The Knowledge ArgumentSam Coleman Frank Jackson's knowledge argument imagines a super-smart scientist, Mary, forced to investigate the mysteries of human colour vision using only black and white resources. Can she work out what it is like to see red from brain-science and physics alone? The argument says no: Mary will only really learn what red looks like when she actually sees it. Something is therefore missing from the science of the mind, and from the 'physicalist' picture of the world based on science. This powerful and controversial argument remains as pivotal as when it was first created in 1982, and this volume provides a thorough and incisive examination of its relevance in philosophy of mind today. The cutting-edge essays featured here break new ground in the debate, and also comprehensively set out the developments in the story of the knowledge argument so far, tracing its impact, past, present, and future. |
Contents
The Knowledge Argument Is an Argument | 7 |
Contents | 9 |
Theres Nothing about Mary | 32 |
Acquaintance Parsimony and Epiphenomenalism | 62 |
Acquaintance and Phenomenal Concepts | 87 |
The Knowledge Argument Meets Representationalism | 102 |
The Mary Go Round | 118 |
Concept Mastery Social Externalism and Marys | 141 |
Marys Powers of Imagination | 161 |
The Knowledge Argument Is Either Indefensible | 180 |
Grounding Analysis and Russellian Monism | 198 |
The Knowledge Argument and the Self | 254 |
What Uninformed Mary Can Teach Us | 269 |
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Common terms and phrases
ability hypothesis ability to imagine acquaintance response argue argument against physicalism aware black and white black-and-white room causal powers Chalmers cilantro claim color colour experience conceivability conclusion concrete reality conscious experience conscious qualitative correct imagining David Rosenthal descriptive knowledge dualism ence entail entities epiphenomenalism epistemic example explain factual knowledge future-proof hedonic ical icosagon ignorance objection intuitions Jackson kind knowledge argument knowledge by acquaintance ledge Mary gains Mary learns Mary's mastery mental qualities metaphysical nature nomenal pain parsimony perceptual Phenomenal Analysis phenomenal concept strategy phenomenal facts phenomenal knowledge phenomenal properties phenomenal redness phenomenology philosophers phys physical facts physical knowledge physicalist plausible premise property dualism propositional propositional knowledge qualitative character qualitative experiences Rabin reason redundant relevant representationalism Russellian monism Sebastian loves sense social externalism stimuli structural argument structural facts subjective taste thesis things thought experiment visual experience white room