 3. That MATS routine channel traffic (regularly scheduled. fixed routes) operations be reduced on an orderly basis, consistent with assured commercial airlift capability at reasonable cost, and consistent with economical and efficient use, including realistic training, of the MATS capacity resulting from the provisions of paragraph 1 above. 4. That as commercial carriers make available modern, economical long-range cargo aircraft and as further orientation of MATS to the hard-core function is effected, increased use should be made of the services of such commercial carriers. 5. That, with respect to services overseas and to foreign countries, commercial augmentation airlift procurement policies and practices be better adapted to the long-range Department of Defense requirements, so as to encourage and assist in sound economic growth, development, and maintenance of an increased air cargo capability; that there be explored the feasibility of: (1) Expanding the provisions of paragraph 3 above to apply to other MATS operations in addition to routine channel traffic; (2) (a) Procuring commercial cargo airlift only from air carriers, as defined in Section 101 (3) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, and increasing the amount of such airlift obtained at tariff rates filed with the Civil Aeronautics Board as distinguished from airlift obtained through the practice of advertising for bids: (b) Requiring that all cargo carried by commercial carriers be so moved; (3) Entering into longer term contracts for MATS traffic; and (4) Giving preference in the movement of MATS traffic to those commercial carriers: (a) Who are effectively committed to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program; (b) Whose facilities and equipment are most advantageous to the emergency needs of the Department of Defense; or (c) Who are demonstrating a willingness and ability to acquire uncompromised cargo aircraft; and that legislation be sought if necessary to permit accomplishment of any of the foregoing considered desirable. 6. That since the development of long-range, economical turbine-powered cargo aircraft is essential to MATS modernization and to long-range evolution of a modern civil cargo fleet, suitable arrangements should be made for Defense and industry participation in the costs of such development. 7. That purchase loan guarantee legislation, if proposed, contain provisions to insure the immediate availability of cargo aircraft covered thereby to meet military and modernization requirements. 8. That consideration be given to equipping certain Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units with transport aircraft that might be available from MATS excesses as augmentation forces for MATS in time of emergency. 9. That the role of CRAF be re-examined with the objective of insuring optimum effectiveness and responsiveness of commercial airlift services to the Department of Defense under all conditions. 1 Resulting from the report of the Department of Defense to the President. 2 Airlift requirements which must move in military aircraft, manned and operated by military crews because of special military considerations, security, or because of limiting physical characteristics such as size or dangerous properties. Included in this category are special military deployments involving nuclear retaliatory forces, the SAC post strike recovery mission, tactical deployments, movement of missiles, special munitions, etc. Wherever used herein, "commercial carriers" means U.S.-owned commercial carriers. COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS SECOND SESSION JULY 3, 1970 [Pages of all documents printed in behalf of the activities of the House Committee on Armed Services are numbered cumulatively to permit a comprehensive index at the end of the Con gress. Page numbers lower than those in |