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A continuing program is necessary to improve and implement a credible nuclear materials security (safeguards) system to guard against the diversion of special nuclear materials. FY 1974 funding will emphasize the application of results of previous and ongoing R&D to actual plant operations and conditions. Applications of R&D resulting from materials accountability, physical containment, surveillance and transportation studies will be made at existing and new facilities. Adversary testing will be stressed to ensure the safeguards effectiveness and sensitivities of these new R&D applications. SUMMARY OF ESTIMATES BY CATEGORY

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The FY 1974 increases in all categories of the Nuclear Materials Security program provide for continuing at the FY 1973 level of effort when considering the increased cost of doing business.

A. Research and Development.

1. Technology

$2,750,000

Advanced nuclear technology is the basis for improved nuclear materials accountability, containment and surveillance at
new and existing plants and in the transportation of nuclear materials between plants to assure effective safeguards of
this material. The effectiveness of nuclear materials safeguards is being enhanced by the application of new and unique
instrumentation systems resulting from safeguards oriented research and development. New types of reactor fuel entering
U.S. plants show the advent and anticipated growth in use of fuel materials with higher strategic value than low enrich-
ment uranium fuels. These materials include highly enriched uranium for the High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (HTGR),
thermal recycle mixed oxide fuel and the higher plutonium content mixed oxide fuel for the Fast Fuel Test Facility (FFTF)
and Liquid Metal Cooled Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR). The FY 1974 effort includes the development of new nondestructive
(e.g., X-ray and neutron beam techniques) and chemical assay techniques for accountability assurance that diversion of
these materials has not occurred. Initial applications will be at fuel fabrication facilities and will include nonde-
structive assay techniques for HTGR and FFTF fuel. A large array of nondestructive assay standards and calibration
techniques will be developed in FY 1974 in conjunction with the application of nondestructive assay instrumentation.
Emphasis will also be continued on the automation of chemical assay techniques.

WEAPONS PROGRAM continued

B.

In FY 1974 an overall improvement will be demonstrated in the detection of possible intruders at AEC plants. Outdoor equipment of types recently introduced for use at military and penal installations will be adapted and demonstrated for use at AEC installations. Improved doorway personnel monitors now under development will be installed to detect and deter pilferage of highly strategic materials. Vehicular and package monitors are also being developed. Indoor intrusion alarm equipment will be adapted and demonstrated for use in AEC plants. Analytical monitoring of plant activities involving special nuclear material will be undertaken. This monitoring will make use of unique approaches to the analysis of routine plant process control, personnel management, and processing capabilities, for the safeguards mission. technology will be tested and demonstrated for automated monitoring by shippers to determine the approximate location of shipment packages en route between plants.

2. Systems

Automated

The Nuclear Materials Security system development effort is aimed at evaluation and development of alternative safeguards
methods and procedures to be used to improve and upgrade the effectiveness of the safeguards effort. The objectives are
(1) to develop the technical basis for facility accountability, surveillance, and physical protection and for inspection
system requirements; (2) where necessary, to evaluate and develop methods and procedures which best satisfy the require-
ments; and (3) the continual evaluation of nuclear materials accountability measurements and the effectiveness of the
overall system.

FY 1974 efforts include the development of technical specifications for modifications to the Safeguards Information System,
inspection procedures for field offices application to specific license-exempt contractors and preparation of detailed safe-
guards design criteria for new facilities. In FY 1974 perimeter surveillance techniques and instrumentation for IAEA safe-
guards at isotope enrichment plants will have been field tested, and an experiment to test the effectiveness of a perimeter
surveillance system will be completed, including adversary testing.

Operation of Safeguards Analytical Laboratory....

..$900,000

The AEC-operated New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL) provides under the Nuclear Materials Security program independent and objective chemical and isotopic analysis of samples submitted by AEC inspectors for verification of license-exempt contractor inventories. The sample workload is estimated at 1,500 for FY 1973 with an increase to 2,000 for FY 1974. The International Atomic Energy Agency plans to use part of NBL capability as a regional laboratory for full cost recovery analysis of IAEA inventory verification samples. AEC supports this use of NBL as contributing to the success of IAEA safeguards operations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. To accomplish the increase in NBL workload with expeditious reporting of analysis results, development is continuing on an NBL capability for automated chemical analyses and for complementing chemical analysis with rapid nondestructive assay (NDA) procedures. The complementary procedures are particularly needed for hard-to-dissolve materials. In FY 1974 NBL will be applying automatic data processing equipment to control all data handling operations associated with high-throughput sample handling programs. Plutonium analyses were terminated at NBL on July 6, 1972. Plutonium analyses will be performed on an interim basis at a selected National Laboratory site, under monitoring by NBL, pending a decision to relocate the entire laboratory (plutonium and uranium).

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D.

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Nuclear Materials Reports and Analysis System..

$300,000

The Nuclear Materials Reports and Analysis System (NMRAS) is a computer-based information system used by the AEC in managing and safeguarding nuclear materials. The system receives, stores, processes, and reports information on forecasts, inventories, and transactions of nuclear materials. On materials owned by the AEC, information is obtained relative to the usage and the programmatic and financial management of the materials. The project will continue the development and maintenance of the system. Requirements analysis, system design, and programming will be performed to enlarge and sustain the data base and to respond to the expanding requirements for materials and financial management information and for domestic safeguards. System development activities in response to the international safeguards requirements will continue at an expanded level. These activities will include the implementation of changes necessitated by the IAEA's impact on the U.S. system, the development of computerized interfaces between U.S. and IAEA data structures, and the generation of input data to the IAEA system as a product of the U.S. system.

Technical Support Organization.

.$450,000
The FY 1974 level provides for the continuation of the Technical Support Organization (TSO) at Brookhaven National Labora-
tory which works intimately with the Division of Nuclear Materials Security to provide both advanced technical expertise
and analytical support. Technical program direction advice and evaluations of R&D proposals are supplied, contractor
capabilities are appraised, and technical progress and work quality are monitored during the periods of R&D contracts.
New or improved instruments (e.g., advanced nondestructive and automated chemical instruments) are procured, calibrated,
laboratory evaluated and field tested for safeguards applications.

In the area of overall safeguards systems, TSO provides systems guidance and direction and applies operations analysis
techniques and statistical methods to determine the best operational procedures for obtaining and using production data
from nuclear facilities for safeguards purposes. TSO provides technical assistance for field investigations of activi-
ties and incidents having safeguards implications.

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B - Obligations for Capital Equipment Not Related to Construction Total Obligations for Plant and Capital Equipment ....

$ 76,818,061 62,605,300 $139,423,361

Obligations for the weapons program for FY 1974 are estimated at $191,650,000, of which:

$111,041,000 57,551,000 $168,592,000

$114,600,000 77,050,000 $191,650,000

$114,600,000 is for construction projects listed in Section A below, requested for authorization in the proposed FY 1974 Authorization Act or were previously partially or totally authorized and for which a request for appropriation is being made in FY 1974.

b. $77,050,000 is for Capital Equipment Not Related to Construction justified in Section B below, requested for authorization in the proposed FY 1974 Authorization Act.

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The projects comprising Section A, which are requested for authorization in FY 1974 or which were previously partially or totally authorized and for which a request for appropriation is being made for FY 1974, are:

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Project 74-2-a Weapons production, development, and test installations ...

$10,000,000

This project provides for the acquisition, construction, or modification of such facilities or sites as may be required to assure the safety, reliability, continuity, responsiveness, or optimum performance of production, research, and test operations. The need and/or the scope and nature of these requirements cannot usually be foreseen in sufficient detail to include them as separate line items in the current budget.

Past experience has proven the inestimable value of this type of project authorization. The magnitude and complexity of current and proposed production, development, and test programs indicate that we may continue to expect such requirements on short notice to support changes in program requirements or operating conditions.

Details of Cost Estimate:

The indefinite nature of the anticipated work precludes inclusion of details of costs.

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