Head-on Collision of Two Greater Cleveland Regional 7. Author(s) 9. Performing Organization Name and Address National Transportation Safety Board 12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD 15. Supplementary Notes 5. Report Date February 9, 1978 6.Performing Organization Code 8.Performing Organization Report No. 10.Work Unit No. 11.Contract or Grant No. 13. Type of Report and Railroad Accident Report 14.Sponsoring Agency Code 16.Abstract About 10:05 a.m., e.d.t., on July 8, 1977, two trains of the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority collided head-on on the eastbound track of the Shaker Heights Line, near 92nd and Holton Streets in Cleveland, Ohio. Sixty persons were injured and property damage was estimated to be $100,000. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the failure of the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority to have established rules and procedures, and special instructions to assure safe train operations. Contributing to this accident were the failure of both supervisors to establish and coordinate adequate local procedures for operating trains in both directions on a single track, and, further, the vegetation along the curve which was allowed to grow to the extent that the view was blocked. 17. Key Words Current of traffic; approach signal; stop and proceed signal; crossover; operating rules; light rail vehicle; trolley car; tie tamper; single-track operation. 19. Security Classification 20. Security Classification (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED NTSB Form 1765.2 (Rev. 9/74) (of this page) 18.Distribution Statement This document is available 21.No. of Pages 23 About 10:05 a.m., e.d.t., on July 8, 1977, two trains of the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority collided head-on on the eastbound track of the Shaker Heights Line, near 92nd and Holton Streets in Cleveland, Ohio. Sixty persons were injured and property damage was estimated to be $100,000. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the failure of the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority to have established rules and procedures, and special instructions to assure safe train operations. Contributing to this accident were the failure of both supervisors to establish and coordinate adequate local procedures for operating trains in both directions on a single track and, further, the vegetation along the curve which was allowed to grow to the extent that the view was blocked. INVESTIGATION The Accident On July 8, 1977, the track department of the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority (GCRTA) scheduled a tie-tamping machine (tamper) to work on a section of westbound track of the double-track Shaker Heights Line. Operating department personnel planned for westbound and eastbound trains to operate on a single track between crossovers at Shaker Square on the east and Pennsy Crossing on the west, approximately 3 miles apart. This would permit the tamper to work without interruption on the westbound track between the two points. Two supervisors were to control train operations between the two points and were to be stationed at each crossover. They were not instructed how to handle this assignment, and neither supervisor was designated in charge. Communications were not available at either crossover, and the supervisors could not obtain portable radios. Motormen operating on the line were not notified in advance of the planned singletrack operation. 1/ At 9:55 a.m., a supervisor was at Shaker Square when Block 12, a single-unit car, arrived on the westbound track for its scheduled westbound trip to Cleveland Union Terminal (CUT) via Windermere Station at 55th Street. The supervisor advised the motorman of Block 12 that after the tamper arrived at Shaker Square, Block 12 could cross over to the eastbound track and continue west. The tamper arrived in a few minutes at Shaker Square on the eastbound track, closely followed by Block 1, an eastbound train; the tamper was crossed over to the westbound track to begin operations. The supervisor who was to control traffic at Pennsy Crossing passed that location and arrived at Shaker Square on the tamper to confer with the other supervisor. He then boarded Block 12 for the trip back to Pennsy Crossing. Block 12 was crossed over to the eastbound track after the tamper had cleared the crossover. The supervisor on the train instructed the motorman to proceed west. The supervisor then contacted, by car radio, the tower operator at Windermere Station, the controlled entrance to the Shaker Heights Line. The tower operator testified that the supervisor asked him to contact eastbound Block 1 and instruct its operator to hold his train west of the crossover at Pennsy Crossing. The supervisor evidently did not know that Block 1 had arrived at Shaker Square immediately behind the tamper and already had departed east from Shaker Square. The tower operator did not know the location of Block 1 and was not able to contact its motorman by radio. The tower operator asked traffic control at CUT to relay the instruction. CUT relayed the instruction to Block 1, which was now east of Shaker Square. Block 12 was never informed about whether Block 1 had received the message or about the correct location of the train. Even though no eastbound trains were contacted, Block 12 continued west on the eastbound track. At 9:55 a.m., Block 4, a single-unit car, departed CUT for Green Road Station, the eastern terminus of the Shaker Heights Line. Block 4 was the next regularly scheduled eastbound train after Block 1 to pass Pennsy Crossing. Block 4's scheduled time of arrival at Pennsy Crossing was after the single-track operation had begun; however, Block 4 had not been instructed to remain at Pennsy Crossing until Block 12 or any other westbound train had cleared the eastbound track. The motorman was not aware of the single-track operation. The supervisor who was to control train operations at Pennsy Crossing was still en route there on Block 12. At the time this supervisor attempted to contact Block 1, via the tower operator at Windermere, Block 4 already had departed CUT. The tower operator did not contact Block 4 or ask CUT to contact Block 4. No attempt was made to hold Block 4 at Windermere Station, the last control point before entering the Shaker Heights Line. 1/ GCRTA assigns a block number to each crew by which they are identified on each run. It has no directional significance. The motorman of eastbound Block 4 could not recall the aspect displayed by signal 38 at Pennsy Crossing; he operated his train past the signal in a normal manner. The motorman of westbound Block 12 also operated his train in a normal manner with approval of the supervisor in the car. About 2.7 miles past Shaker Square, westbound Block 12 moved into the spiral leaving a 6° curve near 92nd and Holton Streets, while eastbound Block 4 was approaching the same curve from straight track. While moving over a bridge at an undetermined speed, the cars collided head-on at 10:05 a.m. The lead truck of Block 4 was derailed but the car remained upright; Block 12 was not derailed. The motorman of westbound Block 12 stated that he did not see the approaching car until it was about 100 feet away, and that he immediately made an emergency application of the brakes. The motorman of eastbound Block 4 could not recall his actions; however, skidmarks indicated an emergency application of the brakes was made. The speed of each car was materially reduced by their brake applications before the collision. The motorman of Block 12 stated that his view of the approaching car was obstructed by vegetation along the track. A westbound train leaving Woodhill Station, the first station east of the accident site, ascends a 4 percent grade for about 1 mile. At the summit of the grade the track is laid on a steel through-truss bridge over a railroad. The track then curves 6° to the left. (See figure 1.) An eastbound train leaving Pennsy Crossing ascends a 2.5 percent grade on straight track for 1,350 feet up to the 6° curve where the accident occurred. The track at the accident site is laid on a ballasted deck concrete arch bridge over 92nd Street. A 4 1/2-foot-high concrete wall extends the entire length of the bridge along each side. The front end of car No. 65 of Block 12 was crushed rearward more than 3 feet. This included the sub-framing, sub-flooring, motorman's platform, formed front of roof and ceiling and side sheets. The front anticlimbers were also damaged. (See figure 2.) |