ATTACHMENT B

PRINCIPLES FOR ESTABLISHING THE SAFEGUARDS AND CONTROL SYSTEM UNDER THE AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION

The principles which will govern the establishment and operation of the safeguards and control system are as follows:

The Euratom Commission will:

1. Examine the design of equipment, devices and facilities, including nuclear reactors, and approve it for the purpose of assuring that it will not further any military purpose and that it will permit the effective application of safeguards, if such equipment, devices and facilities:

a. Are made available pursuant to this Agreement; or

b. Use, process or fabricate any of the following materials received from the United States: source or special nuclear material, moderator material or any other material relevant to the effective application of safeguards; or

c. Use any special nuclear material produced as the result of the use of equipment or material referred to in a and b.

2. Require the maintenance and production of operating records to assure accountability for source and special nuclear material made available or source or special nuclear material used, recovered, or produced as a result of the use of source or special nuclear material, moderator material or any other material relevant to the effective application of safeguards, or as a result of equipment, devices and facilities made available pursuant to this Agreement.

3. Require that progress reports be prepared and delivered to the Euratom Commission with respect to projects utilizing material, equipment, devices and facilities referred to in paragraph 2 above.

4. Establish and require the deposit and storage, under continuing safeguards, in Euratom facilities of any special nuclear material referred to in 2 above which is not currently being utilized for peaceful purposes in the Community or otherwise transferred as provided in the Agreement for Cooperation between the United States and the Community.

5. Establish an inspection organization which will have access at all timesa. to all places and data, and

b. to any person, who by reason of his occupation deals with materials, equipment, devices or facilities safeguarded under this Agreement,

necessary to assure accounting for source or special nuclear material subject to paragraph 2 and to determine whether there is compliance with the guarantees of the Community. The inspection organization will also be in a position to make and will make such independent measurements as are necessary to assure compliance with the provisions of this Attachment and the Agreement for Cooperation.

It is the understanding of the Parties that the above principles applicable to the establishment of Euratom's inspection and control system are compatible with and are based on art. XII of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, ch. VII of the Euratom Treaty, and those adopted by the Government of the United States of America in its comprehensive Agreements for Cooperation.

APPENDIX 16

PRESS RELEASES ON OAK RIDGE NUCLEAR INCIDENT

July 8, 1958

The Atomic Energy Commission today released additional details concerning the criticality incident which occurred at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge on June 16. Eight employees of the plant received significant exposures to radiation and were hospitalized for observation.

The accidental nuclear reaction occurred at 2:05 p. m., on June 16, in a 55gallon stainless steel drum in an enriched uranium recovery area at the Y-12 Plant. The recovery area is located in a wing of one of the large buildings at the plant.

On the basis of presently available information, the following was the sequence of events leading to the nuclear incident:

A portion of highly enriched uranium-bearing solution leaked or otherwise flowed through a valved pipeline from a small diameter tank in one wing of the building to another small diameter tank in the recovery area. The solution also filled piping which connects the first tank with two other small diameter tanks in the area. All of the tanks, because of their geometrical configuration, were of the "always safe" type and a nuclear reaction could not occur even though the tanks were filled with enriched uranium solution.

Subsequent to this inadvertent transfer of enriched uranium, two of the three tanks in the recovery area were partially filled with water for routine leak testing following a monthly cleanout for inventory.

During this operation, an employee, unaware that enriched uranium had leaked or flowed into the tank and piping, drained the solution into a 55-gallon drum. As the valve on the drain line was opened, the enriched uranium solution which was in the tank nearest the valve preceded the water into the drum.

The enriched uranium in the drum was then in a "nonsafe" configuration and a nuclear chain reaction occurred. Although there was no explosion, there was an instantaneous emission of radiation.

Following the initial emission of radiation and upon water dilution, the material in the drum is believed to have pulsed in periodic emissions of radiation for a period not exceeding 4 minutes.

The initial emission of radiation activated the plant alarm system and plant emergency procedures were put into effect. Personnel evacuated the buildings and the main road to the plant was temporarily closed to traffic.

Radiation control specialists were brought in from other portions of the plant and other Commission plants in Oak Ridge to determine the source of the radiation.

By 5 p.m., radiation survey teams had established the drum as the source of the incident and defined the radiation field. The remaining portions of the building were then reoccupied.

Initial efforts following the incident were concerned with determining whether any individuals had been exposed to radiation, providing medical care, and to decontaminating and cleaning up the affected building wing.

Sheets of cadmium, a neutron-absorbing material, were inserted into the 55-gallon drum to insure that further nuclear reactions would not occur, and samples of the material in the drum were taken for analysis. Later, the contents of the drum were transferred to "always safe" containers.

Eight employees were in the vicinity of the drum at the time of the incident. All of them were carrying out routine plant operations and maintenance. One employee, a chemical operator, was participating in the leak testing which inadvertently set off the reaction. He was within 3 to 6 feet of the drum when the incident occurred. The other seven were from 15 to 50 feet away at the time. Two were engaged in installing ductwork; two electricians were engaged in removing conduit; two others, a welder and a machinist, were located on a mezzanine near the scene of the incident; and the seventh, a chemical operator, was in the process of starting up an evaporator some 50 feet away.

Two of the men reported seeing a blue flash at the time the reaction occurred, and some of the men reported a strange sweet smell in the air. They all evacuated the area quickly upon hearing the radiation alarm sound.

Since the determination of radiation exposure from a reaction of this type is complicated under any circumstances, special methods were used to determine the neutron and gamma exposure of the individuals nearby.

These methods included readings from indium foil which is incorporated in all Y-12 security badges; determining the radioactivity of sodium-24 in the bodies of those exposed through whole body and blood counting; and by measurements obtained through a mock-up of the accident. The latter series of experiments was conducted by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory on June 17 and 18. Through use of these methods, it was estimated that the eight men received radiation exposures ranging from a high of 320 rad to a low of 20 rad.

Three of the men who received the lowest exposure were released from the hospital on June 26. Five others who received higher exposures remain at the Medical Division Hospital of the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies where they are undergoing further observation and tests.

These five men are in satisfactory condition and they are permitted to leave the hospital to visit with their families for 8 hours each day.

July 14, 1958.

The five men who received higher exposures in the June 16 criticality incident at the Y-12 plant are again remaining around the clock at the Medical Division Hospital of ORINS where they continue to undergo observation and tests. Previously the men were permitted to leave the hospital for 8 hours each day. All five are permitted to remain out of bed and to visit the recreation rooms in the hospital.

Three of the men have experienced an anticipated further drop in certain of the blood elements. This secondary drop developed later than expected. This delay is regarded as a generally favorable sign. Some employees of Union Carbide Nuclear Co. have been contacted as possible blood donors in the event that therapeutic transfusions may be required.