The Honorable Charles T. Canady understand it. As any person in the public eye knows, however, there is often considerable disparity between what actually occurs and how the media characterize it. Throughout the process of developing our analysis, in any telephone calls my staff received from individuals at the Department, we continually stressed our role as analyzer and not fact finder. We also tried to make it clear to the Department and to various attorneys representing individual employees that we were not triggering the formal procedures of Part 2638 of title 5, CFR. We again emphasized these points in our analysis. Question: 4. Was OGE given a "deadline" or otherwise informed that its report was expected by a certain date? Did the Department of the Treasury communicate to OGE that its report was needed to prepare for the Senate Whitewater hearing? How much time elapsed between the delivery of the results of the Treasury investigation and the issuance of the OGE Report? Answer: OGE was certainly aware that the Secretary wished to have our analysis before he testified; this desire was clear from the status inquiries we received from the Department. We also knew from the investigators that the date the Secretary expected to testify was driving the timetable for the Treasury Inspector General and thus the RTC Inspector General. In view of the public interest and the individual reputations at stake, we endeavored to meet that deadline, provided we could do SO without compromising the integrity of our analysis. We felt that, regardless of the results of our analysis, the analysis would contribute to a more informed understanding of the relevant issues. With regard to the time between the delivery of the Inspectors General report and our letter to Secretary Bentsen, we received their final report on July 29 and we delivered our final analysis to the Secretary on the 30th. We had, however, been given the transcripts of the interviews as they were completed and had seen the relevant documentary attachments prior to that time. From those materials, my Office put together a chronology and began the analysis. We also received drafts of the IGS' chronology as it was developed and we were able to cross-check those drafts against our own reading of the materials. For instance, when we thought the IG chronology might not have a correct date, we passed that information back to them with a reference to the source materials that made us think so. And, when the IGs' drafts made us believe we had an incorrect date, we went back and re-reviewed our materials. As the information on various individual contacts was The Honorable Charles T. Canady we could not have produced the final analysis within that one day. When we received the IGs final report, we were nearing completion of our final draft of the analysis. We checked our dates of contacts, edited out references to the RTC delegation of authority that did not appear as an attachment to the final report, and did one final in-depth review of our written analysis to ensure that it was as clear as it could be. The analysis was then delivered to the Secretary. I hope this information is of assistance to you. free to contact me or my if you have any questions. staff Sincerely, Please feel additional Foghe Petts Stephen D. Potts Enclosures JLey/JL(god) SP Whitewater/Madison Read File Jan Papinchak As you know, the Inspector General has been requested to carry out an investigation into communications between Treasury employees and White House staff concerning the collapse of Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan, and related matters. It is important that the office of Counsel to the Inspector General, headed by Francine Kerner, continue to provide independent legal advice and services during the course of the investigation. Given the nature of the inquiry, we have therefore agreed that Ms. Kerner and members of her staff will report solely to the Inspector General on any matters relating to the investigation. Neither Ms. Kerner nor her staff will communicate any information about the substance of this inquiry without specific authorization from the Inspector General. In addition, a separate job element, concerning the provision of legal advice and services in connection with this specific investigation, will be added to Ms. Kerner's performance standards for rating periods July 1, 1993 through June 30, 1994, and July 1, 1994 through June 30, 1995. The determination on relative job significance and job element performance for this job element will be at the sole discretion of the Inspector General. Moreover, we have agreed that the overall rating of Ms. Kerner's performance in each of these rating periods will need to receive the concurrence of the Inspector General. By taking these steps, the agency will help allay any misperception that legal advice and services are being affected by people whose activities may be subject to review. Should you have any questions concerning this arrangement, please feel free to call me directly. Cc: Dennis I. Foreman GAO Results in Brief United States General Accounting Office Comptroller General of the United States B-258857 March 1, 1995 To the President of the Senate and the This report presents the results of our review of the independence of legal services provided to Inspectors General (IGS) appointed by the President under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. The IG Act requires IGS to audit and investigate their agencies' programs and operations and authorizes them to select, appoint, and employ such officers and employees, including attorneys, as are necessary to carry out these duties. Most presidentially appointed IGS initially obtained legal services Lo support their work from their agencies' Offices of General Counsel (OGCS). and five IGS continue to do so. These arrangements have raised questions about whether attorneys located in an agency's OGC can provide the independent legal services necessary for an official who is statutorily required to independently review that agency's programs and operations. As a result, the Congress required us to review the independence of legal services provided to presidentially appointed IGS in section 6007 of Public Law 103-355, the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994. Specifically, our review compared the independence of legal services provided to IGS by attorneys located in agencies' OGCS with those provided by attorneys located in Offices of Inspector General (OIGS). The IG Act of 1978, as amended, established OIGS in departments and agencies to consolidate the audit and investigative functions of those departments and agencies in an independent office under the leadership of a senior official, the IG. The IG Act contains a number of provisions designed to ensure that IGS carry out their responsibilities independently. For example, under the act, IGS are not to report to those directly responsible for carrying out the programs and activities subject to audit and investigation, but rather to the agency head or, in the case of presidentially appointed IGS, the official next in rank. In addition, with few exceptions, neither the agency heads nor subordinates are to prevent or prohibit IGS from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation. Thus, IGS are to be insulated from the interference of senior officials, such as General Counsels. |