About 2:53 a.m. on October 8, 1977, Southern Railway Company passenger train No. 1, The Crescent, entered a crossover leading from the main track onto a yard track at Spencer, North Carolina, and sideswiped freight cars which were being assembled as Southern train No. 152. Four locomotive units and five cars of The Crescent and seven cars of train No. 152 were derailed. Twenty-six persons received minor injuries, and damage was estimated to be $250,000.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the switch circuit controller to cause a red aspect to be displayed at the entrance to the signal block. Contributing to the cause of the accident was the Southern's failure to insure by enforceable, specific rules that conflicting routes were not established for The Crescent and train No. 152.

INVESTIGATION

The Accident

About 11:00 p.m. on October 7, 1977, a Southern yard engine with 49 empty freight cars approached the Spencer Yard on the southbound main track. After a crewmember lined the Old Spencer Depot crossover for movement from the main track to the yard, the train proceeded, without stopping, into the yard. The yardmaster had instructed the crew not to stop to reline the switch 1/ for movement on the main track; therefore, the crossover was left unattended.

The yardmaster testified that about 11:00 p.m., he instructed a switch tender to go to the north end of the yard to line the crossover for movement on the main track after the yard engine came into the yard, and to bleed the air off of cars on the Old Southbound Yard track.

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During the investigation of this accident the Southern's Superintendent of Operating Rules, Eastern Lines, defined a switch as meaning both ends of a crossover. However, precise reference requires that each end of the switch be identified by direction in this case, north or south.

The switch tender stated that he did not see the yard train enter the yard after he arrived at the north yard shanty, about 700 feet south of the crossover. He called the yardmaster shortly after 11:00 p.m. and was informed that the yard engine had arrived. The switch tender then bled the air from the cars standing on the Old Southbound Yard track. He did not line the switch of the crossover for movement on the main track, and later he denied that he had been instructed to do so. About 11:50 p.m. the switch tender reported to the yardmaster that he had completed his last assignment. The yardmaster stated that he assumed this included lining the switch at the crossover for the main track; he did not ask specifically about the switch, however.

About 2:00 a.m. on October 8, 1977, the engineer and head brakeman for Southern train No. 152 left the Spencer Yard roundhouse on the locomotive to assemble the train's cars which were standing on two tracks. The locomotive's route was over the south switch of the crossover. The locomotive was stopped, and the brakeman lined the south switch of the crossover for movement on the running track, which paralleled the southbound main track. (See figure 1.) At that time he did not observe the north switch of the crossover, about 400 feet away. After the locomotive was coupled to the cars on one of the tracks, the yardmaster instructed the engineer to pull north on the running track and to wait for The Crescent to pass before moving again. When the locomotive of No. 152 passed the north switch of the crossover, the brakeman saw that the switch was lined so that trains would move from the southbound main track, over the crossover, and into the Spencer Yard. He suggested that the engineer call the yardmaster to determine if he wanted the switch to be lined for the main track, but the engineer replied, "the yardmaster knows about it." Shortly thereafter, about 2:53 a.m., Southern's southbound train No. 1, The Crescent, entered the crossover about 50 mph and collided with several cars of train No. 152 on the running track.

The Crescent had left Greensboro, North Carolina, at 1:45 a.m. on October 8, 1977. The train consisted of 4 locomotive units and 11 passenger cars. The locomotive was equipped with a two-way radio and the conductor was provided with a portable radio. A 500-mile brake test made before departure disclosed no defects.

While en route to Spencer, the engineer frequently communicated by radio with the train dispatcher, Southern's northbound train No. 2, and a freight train. The speed of the train was reduced from 70 mph to 50 mph as it approached Spencer, to comply with a speed restriction, and the engineer and fireman testified that the wayside signals displayed clear indications. They called the signal indications to each other as required by the operating rules. The engineer and the fireman discussed the fact that all of the signals were clear, because usually The Crescent was routed from the southbound track to the northbound track at Spencer for movement into the station at Salisbury, North Carolina. When a train is to follow this route, signal 330.7 should display an "approach"

aspect. The engineer usually called the yardmaster on the radio whenever the signal indications approaching Spencer were less favorable than clear. A "clear" aspect on signal 330.7 indicated that the train would continue on the southbound main track.

Shortly after The Crescent passed signal 330.7, it entered the north switch of the crossover and was routed from the main track to the running track in the Spencer Yard where it collided with the freight cars of train No. 152.

A 2° right curve begins immediately south of signal 330.7 and changes to 1°30' with a 1-inch superelevation at the point of the derailment. There is a 50-mph speed limit through the curve. The grade through the same area is 0.37 percent descending southbound. (See figure 1.) The north switch of the Old Spencer Depot crossover is a facing point switch for southbound trains; it is 1,629 ft south of signal 330.7. The crossover is about 380 ft long with No. 14 turnouts. The rail through the Spencer area is 132-1lb continuous welded rail.

The four locomotive units of The Crescent were derailed but remained upright and parallel to the main track. The lead unit was damaged extensively along the right side. The first five cars behind the locomotive were derailed; the second and third of these cars jackknifed toward the west. The passenger equipment was damaged slightly.

The second, third, and fourth cars were coaches, and the fifth car was a sleeper-lounge. The seats of the second and third cars remained intact and there was little interior damage. Five seats in the fourth car had rotated one-quarter turn. The right-front corner of the fourth car was crushed inward to the extent that the aisle was impassable. Otherwise, the interiors of the cars sustained little damage.

Four freight cars of train No. 152 derailed but remained upright, and three were turned on their sides. The freight cars were slightly damaged. About 400 ft of track was destroyed.

Personnel Information

The engineer of The Crescent was employed April 30, 1937, and was promoted to engineer on July 3, 1958. He passed a medical examination

in February 1977, and a rules examination on March 7, 1977. He was wearing corrective lenses for far-sightedness, as required, at the time of the accident.

The fireman of The Crescent was employed July 29, 1973, as a trainman. He was promoted to conductor on October 15, 1975, and transferred to engine service as a fireman on October 1, 1977. He passed a medical examination in September 1977, and an operating rules examination in March 1977. He was an engineer trainee and had made three or four round trips over the division on The Crescent.

The engineer of train No. 152 was employed October 20, 1971, as a yardman. He became a road trainman on November 4, 1972, a fireman on May 2, 1974, and he was promoted to engineer on February 5, 1975. He passed an operating rules examination in March 1977.

The brakeman of train No. 152 was employed October 3, 1972. He passed an operating rules examination in March 1977.

The signal maintainer on whose territory the accident occurred was employed on August 30, 1971, as a signalman. He became signal maintainer at Salisbury on October 6, 1973. He passed a rules examination in February or March 1977. He attended a company signal training school for 2 weeks during December 1972. He had worked for 6 years in electronics before coming to work as a signal maintainer for the Southern. He was responsible for 15 miles of automatic block signal (ABS) double-track territory.

Method of Operation

Trains are operated through Spencer on the main tracks by the indications of an ABS system. The east and west tracks are designated northbound and southbound; respectively.

The accident occurred on the main track within yard limits. According to the Southern, rule 93 of its operating rules applies: therefore, the yardmaster can direct operations on the main tracks within the yard limits. (See Appendix A.) They yard limits for Spencer and Salisbury are contiguous for his control purposes. A crewmember must obtain permission from the yardmaster before using a mainline switch.

Southern operating rule 104 (c) states, in part: "A switch must not be left open unattended." Rule 1203 states, in part: "Yardmasters must require that main track switches be properly lined and locked when not in use...." Rule 104(e) requires that, "A train or engine must not foul a track until switches and derails connected with the movement are properly lined...."