Effects of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on United States National Security Interests: Report of the Panel on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of the Intelligence and Military Application of Nuclear Energy Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, with Dissenting and Supplementary Views, Ninety-fifth Congress, Second Session, Volume 5 |
Common terms and phrases
active duty Admiral ARENTZEN agreement Air Force Airman BRUMAGE Armed Services arms control arms transfers Army bill BOB WILSON capability Captain DAVIS Chairman Civil Air Patrol Congress Corps cost creditable service cruise missile CTBT deleted Department of Defense dependents deploy deployment eligible Europe facilities fiscal FORD funds GELB Germany going housing allowance ICBM increase Indian Ocean initial junior enlisted members junior enlisted personnel launchers legislation limited MCKENZIE ment military MIRV MITCHELL MOLLOHAN NATO Navy negotiations NICHOLS nuclear weapons officer overseas panel percent physicians problems question recruiting reduced reprograming SALT SALT II scholarship program Secretary of Defense Sergeant HOOPER service members SLBM soldiers Soviet Union special pay Specialist WASHINGTON statement station strategic forces subcommittee talking Thank tion tour treaty U.S. strategic UMSTEAD United United States Code warheads WHITE
Popular passages
Page 32 - Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.
Page 31 - Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms.
Page 33 - Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an...
Page 29 - For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.
Page 29 - Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty.
Page 38 - If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, US supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.
Page 39 - In regard to this Article | IX], I have a brief and I believe self-explanatory statement to make. The US side wishes to make clear that the provisions of this Article do not set a precedent for whatever provision may be considered for a Treaty on Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms. The question of transfer of strategic offensive arms is a far more complex issue, which may require a different solution.
Page 32 - May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
Page 34 - In order to Insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles...
Page 29 - ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time.