LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

Hon. MELVIN PRICE,

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C., December 22, 1978.

Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Military Application of
Nuclear Energy,

Committee on Armed Services,

U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have the honor to transmit herewith the report of the Panel on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) entitled "SALT II: An Interim Assessment."

The members of the panel appreciate the opportunity to have been of service to the subcommittee in this undertaking.

Sincerely,

CHARLES H. WILSON,

Chairman, Panel on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks,

and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

(III)

SALT II: AN INTERIM ASSESSMENT

INTRODUCTION

On May 4, 1978, the Honorable Melvin Price, Chairman of the Intelligence and Military Application of Nuclear Energy Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, appointed a panel on the "Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Negotiations." The panel was formed pursuant to the subcommittee's oversight responsibilities for arms control and disarmament matters. Specifically, clause 3(a) of Rule X of the House of Representatives places upon the Committee on Armed Services the oversight responsibility "of reviewing and studying, on a continuing basis, all laws, programs and government activities dealing with or involving international arms control and disarmament

The subcommittee panel was directed to report its findings to the parent subcommittee prior to the conclusion of the 95th Congress. This report reviews SALT II activities. A separate report was issued on October 13, 1978 on the "Effects of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on United States National Security Interests." (H.A.S.C. No. 95-90).

Other committee activities

The activities of the SALT/CTBT subcommittee panel follow an earlier full committee initiative, directed by the committee chairman on July 21, 1977. At that time the committee began hearings to consider H.R. 8390, the fiscal year 1978 Department of Defense Supplemental authorization request. This supplemental request was the result of the Presidential recommendation to cancel the B-1 bomber program and restructure the cruise missile program.

At the opening of the hearings on H.R. 8390, Chairman Price announced that the committee would not be fulfilling its proper responsibilities if it merely considered the request for the restructured cruise missile program as an isolated supplemental authorization. The chairman stated that the committee would, therefore, examine the future viability of the entire Triad of U.S. strategic forces, noting:

What is crucially important... as we examine where our Triad is going in the next decade and beyond, is both the capability of the force we intend to maintain and equally, the clear ability to demonstrate that such projected capability does indeed exist.

The possibility of creating in the Soviet military mind the perception of a degradation in U.S. capability causes me the most serious concern.

The committee undertook a continuing review to assess the present and future state of U.S. strategic forces, not only in relationship to the mission requirements for those forces, but also in relationship to the United States-Soviet (SALT II) strategic arms limitation efforts.