The Knowledge ArgumentSam Coleman Frank Jackson's knowledge argument imagines a super-smart scientist, Mary, forced to investigate the mysteries of human colour vision using only black and white resources. Can she work out what it is like to see red from brain-science and physics alone? The argument says no: Mary will only really learn what red looks like when she actually sees it. Something is therefore missing from the science of the mind, and from the 'physicalist' picture of the world based on science. This powerful and controversial argument remains as pivotal as when it was first created in 1982, and this volume provides a thorough and incisive examination of its relevance in philosophy of mind today. The cutting-edge essays featured here break new ground in the debate, and also comprehensively set out the developments in the story of the knowledge argument so far, tracing its impact, past, present, and future. |
Contents
The Knowledge Argument Is an Argument | 7 |
Contents | 9 |
Theres Nothing about Mary | 32 |
Acquaintance Parsimony and Epiphenomenalism | 62 |
Acquaintance and Phenomenal Concepts | 87 |
The Knowledge Argument Meets Representationalism | 102 |
The MaryGoRound | 118 |
Concept Mastery Social Externalism and Marys | 141 |
Marys Powers of Imagination | 161 |
The Knowledge Argument Is Either Indefensible | 180 |
Grounding Analysis and Russellian Monism | 198 |
What Uninformed Mary Can Teach Us | 269 |
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Common terms and phrases
ability hypothesis able acquaintance acquire analysis appeal argue avoid aware causal cause claim color complete conceivability concerns conclusion concrete condition conscious conscious experience consider correct deduce deny describe descriptive discussion distinctive dualism entail entities epiphenomenalism epistemic example existence experience explain explanatory expressed factual feel follows gains give given grounding idea ignorance imagine individual intuitions involve issue it’s Jackson kind knowledge argument learns least leaves looks Mary Mary’s mastery matter means mental metaphysical mind nature objection one’s pain parsimony particular perceptual phenomenal concepts phenomenal facts phenomenal properties philosophers physical facts physicalist plausible position possible powers premise present problem propositional qualitative qualitative character qualitative experiences question reality reason recognize refer relation relevant represent requires response seems sense similar simply structural suggests Suppose taste theory thesis things thought true truths understanding visual