stitution, so soon as, by a change of public sentiment, the united voice of the people shall demand it. The people made the constitution. They adopted it. They sustain it. It is but the expression of their will; and they are, therefore, competent to make any changes or amendments in it, they choose. If, then, it needs amendment, touching the matter of slavery, it is theirs, of right, to amend it, if they will. And if the people, as a people, will to amend it, who shall veto the people's will? Who wrest from them the right and power to amend it in this particular, as well as in others?

But there is no need of such amendment. Congress, under the present form of the constitution, can have all the action on the subject which is needed, just so soon as the public sentiment of the people, shall constrain it to act. Many have supposed that the constitution expressly sanctions the existence of slavery. But it is not so. Slavery, considered as involving the right of property in man, is no where recognized in the constitution. The word slave is not there. It does not speak of slaves, as slaves-as chattels or property, but as 'persons'-as persons not 'white,' not 'free,' 'held to service or labor.' It speaks of them, therefore, just as it does of other men, and recognizes no relation between them and their masters, which differs at all, from the relation of master and apprentice, or hired servant. It puts the runaway slave on the same footing with the runaway apprentice. He is simply and only, a 'person held to service or labor,' and the constitution simply provides, that, in case he escape into another state, the laws of that state shall not nullify the laws of the other, but that the person' thus escaping, shall be delivered up, on claim of the party, W

to whom such service or labor may be due. In doing this, however, the constitution does not enter at all into the nature of that claim. It does not ask whether he be held to service by the claim of property, or by the simple claim of hired service. It does not ask whether he be held as a slave, or an apprentice, or a hired servant, but, leaving the particular nature of the claim unquestioned and unrecognized, it simply provides that one State shall not exercise jurisdiction over another to nullify, by its laws, claims, which are valid under the laws of the other. The constitution, therefore, is not committed to the existence of slavery, so far at least, as the Territories and the District of Columbia are concerned. In respect to the abolition of slavery in these, Congress can therefore act freely and at once, if it will. The constitution interposes no barrier whatever to such action. And this action, be it remembered, is all the action that is needed in the case. The abolition of slavery in the Territories, and in that District, would be its virtual abolition throughout the land. The state of public sentiment that should demand and sustain its abolition there, would be one, that would demand and sustain its abolition in a majority of the slave States. The voice of the people that moved Congress to act on the subject, would also be heard in those States, and move them to act. And besides, the example of Congress acting for its abolition, would be an example that would be seen and felt. It would shake the whole system. It would be the nation uttering its testimony against it, and that testimony would pour such a flood of light and influence on the States, as could not be resisted. And more than all, abolition in the Territories, would be cutting off the branches of slavery, and

er take the sword, then shall we perish with the sword. Oppression will provoke resistance, violence will beget violence, blood will cry out for blood, and we shall have our fill. Dangers, dark and dreadful, will overtake us, both as individuals and a nation, and there will be no escape.

But let us examine these pleas of danger more particularly.

OBJECTION 1. The scheme of immediate emancipation, it is said, is fraught with danger to the nation.

How so? In what respects? Suppose the scheme carried through, and every slave to be this day a free man, and to be employed as a free laborer by his master-what harm would be done to the nation? Would the nation be the poorer for it? Would it become bankrupt, because forsooth two millions of free laborers occupied the place of two millions of slaves? Has free labor ever made the free States brankrupt? Or would the nation be more guilty in the sight of God? Would the breaking of every yoke be the filling up of its measure of iniquity? Or would the nation be more obnoxious the judgments of heaven? Would God be angry? Would he clothe himself in utter wrath, and gather up his judgments, and pour them on us without mercy, because we had, for once, learned righteousness and done it? Whence then the danger?

From this injudicious agitation of the subject of slavery and emancipation, by the people of the North, is the reply. It is said, that we cannot constitutionally meddle with the subject-that in the Constitution we have entered into a solemn compact not to meddle with it; and therefore, that if we push our mad schemes of immediate emancipation, we do it in violation of the

subject, at least within its own jurisdiction, who shall bring the charge of treason against us, because we presume, in the lawful exercise of lawful rights, to get up a public sentiment which shall compel it to act?

And so of individual States—whenever the public sentiment in any slaveholding State shall demand immediate and entire abolition, who shall deny that State the right and the power of repealing its present laws, and enacting such others, as may be necessary to effect the object? And if we, in the non-slaveholding States, by the lawful exercise of our liberty of thought and speech, can succeed in getting up such a sentiment, both among ourselves and them, who shall stigmatize us as 'disorganizers,' 'reckless incendiaries,' and the like-sacrilegiously trampling on the sacred constitution? May we think, and then speak out, and print out, and act out our thoughts in respect to other prevailing sins? May we thus correct, and change the public sentiment, in respect to them? And, when that sentiment is sufficiently changed to demand it, call in legislative aid to effect our object, and yet not trample on the constitution, or trifle with 'sacred, chartered rights'? May we abolish the slave-traffic thus? May we vindicate the claims of the poor Indian thus, and if possible, destroy the oppression that would crush him? How then does it happen that we must be thoughtless, and speechless, and motionless, in respect to slavery? Plainly, we need not be; and no sober man, in his senses, ever really supposed it. The constitution does not bind us to any such course. We may, constitutionally, think and speak and act on this subject, and continue to do it, until public sentiment throughout the land is radically changed; and, until it demand, with

one united voice, the entire and immediate extinction of slavery; and then we may, constitutionally, call in legislation to our aid. Congress can legislate on the subject wherever its jurisdiction extends, and each. State can legislate for itself.

But what if it be constitutional to interfere with slavery in this way; slavery, it is said, is altogether a Southern matter, it is no concern of ours, why then should we, of the North, wish to meddle with it? Why not leave the South to manage its own concerns in its own way?

Nó concern of ours! No more is Paganism a concern of ours. Why not keep our printing presses, and tracts, and bibles, and missionaries at home then? Why send them abroad to break up the existing order of things, to overturn and overturn and overturn, until the whole structure of society is changed, and Paganism lies prostrate before Christianity? Is all this to be brought about, think you, without excitement, and commotion, and convulsions even? Far from it. Why not quit our disorganizing schemes at once then, and let Paganism alone? Why meddle with that which is none of our business? Don't you think Pagans are capable of managing their own matters? Let them alone then, and let them manage their own concerns in their own way.

No concern of ours! No more is the tariff a concern of the South? Does the tariff levy taxes on the South? So does slavery levy tenfold heavier taxes on the North, and every northern man pays his proportion of them. Why then does the South make such a bluster about the tariff? It is no concern of theirs. Why can they not let us alone, and let us manage our own