About 2:41 a.m., m.s.t., on March 29, 1979, Union Pacific Railroad (UP) freight train Extra 3449 West struck the rear of UP unit coal train Extra 3055 West as it was moving from the No. 1 main track into a siding at Ramsey, Wyoming. Two train crewmembers were killed and three crewmembers were injured. The 3 locomotive units of Extra 3449 West and 23 cars were derailed. Total damage was estimated to be $1,121,000. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the failure of the engineer of Extra 3449 West to comply with a series of restrictive wayside signals, wayside signals, repeated by locomotive cab signals, including a "stop-and-proceed" aspect 6,303 feet from the point of collision. Contributing to the accident was the unauthorized muting of the cab signal warning whistle, so that it could not alert the engineer when a more restrictive signal was passed. NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594 RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT Adopted: August 16, 1979 REAR-END COLLISION OF UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD FREIGHT TRAINS RAMSEY, WYOMING SYNOPSIS About 2:41 a.m., m.s.t., on March 29, 1979, Union Pacific Railroad (UP) freight train Extra 3449 West struck the rear of UP unit coal train Extra 3055 West as it was moving from the No. 1 main track into a siding at Ramsey, Wyoming. Two train crewmembers were killed and three crewmembers were injured. The 3 locomotive units of Extra 3449 West and 23 cars were derailed. Total damage was estimated to be $1,121,000. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the failure of the engineer of Extra 3449 West to comply with a series of restrictive wayside signals, repeated by locomotive cab signals, including a "stop-and-proceed" aspect 6,303 feet from the point of collision. Contributing to the accident was the unauthorized muting of the cab signal warning whistle so that it could not alert the engineer when a more restrictive signal was passed. INVESTIGATION The Accident On March 28, 1979, westbound UP unit coal train Extra 3055 West, consisting of 5 locomotive units, 121 empty cars, and 2 cabooses, departed Cheyenne, Wyoming, at 9:30 p.m. for Hanna, Wyoming. At about 2:20 a.m., on March 29, the dispatcher contacted the engineer by radio and instructed him to stop his train in the north running track at Ramsey. At the time of this transmission, Extra 3055 West was running on the No. 1 main track and was about 9 miles east of Ramsey. The engineer and head brakeman were in the lead locomotive unit, and the conductor and rear brakeman were in the rear caboose. According to the engineer and head brakeman of Extra 3055 West, the last two intermediate signals approaching the home signal at Ramsey continuously dis played "advance approach" and "approach diverging" aspects, 1/ respectively, as their train approached them, and the aspects were properly repeated by the locomotive cab signals. The home signal properly displayed a "diverging approach" aspect 2/ when Extra 3055 West passed it at 2:34 a.m. About 1 minute earlier, the rear of the train had cleared the last intermediate signal 8,134 feet east of the home signal. Without stopping, Extra 3055 West entered the turnout to the north running track at a speed of about 10 mph. About 2:42 a.m., the rear caboose of Extra 3055 West was struck by the lead locomotive unit of westbound UP freight train Extra 3449 West at a point 6,303 feet west of the last intermediate signal and 3,340 feet east of the turnout. Extra 3449 West had departed Cheyenne at 11:50 p.m., March 28, for Rawlins, Wyoming. En route the train stopped and picked up a car at Lookout, 44 miles east of Ramsey. Thereafter, Extra 3449 West consisted of 3 locomotive units, 43 loaded cars, and 1 caboose. The engineer and head brakeman were in the lead locomotive unit which was operated by the engineer from the right side, and the conductor and rear brakeman were in the caboose. Extra 3449 West departed Lookout on the No. 1 main track at about 2:02 a.m., on March 29, and reached its maximum authorized speed of 65 mph within 4 miles. When the train was about 23 miles east of Ramsey, the engineer, conductor, and rear brakeman heard the dispatcher instruct the crew of Extra 3055 West by radio to stop their train in the north running track at Ramsey. Extra 3449 West passed two eastbound trains at about 2:18 a.m. and 2:24 a.m., and the engineer dimmed the headlight for both trains. When Extra 3449 West reached Medicine Bow, 14 miles east of Ramsey, at 2:28 a.m., the control signal there displayed a "clear" aspect, 3/ and the route was aligned for track No. 1. The first two of the six intermediate block signals between Medicine Bow and Ramsey also displayed "clear" aspects as the train approached, but the third signal (6299-1) displayed an "advance approach" aspect. (See figure 1.) About the time Extra 3449 West passed this signal, Extra 3055 West had cleared the second block east of Ramsey. As a result, the fourth signal (6319-1) also displayed an "advance approach" aspect for Extra 3449 West. This aspect indicated that the third block ahead of the signal was occupied and that Extra 3449 West would have to reduce its speed to 40 mph by the time the train reached the fifth signal (6345-1). Because Extra 3055 West still occupied the block east of the home signal at Ramsey, signal 6345-1 would have been displaying an "approach" aspect 4/ requiring the engineer to immediately reduce speed to 30 mph and be prepared to stop the train short of the sixth, and 1/ "Advance approach" requires that train speed not exceed 40 mph when the next signal is reached; "approach diverging" allows a train to proceed prepared to take a diverging route beyond the next signal at a prescribed speed. 2/ "Diverging approach" allows a train to proceed on a diverging route prepared to stop at the next signal. 3/ "Clear" requires that a train proceed at authorized speed. 4/ "Approach" requires that a train's speed be immediately reduced to 30 mph and that the train stop short of the next signal. last, signal (6367-1) east of Ramsey. This signal would have displayed a "stop and proceed" aspect. 5/ Extra 3449 West passed signal 6345-1 at 2:37 at a speed of about 62 mph, as indicated on the locomotive speed recorder tape, and passed signal 6367-1 at 2:40 a.m. at a speed of about 52 mph. About 90 seconds later, the train struck the rear of Extra 3055 West. At the time, Extra 3449 West was running in full throttle at about 48 mph. No braking action had been initiated. Signal 6299-1, the third signal west of Medicine Bow, can be seen from a westbound train as soon as the train passes the preceding signal more than 9,400 feet to the east. Due to track curvature and terrain, the last three intermediate signals approaching Ramsey 6319-1, 6345-1, and 6367-1 -- are first continuously visible to a westbound train at distances of about 3,300, 2,300, and 2,500 feet, respectively. The point of collision could first be seen from a westbound train 2,300 feet to the east. Beyond that point, a pole line south of the main track partially obscured the location. Beginning at signal 6367-1, a westbound train on the No. 1 track moves through a tangent for 1,512 feet, followed by a 2-degree, left-hand curve for 1,174 feet, a tangent of 1,289 feet, and a 1-degree, left-hand curve for 1,597 feet. The remaining 731 feet to the point of collision is tangent. Over the entire distance the grade ascends at the rate of 0.70 percent except for the last 300 feet which is 0.26 percent descending westbound. (See figure 2.) All of the progressively more restrictive signal aspects would have been repeated by cab signals in the cab and would have required acknowledgement by the engineer. His failure to acknowledge would have resulted in the continuous sounding of a warning whistle in the cab. The engineer of Extra 3449 West stated that the wayside signals approaching the accident location were "clear" and his cab signal was clear at all times. The engineer also stated that the head brakeman first saw and called attention to the caboose on the rear of Extra 3055 West when it was about 1,400 feet ahead. However, the engineer did not apply his train's brakes, reduce throttle, or sound the whistle. The engineer stated that he had heard instructions being given by radio to a train near Ramsey a few minutes before Extra 3449 West passed signal 6299-1. The conductor and rear brakeman of Extra 3449 West stated that they passed an eastbound train 4 or 5 miles east of Ramsey and that the conductor went to the rear caboose platform to inspect the train. Three days after the accident, the conductor of Extra 3449 West could not remember having seen any of the signals which should have displayed restrictive aspects. Later, he said he saw a "clear" aspect on signal 6345-1. Finally, he stated he saw a "clear" aspect only on signal 6319-1. The rear brakeman originally stated he saw "clear" aspects on signals 5/ "Stop and proceed" requires that the train be stopped short of the signal, and then proceed at a restricted speed through the entire block beyond the signal. |