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by the Comptroller General pursuant to section 112 of this part (31 U.S.C. 66b).
Sec. 115. (a) When the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller General determine that existing procedures can be modified in the interest of simplification, improvement, or economy, with sufficient safeguards over the control and accounting for the public funds, they may issue joint regulations providing for the waiving, in whole or in part, of the requirements of existing law that,
(1) warrants be issued and countersigned in connection with the receipt, retention, and disbursement of public moneys and trust funds; and
(2) funds be requisitioned, and advanced to accountable officers under each separate appropriation head or otherwise. (b) Such regulations may further provide for the payment of vouchers by authorized disbursing officers by means of checks issued against the general account of the Treasurer of the United States: Provided, That in such case the regulations shall provide for appropriate action in the event of delinquency by disbursing officers in the rendition of their accounts or for other reasons arising out of the condition of the officers' accounts, including under necessary circumstances, the suspension or withdrawal of authority to disburse (31 U.S.C. 66c).
Sec. 116. The Comptroller General is authorized to discontinue the maintenance in the General Accounting Office of appropriation, expenditure, limitation, receipt, and personal ledger accounts when in his opinion the accounting systems and internal control of the executive, legislative, and judicial agencies are sufficient to enable him to perform properly the functions to which such accounts relate (31 U.S.C. 66d).
Sec. 117. (a) Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, the financial transactions of each executive, legislative, and judicial agency, including but not limited to the accounts of accountable officers, shall be audited by the General Accounting Office in accordance with such principles and procedures and under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Comptroller General of the United States. In the determination of auditing procedures to be followed and the extent of examination of vouchers and other documents, the Comptroller General shall give due regard to generally accepted principles of auditing, including consideration of the effectiveness of accounting organizations and systems, internal audit and control, and related administrative practices of the respective agencies.
(b) Whenever the Comptroller General determines that the audit shall be conducted at the place or places where the accounts and other records of an executive agency are normally kept, he may require any executive agency to retain in whole or in part accounts of accountable officers, contracts, vouchers, and other documents, which are required under existing law to be submitted to the General Accounting Office, under such conditions and for such period not exceeding ten years as he may specify, unless a longer period is agreed upon with the executive agency: Provided, That under agreements between the Comptroller General and legislative and judicial agencies the provisions of this sentence may be extended to the accounts and records of such agencies. (31 U.S.C. 67)
SEC. 118. As used in this part, the term "executive agency" means any executive department or independent establishment in the executive branch of the Government but (a) except for the purposes of sections 114, 116, and 119 shall not include any Government corporation or agency subject to the Government Corporation Control Act (59 Stat. 597), and (b) except for the purposes of sections 111, [113(c)],2% 114, and 116 shall not include the Post Office Department (31 U.S.C. 65a).
Sec. 119. The head of each executive agency is authorized to designate the place or places, at the seat of government or elsewhere, at which the administrative examination of fiscal officers' accounts will be performed, and with the concurrence of the Comptroller General to waive the administrative examination in whole or in part: Provided, That the same authority is hereby conferred upon the officers responsible for the administrative examination of accounts for legislative and judicial agencies (31 U.S.C. 65b).
20 Added by sec. 2(c), Public Law 863 (710 Stat. 782, 783), 84th Cong.
AUTHORIZATIONS FOR APPROPRIATIONS
SEC. 201. No requests for legislation, which, if enacted, would authorize subsequent appropriations for a department or establishment in the executive branch of the Government, shall be transmitted to the Bureau of the Budget, to the President, or to the Congress by such department, or establishment, or by any organization unit thereof, withou the prior approval of the head of such department or establishment (31 U.S.C. 581b).
ADJUSTMENT OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR REORGANIZATION Sec. 202. (a) When under authority of law a function or an activity is transferred or assigned from one agency within any department or establishment to another agency in the same department or establishment, the balance of appropriations which are determined by the head of such department or estab lishment to be available and necessary to finance or discharge the function or activity so transferred or assigned may, with the approval of the President, be transferred to, and be available for use by, the agency to which said function or activity is transferred or assigned for any purpose for which said funds were originally available. Balances so transferred shall be credited to any applicable existing appropriation account or accounts, or to any new appropriation account or accounts, which are hereby authorized to be established, and shall be merged with funds in the applicable existing or newly established appropriation account or accounts and thereafter accounted for as one fund.
(b) When under authority of law a function or activity is transferred or assigned from one department or establishment to another department or estab lishment, the balance of appropriations which are determined by the President to be available and necessary to finance or discharge the function or activity so transferred or assigned, shall be transferred to and be available for use by the department or establishment to which said function or activity is transferred or assigned for any purpose for which said funds were originally available. Balances so transferred shall be credited to any applicable existing appropriation account or accounts, or to any new appropriation account or accounts, which are hereby authorized to be established, and shall be merged with funds in the applicable existing or newly established appropriation account or accounts and thereafter accounted for as one fund. (31 U.S.C. 581c)
TITLE III-REPEALS AND SAVING PROVISIONS
Sec. 301. The following Acts and parts of Acts are hereby repealed :
NOTE.—Repeals numbered (1) through (106) omitted from this codification.
SEC. 302. (a) The omission of any provision of law from the provisions of law repealed under section 301 shall not be construed as limiting the application of section 201 or 216 of the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, as amended, or the powers of the President thereunder, or as evidencing an intent that such provision was not to be superseded by such sections.
(b) Whenever any law authorizes expenditures for a particular object or purpose to be made from an appropriation item referred to in such law by the specific title theretofore used for that appropriation item in the appropriation Act concerned, and thereafter such title is changed or is eliminated from such appropriation Act, expenditures for such object or purpose thereafter may be made from any corresponding appropriation item.
(c) Except where authority for performance of a function is specifically repealed in section 301, none of the provisions of such section shall be construed as affecting the jurisdiction or responsibility of any agency or officer of the Government over any function or organizational unit referred to in such section.
(d) Existing laws, policies, procedures, and directives pertaining to functions covered by this Act, and not inconsistent herewith or repealed hereby, shall remain in full force and effect unless and until superseded, or except as they may be amended, under the authority of this Act or under other appropriate authority.
Approved September 12, 1950.
EXHIBIT No. 6
EXPENDITURE ANALYBES BY COMPTROLLER GENERAL Sec. 206. The Comptroller General is authorized and directed to make an expenditure analysis of each agency in the executive branch of the Government (including Government corporations), which, in the opinion of the Comptroller General, will enable Congress to determine whether public funds have been economically and efficiently administered and expended. Reports on such analyses shall be submitted by the Comptroller General, from time to time, to the Committees on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, to the Appropriations Committees, and to the legislative committees having jurisdiction over legisla. tion relating to the operations of the respective agencies, of the two Houses.
EXHIBIT No. 7
(House of Representatives, 66th Cong., 2d se88. Doc. No. 805) MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, RETURNING TO THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, WITHOUT APPROVAL, HOUSE BILL 9783, “An Act To PROVIDE A NATIONAL BUDGET SYSTEM, AN INDEPENDENT AUDIT OF GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," AND STATING CERTAIN OBJECTIONS THERETO.
JUNE 4, 1920.-Referred to the Select Committee on Budget and ordered to be printed To the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES :
I am returning without my signature H.R. 9783, “An Act to provide a national budget system, an independent audit of Government accounts, and for other purposes.' I do this with the greatest regret. I am in entire sympathy with the objects of this bill and would gladly approve it but for the fact that I regard one of the provisions contained in section 303 as unconstitutional. This is the provision to the effect that the comptroller general and the assistant comptroller general, who are to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, may be removed at any time by a concurrent resolution of Congress after notice and hearing, when, in their judgment, the comptroller general or assistant comptroller general is incapacitated or inefficient, or has been guilty of neglect of duty, or of malfeasance in office, or of any felony or conduct involving moral turpitude, and for no other cause and in no other manner except by impeachment. The effect of this is to prevent the removal of these officers for any cause except either by impeachment or a concurrent resolution of Congress. It has, I' think, always been the accepted construction of the Constitution that the power to appoint officers of this kind carries with it, as an incident, the power to remove. I am convinced that the Congress is without constitutional power to limit the appointing power and its incident, the power of removal de rived from the Constitution.
The section referred to not only forbids the Executive to remove these officers but undertakes to empower the Congress by a concurrent resolution to remove an officer appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. I can find in the Constitution no warrant for the exercise of this power by the Congress. There is certainly no express authority conferred and I am unable to see that authority for the exercise of this power is implied in any express grant of power. On the contrary, I think its exercise is clearly negatived by section 2 of Article II. That section, after providing that certain enumerated officers and all officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for shall be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, provides that the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of department. It would have been within the constitutional power of the Congress, in creating these offices, to have vested the power of appointment in the President alone, in the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, or even in the head of a department. Regarding as I do the power of removal from office as an essential incident to the appointing power, I can not escape the conclusion that the vesting
of this power of removal in the Congress is unconstitutional and therefore I am unable to approve the bill.
I am returning the bill at the earliest possible moment with the hope that the Congress may find time before adjournment to remedy this defect.
WOODROW WILSON. THE WHITE HOUSE, June 4, 1920.
EXHIBIT No. 8
Washington, June 13, 1958.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Defense Accounting and Auditing Division of this Office has begun a review of the research and development program of the Air Force. The basic objective of this review is to evaluate the effectiveness of Air Force policies, procedures, and management as they pertain to research and development activities.
In order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the research and development activities, we have met with the Assistant Secretary (Research and Development); the Deputy Chief of Staff, Development; the Commander, Air Research and Development Center; and with members of their staffs. We have selected the ballistic missiles program for our initial review in the research and develop ment field and our representatives are presently at the Ballistic Missiles Division in Inglewood, Calif.
We understand that a report was recently prepared by the Inspector General covering a "Survey of Management of the Ballistic Missiles Program.” In view of our current survey in the management aspects of the ballistic missiles program, we believe it would be mutually advantageous for our representatives to review this report and thereby minimize the duplication of work performed by the Inspector General's staff.
Your cooperation is requested in providing a copy of the Inspector General's report on the Survey of Management of the Ballistic Missiles Program, covering the period January 14 to February 21, 1958, to the Defense Accounting and Auditing Division of this Office for use in connection with their current review at the Ballistic Missiles Division. Mr. Harold H. Rubin, Assistant Director, Defense Accounting and Auditing Division, may be contacted to arrange for receipt of this report. Sincerely yours,
JOSEPH CAMPBELL, Comptroller General of the United States.
EXHIBIT No. 9
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, July 30, 1958. B-133042 The Honorable the COMPTROLLER GENERAL.
DEAR MR. COMPTROLLER GENERAL: Reference is made to your letter of June 13, 1958 (file No. B-133042), in which you requested that a copy of a report prepared by the Inspector General of the Air Force titled "Survey of Management of the Ballistic Missiles Program" be furnished to your office.
As you know, Inspector General's reports are prepared solely for the use of responsible officials within the Department of the Air Force. It is of the utmost importance that the Military Department have the benefit of an inspection service which is capable of stern, impartial analysis of the effectiveness and efficiency of its operations. I firmly believe that the goal of objective self-criticism can be attained only if the Inspector General's organization has the assurance that its reports will, without exception, be kept within this Department.
In addition, the report which you requested is a report concerning the internal management of this Department, and it was prepared solely for the benefit and use of those officers and employees of this Department who are responsible for
its administration. The release of such reports to persons outside the Department would have a serious adverse effect on the effective administration of the Department.
These considerations compel me to conclude that the public interest would best be served by not releasing the report which you have requested. However, in order to render all possible assistance and cooperation to your organization consistent with the sound administration of this Department, I have requested that a summary of the findings of fact contained in the Inspector General's report be prepared and forwarded to your office. This summary should be available in the near future. Sincerely yours,
JAMES H. DOUGLAS.
EXHIBIT No. 10
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, August 13, 1958. The Honorable the COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES.
DEAR MR. COŃPTROLLER GENERAL: Reference is made to your letter of June 13, 1958 (file No. B-133042), and my letter to you dated July 30, 1958.
The summary of the Inspector General's "Survey of Management of the Ballistic Missile Program” is hereby forwarded in accordance with your request.
The problem areas which have been revealed during this survey are matters of continuing interest to this Department and will be kept under surveillance until corrected. Sincerely yours,
JAMES H. DOUGLAS.
EXHIBIT No. 11
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, September 10, 1958.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Your letter of July 30, 1958, stating that a copy of a report prepared by the Inspector General of the Air Force, covering a "Survey of Management of the Ballistic Missiles Program," cannot be released to the General Accounting Office, has been considered.
For the reasons stated in the attached letter, we must consider your refusal to furnish the subject report to be contrary to congressional intent and purpose of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, the egislative Reorganization Act of 1946, and the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950. Your refusal makes it impossible for the General Accounting Office to discharge its statutory responsibilities in the manner contemplated by the Congress. Because of the seriousness of this matter, we are informing the interested congressional committees and the Secretary of Defense of your decision. Sincerely yours,
Comptroller General of the United States. Enclosure.
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, September 10, 1958.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN : The question of General Accounting Office access to records of the Department of Defense and the military departments has received extensive consideration by congressional committees in the past year. The matter has not been satisfactorily resolved, and we intend to report to the appropriate committees of Congress any cases involving a refusal by any execu