6319-1, 6345-1, and 6367-1 approaching Ramsey from his seat in the caboose cupola. Later, he testified that he actually saw a "clear" aspect on signal 6367-1, may have seen only the reflection of a "clear" aspect on signal 6345-1, and did not see signals 6299-1 and 6319-1. The two cabooses and six rear cars of Extra 3055 West were derailed. Much of the collision force was absorbed by the rear caboose which had its center sill driven forward about 8 feet, both platforms demolished, and the car body separated from the trucks. However, the car body was relatively intact and came to rest upright, north of the No. 1 track near the point of collision. The forward caboose was completely demolished. Of the six derailed hopper cars, four were destroyed and one was damaged. The 3 locomotive units and head 15 cars of Extra 3449 West were derailed. The locomotive units left the track alignment to the north but remained upright and parallel to the track. The lead unit stopped 636 feet west of the point of collision, still coupled to the unit behind it but with its lead truck about 40 feet beyond it. There was substantial damage to the forward hood and operator compartment of the lead unit from being overridden by the rear caboose of Extra 3055 West. The roof of the operator's compartment was crushed downward, and a wheelset from the caboose was lodged crosswise in the left side of the cab. The trailing units had only minor damage. Twelve of the 15 derailed cars were destroyed. About 400 feet of track No. 1 were destroyed. Derailed cars blocked the No. 2 track, disturbed the alignment, and shunted the signal circuitry. Crewmember Information Each of the trains involved in the accident had an engineer, conductor, and two brakemen. All were qualified under UP operating rules without restrictions. (See appendix B.) The crewmembers of Extra 3449 West reported for duty at 11:10 p.m. on March 28 and had been on duty 3 hours 31 minutes when the accident occurred. Except for the conductor, an extra man working a temporary vacancy, all were regularly assigned to the Cheyenne-Rawlins through-freight pool. The engineer had 10 years service as a fireman and engineer and had been qualified as an engineer on the Cheyenne-Rawlins territory in September 1975. Prior to reporting on March 28, the engineer had been off duty 41 hours 25 minutes. He stated that on March 28 he awoke after a full night's sleep at 8:00 a.m., napped in the afternoon, and ate a full evening meal at the home of friends. After the accident the engineer submitted to a toxicological scan of his blood which was negative for alcohol and drugs. The head brakeman had 6 years service and had last worked on March 21. He lived alone in Laramie, 60 miles from Cheyenne. On March 28, he spent the day working on a home improvement project, had an evening meal with friends, and drove to Cheyenne to report for duty. A postmortem toxicological examination was negative for alcohol and drugs. The conductor and rear brakeman of Extra 3449 West had been off duty for 45 hours and 71 hours, respectively, prior to reporting. The conductor noticed nothing unusual about the engineer's behavior at the time they reported. The rear brakeman was well acquainted with the head brakeman and had ridden with him from Laramie to Cheyenne, to report for duty that night. He stated that he noticed nothing unusual about the other man's condition or behavior during the trip. The crewmembers of Extra 3055 West had reported for duty at 7:05 p.m., March 28, and had been on duty 7 hours 36 minutes when the accident occurred. The engineer had been off duty more than 21 hours prior to reporting; the other crewmembers had been off duty for more than 50 hours. Train Information Extra 3449 West originated in North Platte, Nebraska, and, except for the car picked up at Lookout, the original makeup of the train was never altered. At the time of the accident, the train consisted of 3 General Motors Model SD40-2 dieselelectric locomotive units, 43 cars, and a caboose. Extra 3449 West had a maximum authorized speed of 65 mph which was noted on the clearance card given to the crew at Cheyenne. The nominal length of the train after it left Lookout was 3,150 feet. The lead locomotive unit had the short hood forward and was equipped with functioning dual sealed-beam headlight, speed indicator and recorder, overspeed control, floor-mounted deadman pedal, and cab signals with acknowledging lever and warning whistle. The whistle was mounted on the forward cab wall in a conspicuous location. The caboose was a standard UP type with cupola. Both lead unit and caboose had functioning permanent radios using the UP frequency. Extra 3055 West consisted of 5 locomotive units, 121 empty hopper cars, and 2 foreign line cabooses. The lead unit was a General Motors Model SD40 equipped with functioning cab signals, UP radio, speed indicator, and speed recorder. The train had a maximum authorized speed of 50 mph and a nominal length of 6,636 feet. The rear caboose, Burlington Northern 10783P, had a permanent radio which would not operate on the UP frequency. However, there was a functioning UP portable radio on the caboose. The rear caboose had an electrically-powered red marker light facing to the rear which was lighted prior to and at the time of the accident. Method of Operation Trains are operated over the two main tracks between Cheyenne and Rawlins by automatic wayside signals of a centralized traffic control system supplemented by locomotive cab signals. Traincrews are also directed in their duties by radiotransmitted instructions from the dispatcher. The tracks are numbered 1 and 2 from north to south. Through the use of crossover tracks, the dispatcher can route a train over either main track between control points to allow it to overtake another train. Once the dispatcher has established the route for a train between control points, the intermediate signals governing that route are automatically locked in for that train. The first control point east of Ramsey is Medicine Bow and in the 14-mile section between these points there are six intermediate block signals from 1.6 to 2.7 miles apart. The tracks are signaled in both directions and the intermediate signals are of the approach-lighted, four-aspect color-light type. They are mounted on a low mast to the field side of the track they govern. The signals for a westbound train moving on the No. 1 track are located north of the track; those governing westbound movement on the No. 2 track are south of the track. The intermediate signals do not light until a train passes the preceding signal or the circuitry in the preceding block is otherwise shunted. The aspects for both tracks are displayed regardless of which track is occupied by an approaching train. If the block beyond an intermediate signal is occupied by a train, the signal will display the following aspect: If the block governed by the signal is clear and the block in advance of that block is occupied, the signal will display the following aspect: Aspect Name Approach Indication Proceed prepared to If two blocks in advance of the signal are unoccupied, but the third block ahead of the signal is occupied, the signal will display the following aspect: If three blocks in advance of the signal are unoccupied and the route was established for the train at the last control point, the signal will display the following aspect: Aspect Green Name Indication Proceed The automatic cab signal system (ACS) in the UP locomotives repeats the four basic wayside signal indications — clear, advance approach, approach, and stop and whenever the cab signal changes to a more restrictive indication, the engineer is required to move the 3-position acknowledging device from "normal" to "acknowledge" position. Failure of the engineer to do this will result in the continuous sounding of a warning whistle located on the front wall of the locomotive cab. UP Rule 464 requires any other member of the crew in the cab to take immediate action to stop the train if the whistle sounds longer than 6 seconds. (See appendix C.) However, the automatic air brake system will not apply, even if the engineer fails to acknowledge as required. A dispatcher at Cheyenne supervised operations over the territory involved in this accident. He monitored the movement of trains as they reached and passed the control points, represented by lights on the panel of his centralized traffic control console. In addition, the console was equipped with a recording graph that tracked the movement of trains by time and location (see figure 3). The dispatcher was required to check the graph's timing device against the standard clock every 4 hours. On March 29, he first checked the timing device at 12:20 a.m. At that time it was 30 seconds fast and he reset it to the correct time. The dispatcher made a second check at 4:54 a.m. at which time the timing device was 15 seconds fast. |