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leged information, but it is contended that since the testimony of the witness may conflict with the views of another executive agency, that this matter should be left to be ironed out within the executive branch of the Government.
What this amounts to is that a regular executive department can air its views in public, even if these views conflict with public policy, but a consultant to a Presidential advisory body cannot make some of his views public, even if they agree with the policy. Now this is a strange situation. Let me be a little more explicit
The stated policy of the Government at the moment is that we shall try to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests provided an effective control and inspection system is included in the agreement.
The Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission question the advisability of this policy, and say so publicly.
However, all the private evidence is that the President's Science Advisory Committee, headed by Dr. James R. Killian, formerly head of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, approves the policy.
Yet neither Killian nor any of the members of the Committee can publicly say they agree with the policy if their statements imply they are speaking as a member of the Committee.
So what we have is a policy, the defenders of which are gagged and those who oppose it have a relatively free hand in expressing their opposition.
All I can say is that this is a rather peculiar way to run a government.
One might even ask, what about the fellow on top? What does he think about all this? Why won't he speak out so that we might know just how firm the policy is?
Before I leave this point, I wish to stress I do not disagree with the right of the President to have advisers who have a confidential role. But this prerogative can be carried too far, so far that whole segments of informed opinion are constantly being bottled up. They are stored away and saved for the infighting of the executive branch but the benefit of their views and wisdom are hidden from the public.
Dr. Killian and his Science Advisory Committee is not the only group which has been sheltered from congressional and public inquiry. When Mr. Stassen was disarmament adviser to the President, all of his work and studies conducted for him were classified under the label of executive privilege.
When Clarence Randall was the President's adviser on foreign trade, he was prohibited from testifying before Congress because of his role as Presidentia) adviser.
Nelson Rockefeller, when he was advising the President on matters of psychological warfare, could not tell the public what his views were and that they were not being accepted.
William Foster, an able and as conscientious a public servant as one can find, served as vice-chairman of the famous Gaither report on our national defense. The Gaither report was completely classified, even from Members of Congress. Mr. Foster, it is reported, felt so strongly about his views that he wrote a book, but even this was labeled secret by the White House. Mr. Foster is a patient man, far more than I would be under such circumstances.
VALIDITY OF SOVIET POSITIONS
Case No. 5. Another type of information that the Government classified in our recent hearings has to do with the validity of arguments presented by the Soviet Union. A Government witness in the course of his testimony suggested that the Soviet Union possibly had a valid objection to one of our arguments, but the executive branch decided this ought to be censored.
Now, there is considerable merit in not conceding too many points to your opponent in the course of a debate or in the coure of delicate negotiations. On the other hand, if the American people are constantly fed the line that every Soviet proposal is by definition full of evil for us or that every Soviet fear is a trumped up Communist plot, then how shall we every judge the genuine points of view of that nation and its people?
I am not suggesting here that the Soviet Union is a country to be trusted.
I am suggesting that occasionally the Soviet leaders have made arguments that are legitimate from its security interests, and that it is to the interests of the American people to be aware of what those points of view are. I think we should be grown up enough to allow witnesses to release remarks which indicate that a particular Soviet position has some merit, and ought to be studied and given some consideration.
I have labored long on this point of the classification of information by the executive branch of the Government. I have done so first because I am talking to a group that appreciates the importance of having adequate information on public issues, and secondly, because I hope that more and more of our citizens will demand that such information be released so that they can participate in the discussion of what policies our Government should pursue in meeting the challenges of today's world.
DIRECTION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICIES Perhaps one of the reasons that so much information is classified by our Government is that those at the top are uncertain as to the direction our foreign policy should take.
Perhaps some of us are clinging to principles annunciated in the past but have neglected their meaning and implementation in light of today's events and problems. Let me illustrate what I mean.
Since about the time of the Korean war, in 1950, our foreign policy took the form of building national defense so that when the time came, we could negotiate from a position of strength. This was the theme, adopted in the late forties or early fifties, and carried on until the present.
I have no objection to this .principle-negotiating from positions of strength. In fact, I would say that the principle is a fundamental prerequisite to any kind of negotiation.
But I doubt that we have followed and abided by this concept. We have allowed certain aspects of our national defense to be weakened considerably, and we have forgotten that we wanted to achieve positions of strength so that we could engage in meaningful negotiations.
On the one hand, we have acted as though we could engage in some unilateral disarmament at home, directed by the Bureau of the Budget and motivated by a desire to save money at the expense of national security.
And on the other hand, we have forgotten that the positions of strength we wanted to build to be used as the basis for serious bargaining and negotiation.
We have spent billions and billions of dollars for weapons for destruction and annihilation.
We have put most of our knowledge and efforts in the nuclear weapons field into weapons of the very large yield.
We have had to make weapons of very large yield as warheads for our missiles because the range of accuracy of our missiles was sufficiently poor that only a weapon of very large yield could obliterate and destroy its designated target.
By comparison, we are spending nothing on problems of arms control.
We are spending very little on the problem of defense against probing actions of the Soviet Union, and on the problem of limited military conflicts.
We have also used the vast majority of our foreign aid expenditures to supply other countries with military hardware.
We have joined with as many nations as we could in signing military defense pacts.
We have responded to an increasing degree to the problem of competition from foreign markets by establishing import quotas and raising tariffs. We have accumulated large amounts of foreign currencies through the sale of surplus agricultural products, currencies which now sit idle and which day by day depreciate in value and are not used for productive projects.
These are some of the things we are doing in the field of defense and foreign policy. I submit that the direction of this approach is wrong, misguided, and lacking in vision and creative leadership.
POSITIONS OF MILITARY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC STRENGTH LACKING The direction of our policies is not making for positions of strength. They are going in the direction of retrenchment.
Too often we appear to be saying that we, the richest nation the world has ever known, cannot afford to spend the money to have a balanced Defense Establishment. Too frequently we give the impression that we dare not sit down at the bargaining table with the Soviet Union because our representatives cannot bargain as effectively as the Soviets.
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Too many times do we seem to be saying that the great American market cannot take the competition of foreign made goods.
And, finally, too often does our answer to the problem of need abroad seem to be in terms of military equipment—and not enough in terms of the implements for economic well-being and the expansion of opportunties for human growth and happiness.
But I do not propose to dwell on the inadequacies of our policies. It is more important to stress what we should be doing, what we can be working for as citizens of a free government and a rich and prosperous society.
1. We need to have a much more balanced Defense Establishment than we now have. The threats to security and peace today exist in such areas as the island of freedom of Berlin, Communist subversion and infiltration in the Middle East, and probing actions along the periphery of Asia. If we do not have the know-how, the fortitude, and the equipnient to face these situations, then the Soviet bloc will gradually nibble away the free world, bit by bit.
2. We must engage in serious study and preparation for the purpose of bargaining with the Soviet Union on all areas-exchange of persons, joint participation of international health activities, solution of the division of Europe, trade in goods, and the control of armaments. We should not be fearful of negotiating, but whenever we negotiate we should know what we are after, and we must be well prepared and select the best of negotiators to represent us. In none of these areas should we expect quick results.
3. We should focus more on the potential of the economic and political power of the newly developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In this power-conscious world we have tended to look primarily where power is today and not enough where power may be tomorrow. As part of western civilization it is natural that we have looked mainly to Europe for support and advice and as the area in which to invest our capital. I would not for one minute diminish the degree of cooperation we have achieved with the countries of Western Europe. But I would place much more stress on working with the countries of the Latin, Asian, and African worlds.
4. The direction of our foreign economic policy should be one of expansion, not one of caution and retrenchment. As we have grown rich and wealthy in our economic system, we have lost to some extent the spirit of competition and the spirit of risk in conducting our economic affairs. If we are to promote and extend ideas of a free economy, I believe we must look outward, not inward. But we cannot expand and strengthen international trade and international economic development without meeting some competition from abroad and without subjecting our capital to some risk.
5. The focus of our cultural policy should be one of opening up our shores for the people of all nations to observe the operation of our political, economic, and social system.
We know there are many aspects of our way of life that require vast improvement. But what is and can be exciting and challenging about our free society is that if we have the vision, the will, and the leadership, the sores and the defects can be removed.
Our society is constantly changing, and it is the art of statesmanship and politics to have this change be for the good—and not the bad.
I could go on at considerable length elaborating on these points and adding But on all these matters, much more public discussion and debate are needed.
You have done a masterful job in weighing the pros and cons and the various courses of action on one of the crucial issues that face us, that of the direction of our arms control program and policies.
I cannot help but have the feeling that whatever views you come out with on this issue, the country will be better served as a result.
I am pleased to have had a small part in your deliberation tonight, and I can only hope that through the deliberations of you and your fellow students, United States policy will evolve to serve the Nation in the cause of a better and more peaceful future for all of us.
Mr. SLAYMAN. Provisions from the Federal Bar Journal symposium dealing strictly with "executive privilege," and the public's right to know and the public interest.
Senator O’MAHONEY. Is this a letter?
Mr. SLAYMAN. This is a letter authorizing the inclusion in our record of that symposium, those articles.
Senator O'MAHONEY. A letter addressed to whom?
THE FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION,
Washington, D.C., March 9, 1959. Hon. THOMAS C. HENNINGS, Jr., Chairman, Senate Committee on the udiciary, Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. DEAR SENATOR HENNINGS: Your March 6, 1959, letter requests permission to include in the hearings scheduled for March 13 by your committee, the contents of the January 1959 issue of the Federal Bar Journal on "Executive Privilege: Public's Right to Know and Public Interest."
This is to advise that you are authorized to include the contents of that issue in the planned hearings. We are happy to be of service. Sincerely yours,
PAUL A. BARRON,
Editor-in-Chief, Federal Bar Journai. Senator HRUSKA. May I ask how extended is that symposium material?
Mr. SLAYMAN. I thought it was about 30 pages. Mr. Patton tells me it is more extensive, and that it includes the article by Senator Hennings and the statement by one witness or one potential witness here, Mr. Wiggins.
Senator HRUSKA. Was that the American Bar Association ?
Just those articles that deal with executive privilege is what I am referring to, Mr. Chairman, if those can be included.
Senator HRUSKA. No objection.