Opinion of the Court. 386 U.S. It was further established that counsel for the prosecution had known at the time of the trial that the shorts were stained with paint. The prosecutor even admitted that the Canton police had prepared a memorandum attempting to explain "how this exhibit contains all the paint on it." In argument at the close of the habeas corpus hearing, counsel for the State contended that "[e]verybody" at the trial had known that the shorts were stained with paint.13 That contention is totally belied by the record. The microanalyst correctly described the appearance of the shorts when he said, "I assumed I was dealing with a pair of shorts which was heavily stained with blood. . . . [I]t would appear to a layman . . . that what I see before me is a garment heavily stained with blood." 14 The record of the petitioner's trial reflects the prosecution's consistent and repeated misrepresentation that People's Exhibit 3 was, indeed, “a garment heavily stained with blood." The prosecution's whole theory with respect to the exhibit depended upon that misrepresentation. For the theory was that the victim's assailant had discarded the shorts because they were stained with blood. A pair of paint-stained shorts, found in an abandoned building a mile away from the scene of the crime, was virtually valueless as evidence against the petitioner, 15 The prosecution deliberately misrepresented the truth. 13 "Now, then, concerning the paint on the shorts, the petitioner yesterday introduced scientific evidence to prove that there was paint on the shorts, a fact that they knew without scientific evidence. Everybody knew, in connection with the case, whoever looked at the shorts, and I think that the Court can look at them now and know there is paint on them. This is not anything that was not disclosed to anybody. It is very obvious by merely looking at them. . . .' 14 See n. 9, supra. 15 The petitioner was not a painter but a taxi driver. More than 30 years ago this Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment cannot tolerate a state criminal conviction obtained by the knowing use of false evidence. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103. There has been no deviation from that established principle. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264; Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U. S. 213; cf. Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U. S. 28. There can be no retreat from that principle here. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. FLORIDA EAST COAST RAILWAY CO. v. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA. No. 715. Decided February 13, 1967. 256 F. Supp. 986, affirmed. A. Alvis Layne for appellant. Solicitor General Marshall, Assistant Attorney General Turner, Howard E. Shapiro, Robert W. Ginnane and Raymond M. Zimmet for the United States et al.; Richard A. Hollander for Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co.; and Thomas C. Britton and St. Julien P. Rosemond for Dade County et al., appellees. PER CURIAM. The motion of Dade County et al. to join Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company in its motion to affirm is granted. The motions to affirm are granted and the judgment is affirmed. D'AMICO v. PENNSYLVANIA ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT. No. 858. Decided February 13, 1967. Appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. PER CURIAM. The motion to dispense with printing the jurisdictional statement is granted. The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. 386 U.S. February 13, 1967. WOODINGTON v. WISCONSIN. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN. No. 801. Decided February 13, 1967. 31 Wis. 2d 151, 142 N. W. 2d 810, 143 N. W. 2d 753, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Jack R. De Witt for appellant. Bronson C. La Follette, Attorney General of Wisconsin, for appellee. PER CURIAM. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. WEISS ET AL. v. GARDNER, SECRETARY APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE No. 904. Decided February 13, 1967. 263 F. Supp. 184, vacated and remanded. William D. Zabel and Melvin L. Wulf for appellants. Solicitor General Marshall for appellees. PER CURIAM. The judgment of the court below is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York with instructions to dismiss the complaint as moot. FENSTER v. LEARY, COMMISSIONER OF POLICE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. No. 905. Decided February 13, 1967. 264 F. Supp. 153, affirmed. Emanuel Redfield for appellant. J. Lee Rankin for Leary, and Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, and Joel Lewittes, Assistant Attorney General, for Koota, appellees. PER CURIAM. The motions to affirm are granted and the judgment is affirmed. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted. RISCH v. RISCH. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS. No. 963, Misc. Decided February 13, 1967. 395 S. W. 2d 709, appeal dismissed and certiorari denied. Ted Musick for appellant. PER CURIAM. The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the papers whereon the appeal was taken as a petition for a writ of certiorari, certiorari is denied. |