thing that occupies the time, attention, and la- | bor of men for profit, it seems to me that these facts show that the Minehill Company is carry ing on business in the present instance.

*

I think the present case is much nearer the ruling made by this court in the Corporation Tax Cases in the matter of the realty companies therein involved. Take, for instance, the Park Realty Company. That corporation was organized to work, develop, sell, and convey real estate; to lease, exchange, hire, or otherwise acquire property; to erect, alter, or improve buildings; to conduct, operate, manage, or lease hotels, etc. It appeared that at the time of the imposition of the tax the sole business or property owned by the realty company was the Hotel Leonori. It was leased for 21 years at an annual rental of $55,000. The corporation was engaged in no business, except the management and lease of that hotel property, and was in receipt of no other income than that derived from its rental, and has no assets other than that property and the income thereof. It was held to be doing business within the meaning of the act."

State v. Anniston Rolling Mills, 125 Ala. 121, 27 South. 921, is similar to the Minehill Case. The action was to recover a license tax imposed for doing business as a corporation. The rolling mill corporation, after organizing for the purpose of manufacturing and dealing in iron and iron products, leased its plant to another corporation, and its only corporate acts during the year in question were the collection of rents, the payment of taxes, the rent of some of its money, and collecting interest thereon, the doing all such other things as are incident to the preservation of its property and the holding of its directors' meetings. The test under the law was whether the corporation exercised any of the functions, powers, or franchises which it was intended to perform, or was engaged in the transaction of the business or any part thereof which it was organized to transact. It was held that it had not done so, and that it was not taxable. This case is also readily distinguishable from the case at bar on grounds already indicated.

In People v. Horn Silver Mining Co., 105 N. Y. 76, 11 N. E. 155, the acts and activities of the defendant company were held to constitute "doing business." Peterson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 205 U. S. 364, 27 Sup. Ct. 513, 51 L. Ed. 841; People v. American Bell Telephone Co., 117 N. Y. 241, 22 N. E. 1057; Mannington v. Hocking Valley R. R. Co. (C. C.) 183 Fed. 133; Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Bashford, 120 Wis. 281, 97 N. W. 940; and Toledo Traction, Light & Power Co. v. Smith (D. C.) 205 Fed. 643-are authorities for the doctrine that the holding by a corporation of a controlling portion or all of the capital stock of a local corporation and the exercise of the rights of a stockholder, such as voting on the stock and assenting to the adoption of regulations, do not constitute doing business within the state of the local corporation. They need no further comment.

We are of the opinion therefore that the United Traction & Electric Company was

carrying on business for profit within this state in 1912 within the meaning of the Tax Act of 1912; that it was liable to taxation under the provisions of sections 9 to 20 of said act; and that the petitioner as a holder of the shares of the capital stock of said traction company was exempt from taxa

tion in this state thereon.

The exception of the petitioner is sustained; the decision of the court below is reversed, and the case is remitted to the superior court, with direction to enter judgment for the petitioner for $148.05 with interest thereon from October 18, 1912.

(37 R. I. 189)

RIBAS v. REVERE RUBBER CO.
(No. 4682.)

(Supreme Court of Rhode Island. July 10, 1914.)

1. EVIDENCE (§ 351*) - DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY.

To render a record admissible as evidence, there need not be any law or ordinance requiring it to be kept, but it is sufficient if such record be kept by some person in the regular course of his occupation or business.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 1388-1397; Dec. Dig. § 351.*] 2. EVIDENCE (§ 373*) — DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE-HOSPITAL RECORD.

to show that a hospital record was required to In a personal injury action, evidence held be kept by an interne, rendering it admissible as evidence.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 1581-1586. 1590, 1592, 1593, 1610, 1611; Dec. Dig. § 373.*]

3. EVIDENCE (8 351*) - DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE-DELAY IN MAKING ENTRIES.

For a record to be admissible as evidence, the entries must be made contemporaneously with the facts to which they relate.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Evidence, dence, Cent. Dig. §§ 1388-1397; Dec. Dig. § 351.*1

4. EVIDENCE (§ 351*) - DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE-DELAY IN MAKING ENTRIES "CONTEMPORANEOUS.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 1388-1397; Dec. Dig. § 351.*

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 2, p. 1489.]

5. EVIDENCE (§ 351*) - DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE-ENTRIES MADE FROM INFORMATION.

A hospital record of the progress of a patient, made by an interne in the regular course of business, was not rendered inadmissible because some of the facts recorded were not of his own personal knowledge but were reported to him by nurses and other doctors. Cent. Dig. §§ 1388-1397; Dec. Dig. § 351.*] [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Evidence, 6. EVIDENCE (§ 351*) - DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE-ENTRIES MADE FROM INFORMATION. A hospital record kept by an interne, based partly upon his own knowledge and partly on

"(15) To the giving of certain instructions to the jury by said justice at said trial at the request of the plaintiff, namely, the plaintiff's second request to charge as modified by said justice, the exception thereto appearing on page 520, said plaintiff's request to charge No. on page 522, and said plaintiff's request to charge No. 2 as modified by said justice and given to the jury on page 517 of the transcript of testimony, etc., filed herewith.

"(16) To the giving of certain instructions to the jury by said justice at said trial at the request of the plaintiff, namely, the plaintiff's third request to charge, the exception thereto appearing on page 520, said plaintiff's request to charge No. 3 on page 522, and said plaintiff's request to charge No. 3, as given to the jury by said justice on page 517 of the transcript of testimony, etc., filed herewith.

"(17) To the giving of certain instructions to the jury by said justice at said trial at the request of the plaintiff, namely, the plaintiff's fifth request to charge as modified by said justice, the exception thereto appearing on page 520, said plaintiff's request to charge No. 5 on page 523 and said plaintiff's request to charge No. 5 as modified by said justice and given to the jury on page 518 of the transcript of testimony, etc., filed herewith.

(18) To the giving of a certain portion of the charge to the jury by said justice at said trial, which part and the exception thereto are set forth on page 521 of the transcript of testimony, etc., filed herewith, line 3, said part also in the charge of said justice, being paragraph 'First' at line 8 on page 515 of the transcript of testimony, etc., filed herewith. "(19) To the giving of a certain portion of the charge to the jury by said justice at said trial, which part and the exception thereto are set forth on page 521 of the transcript of testimony, etc., filed herewith, line 3, said part also in the charge of said justice, being paragraph "Third' at line 21 on pages 515 and 516 of the transcript of testimony, etc., filed herewith. "(20) To the giving of a certain portion of the charge to the jury of said justice at said trial, which part and the exception thereto are set forth on page 521 of the transcript of testimony, etc., filed herewith, lines 4 to 8, inclusive, said portion also appearing in the charge of the said justice on pages 514 and 515 of said transcript of testimony, etc., filed herewith.

"(21) To the decision of said justice denying defendant's motion for a new trial, which motion was based upon the following grounds."

The several questions which the defendant argues under its bill of exceptions are more particularly set forth in its brief as follows: (1) That the hospital record, showing clearly the misconduct of the plaintiff at the hospital, which, to some extent precluded a satisfactory recovery from his injuries, should have been admitted in evidence.

(2) That the trial justice charged the jury improperly as to the plaintiff's misconduct at the hospital.

(3) That the trial justice instructed the jury improperly as to the law of the road as applied to the facts of this case:

"A. It was error for the court to charge that the statutory rule of the road in case of

"B. It was error for the court to charge that, if the defendant was at the time of the accident traveling on the left of the road, he assumed the risk of so doing, and was required to use greater care than if he had been traveling on the right side.

"C. It was error for the trial justice to charge that, if at the time of the accident the defendant was on the left of the road, he would be liable for all injury flowing exclusively therefrom.

"D. It was error for the court to include in its charge the quotations from the opinion in the case of Angell v. Lewis, 20 R. I. 391 [39 Atl. 521, 78 Am. St. Rep. 881].

"E. It was error for the trial justice to refuse to grant the defendant's first, second, third, and fourth requests to charge.

"F. It was error for the trial justice to grant the plaintiff's fifth request to charge." (4) The trial justice erred in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial. And (5) the damages were excessive.

The plaintiff's declaration consists of one count. He alleges that on June 14, 1912, he was riding a bicycle easterly along Point street in the city of Providence when an auto truck near the boundary of Point Street Bridge, traveling westerly, was driven so carelessly by the defendant's chauffeur that it ran into him, throwing him to the ground, as a result of which he sustained a fracture of the left leg between the hip and the knee.

It appears from the evidence that about 6 o'clock, on the afternoon of Ju e 14, 1912, the defendant's auto truck, used for carrying merchandise, was being driven in a westerly direction over the Point Street Bridge, and was being operated by one Alexander J. Lodge, one of the defendant's employés. Another employé of the defendant, Arthur Berry, was upon the truck with Lodge at the time. In proceeding across the bridge the truck traveled at a low rate of speed along the northerly side thereof, and behind a twohorse wagon, the horses being driven at a walk. When the wagon in front reached a point near the west end of the bridge, having already passed the gates at the west end of the draw and also the joist set in the middle of the bridge to separate the driveways, Lodge sounded his horn, shifted his speed from first to second, and started to pass on thus attempting to pass the team in front, a the left of the wagon in front of him. While collision took place between the truck and the plaintiff, who was riding a bicycle in an opposite direction. The collision resulted in throwing the plaintiff to the ground and inflicting upon him injuries for which he now seeks to recover damages. At the westerly end of the bridge, where the asphalt pavement and the granite block pavement meet, the roadway for vehicles is 24' 10" in width, and this width continues across the bridge to the east. In a westerly direction from the bridge, the roadway widens gradually on the north side until it reaches a width of 32' 4". It then commences to widen on the south side, and finally reaches a width of

The distance from the westerly boundary of the asphalt to the point where the street obtains its full width is 38' 4". The accident occurred near the boundary between the granite blocks and the asphalt pavement. The defendant's truck was about 6' wide, and probably somewhat wider in the upper body. The two-horse wagon which was first ahead and later north of the defendant's truck was 12′ long and about 6' wide.

There is a conflict of testimony as to the movements of the plaintiff in approaching the place of the accident. The plaintiff claims that he was proceeding along Point street on his way to the bridge on his own right side of that street, and that both before and after the defendant's truck was turning out for the purpose of passing the team ahead of it his approach could have been easily observed by Lodge, who was operating the truck. The defendant claims that the plaintiff was not upon his right side of the street, as he claims, but that, so far as Lodge could observe, the street presented a clear passage for his truck upon the left of the team in front of him; that the plaintiff must have been traveling on his left-hand side of Point street, and his approach, therefore, obscured by the team ahead, and that the plaintiff, evidently intending to bear to his left, in passing the team and truck, suddenly found that a passage upon that side was impracticable, and so quickly turned to the other side, passing close to the heads of the horses of the team ahead of the truck, and unexpectedly appearing in front of the truck too late for Lodge, the driver, to avoid a collision. The truck did not run over the plaintiff, but the left front mud guard came in contact with his left leg, and he sustained a fracture of the left thigh.

We shall not undertake to deal with the questions of fact which were presented to and were particularly within the province of the jury, but the foregoing brief statement will serve to assist the understanding in the discussion of the questions of law.

time of the trial without the jurisdiction of the court, and was not available as a witness. The record of Dr. Peet covered the case from June 14 to August 15, 1912. It appears to have been his business, as the recording official, to place upon record such facts relating to the patient as were communicated to him by his associates and subordinates, as well as those which came under his personal observation. It also appeared that the record in question was written up by Dr. Peet every third day. These facts, explanatory of the record, having all appeared in testimony, and it having also appeared that Dr. Peet was without the state, and that the record was in his handwriting, it was, offered in evidence by the defendant. The court excluded the record and noted the defendant's exception, stating that it had been excluded with the understanding that it was objected to, whereupon counsel for the plaintiff observed:

"I don't understand that it is legal evidence, that it is hearsay, and we have no opportunity to cross-examine the people who made up that record."

So far as appears, both sides proceeded upthe plaintiff had regularly objected to the inon the assumption and understanding that troduction of the record, and we, therefore, may consider it in the same way. The purpose for which this record was offered in evidence was to show the unruly behavior of the plaintiff and his disobedience of the positive orders of the surgeons and nurses as to keeping quiet and refraining from movements which would be likely to seriously interfere with the proper adjustment and knitting together of the fractured bone. It also appears in evidence that some, if not all, of those who reported the plaintiff's condition and actions from time to time were called as witnesses at the trial, and that therefore, as the plaintiff claims, the exclusion of the record did not in effect deprive the defendant of any useful or important testimony. We do not think that the plaintiff's claim in this regard is well founded. The exclusion of the record deprived the defendant of its force as corroborative of the testimony of the other witnesses, the record having been made long prior to the suit and without any reference to the plaintiff's claim.

upon Dr. Peet, under the rules and regulations of the Rhode Island Hospital, that would be sufficient in that regard, and the source from which that duty originated would not be material. Such duties may arise from the casual direction of a superior, or from functions necessarily inherent to the position