his ideal ends, drawing in vitality from the social environment as he himself contributes to the welfare of the whole. It is obvious that there is often antagonism between the selfish and the social sentiments. Social conservation may be opposed to individual, and the converse. But however they reconcile themselves or oppose themselves to each other, neither can be wholly eradicated. Both are present as factors of the development of individual character and as influencing individual conduct. At least, so far as the action of other people is concerned, it is certainly for the interest of the individual that they be governed by the social law. I may not conform to altruistic principles, but I have very strict ideas of how my neighbour ought to act. And though everybody be more or less egoistic himself, the social sentiment tends to increase under the force of law laid down for other people. Men are moulded reactively to no little degree, if not directly by education. Individual conservation through progressive adaptation to circumstances is the motive force of individual human activity. And as a means to this, altruistic regard for the conservation of the social organism becomes more and more prominent, and indeed necessary, as human life increases in complexity. Social progress, the maintenance of the social organic unity, depends altogether upon altruism. CHAPTER XXVII. BELIEF AND DISBELIEF IN A FUTURE STATE. IN the earlier part of this work we noticed the waning of human life (Chapter VII.) as generating religious sentiments. Whatever ends we propose to ourselves, and however prudently and enthusiastically we follow them, as age comes on we find ourselves thwarted. We are profoundly impressed with a sense of our impotence. Vitality is constantly slipping away, and from our knowledge of human life we are forced to anticipate a further deterioration. Death must come. We may or we may not believe in a post-mortem conscious existence. What is the effect of either belief upon our present life? We have seen in a former chapter (Chapter XIX.) how, when we reason upon the subject, we are induced to believe in such an immortality. But it is quite possible for us, looking upon the phenomena of physical disintegration, to doubt our own introspective consciousness, and arrive at the belief that memory is irrecoverably lost, personal identity completely abolished, and death the end of all for the individual. Bearing in mind the statement of the last chapter, that the motive to activity is the conservation of life, if we appreciate that death is certain and we already feel its approach, and have no hope of a further existence, at least ideal ends of future development must fail of being formed and presented to the mind as objects of attainment. They are not only useless, they are a mockery. The result is that in such case, the sphere of activity being limited by the present life, action is determined solely with reference to it. A tendency is created to get for one's self all that A one can out of the present. Carpe diem. To-morrow we die. That such a thought has a depressing effect upon activity directed to remote ends is perfectly evident. Economy of pleasure is of no use. The higher ideals hence give way to the demands for present enjoyment. To the latter there is no resisting power which our minds are capable of furnishing. To be sure we wish to preserve our lives as long as possible, but life at best is uncertain, and in the disbelief in its continuance after death we insensibly lose a strong volitional influence favouring its present prolongation : Ah, my beloved, fill the cup that clears Myself with yesterday's seven thousand years.1 In my former work, 'A System of Psychology,' to which I have made reference, in an examination of the comparative value of pleasures as ends, the truth was brought out that pursuit of the primary (that is, appetitive) pleasures is not conducive to increaseX of vitality. This point is of so much importance in the present inquiry that I shall venture to quote a portion of what was there said. 'Primary pleasures, when made principal ends of activity, have the effect to fasten the attention and desire upon sensation. The thoughts are directed toward the sensational pleasurable experience, and are constantly seeking a repetition of that experience: the mind does not rest satisfied with a representative pleasure, but is eager for a return of the presentative. The result of this is that the importance of conservation of pleasure is lost sight of. Providence is not found in such a case. The nearest means of gratifying the desire is seized upon, and there is little consideration of the future. Economy of pleasure no longer exists. Hence there is greater room for the operation of pain-producing agencies; they are not guarded against; there is no forewarning and no forearming. Allied with this is the further fact that making sensual pleasures principal ends has the effect to shorten their duration, and prevent their repetition and recurrence, through a weakening of the organs through which the pleasure is produced. All the evils of excess are engendered, the system is broken down, and the vitality destroyed. Another way of stating the same fact is to say that one pleasure is cultivated and pursued, to the utter neglect of others. The enjoyment of eating and drinking is sought, while the pleasures of organic integrity are despised. In order to obtain happiness there must be a balance preserved of pleasures. If one set is eschewed, there will, in all likelihood, be a considerable increase and greater 1 Rubaiyát of Omar Khayyam, xxi. 2 Chap. lxviii. predominance of the corresponding pains; and unless all the primary pleasures receive their due share of cultivation, there will be a superabundance of one group of pleasures (or a few), and with the depreciation of the others a prevalence and overmastery of pain, which overbalances and countervails the pleasure and makes misery instead of happiness. 'It should further be noticed that when a person makes the primary pleasures principal ends, he sets himself against the line of development of the human mind, and begins a retrogression. This line of development is from the simple to the complex through the redintegrating processes, that is to say, by means of representations. In order to foster such a development, the mind must pursue as its principal ends more highly representative ideals rather than less representative and sensual pleasures. He who follows the latter sets himself to repress and thwart the principle of growth in his own nature, and if the growth is arrested, soon causes decay.' The tendency to sybaritism is undoubtedly increased by whatever destroys hopes for the future. This is true with regard to the present life. In times of pestilence or war, when death is imminent, revelry and debauchery of all kinds are much more prevalent. Under oppression, where motives to activity are taken away, through impossibility of accomplishing one's ends, people are led to content themselves with sensual pleasures. Despots have frequently seen the force of this, and in the midst of their tyranny have kept the people amused and winked at appetitive excesses. In regard to the hope of a future life, the influence of disbelief or despair upon present activity is of the same character. One would at first think such a disbelief would induce greater care to conserve the life that now is, but, as just seen, the contrary is the fact. It depresses the mental energies, destroys or prevents the formation of high ideal ends, turns the mind to present intensity of enjoyment, rather than to conservation of pleasure, weakens the vital forces, and hastens the accomplishment of what is most dreaded-decay and death. It must now be brought to mind that sybaritism is one of the phases of the egoistic or selfish character. It is the passive form of egoism, and results in a carelessness or want of interest in the welfare of others, which is disintegrating to the social organism.' It is of a fundamentally anti-social character. Hence the disbelief in a future state, so far as it develops in the individual the disposition to prefer the present enjoyment to the remoter good, encourages The Problem of Evil, chaps. xxvii., xxix., xxx. selfishness and weakens the bonds which hold together the social organism, the preservation of which, as we have seen, is so necessary to individual growth. But there is another way in which the same effect is wrought. The natural force of human energy is very great, and it must expend itself upon something. It will not always content itself with the ease and luxury of the voluptuary. But there must be some end of activity. If it is believed that there is nothing for the individual beyond the present life, the purpose of getting as much as possible out of the life as it is will be the limit of effort. Every one of intelligence will recognise that in order to do this some regard must be paid to society; but it is more difficult in such case to develop the pure altruistic feeling. It is harder to construct a stimulating ideal of the social state and the social feeling as of permanent value to the individual. He is more apt to say, What care I for society, its progress, its welfare? He forms the notion of using others so as to give him the greatest advantage, to enable him to command to the fullest extent the possibilities of worldly happiness. Hence the lust for power in the form of authority, or fame, or wealth, grows to the utter disregard of the happiness of others. In order to enjoy it is necessary to acquire; either may become the ruling passion, the pursuit often becoming the greater pleasure, but in either case it is the egoistic ideal that controls and the egoistic character that is formed, altogether to the detriment of the social organism, and very often visibly to the damage of the individual also. It cannot be denied that some forms of the belief in a future state, presently to be reviewed, have just as damaging an effect upon individual and social life, in both the directions we have been considering, as has a disbelief in immortality; but for the moment regarding only the latter, I think both analysis of the modes of operation of the volitional powers of the human mind and observation historically upon the course of mental development conclusively show that disbelief in a future state has a tendency to favour egoistic, or selfish, rather than altruistic, or social, character. It is destructive of the social organism, the life of which is that each member be the means and end of all the rest. I do not feel able to allow space for an exhaustive historical examination upon this point, but many illustrations of the truth of what I have been saying will suggest themselves to the reader. Wherever we find disbelief in a future state we find an increase of egoism. The French revolutionary period is as conspicuous an example as can grasping Self suffic rend indiv. idual H |