own Scheme, that all Thought proceeds from a certain accidental Combination of the Parts of Matter, can take no Refuge in Atheism, against the Apprehenfions of future Existence or MiSery.

2. Others, therefore, have endeavoured to find that fecurity in gratifying their Inclinations and Paffions, which they were fenfible could not be found in Atheism, by perfuading themfelves, that there is no real Diftinction between Virtue and Vice, and that thefe are only different Names, which Mankind have arbitrarily agreed to give to Things.

3. This being an Opinion, equally pernicious, if not more fo, to the Caufe of Morality than A

theifm,

Atheism (fuppofing Men in a mere State of Nature) I think it incumbent on me, to examine fome of the most specious Arguments, whereby it has been fupported; and particularly by the modern Author referred to above, in two diftinct Treatifes, one intitled, An Inquiry into the Origin of Moral Vertue; the other, A Search into the Nature of Society.

In the former, he afferts that Lawgivers have found it advifeable to recommend Self-denial and Publick-fpiritedness to Men, as neceffary to the Ends of Civil Society. But because this was a Sacrifice, which would not easily be made, without fome Equivalent; and they obferved the predominant Paffion of Man was a De

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Defire of Praife, they thought fuch Arguments were likely to operate with the greatest Force upon him, as tended to flatter his Vanity. With this View, they began to inftruct him in "the Notions of Honour and

Shame, reprefenting the one as "the worst of all Evils, and the "other as the highest Good to "which Mortals could afpire.” *. This is what the Author illuftrates with a great and agreeable Variety of Expreffion. But the Force of his Arguments, which I am only obliged to confider, lies in a narrow Compafs, and they may all be reduced to this fingle Propofition, "That moral Virtues are the "political Off-pring, which Flattery begot upon Pride." +

* Pag. 29.

t Pag. 37.

We

We do not deny, Man is caft in fuch a Mould, as easily to yield to the Impreffions of Vanity; and that Pride is very often the fecret Motive, to which his best Actions, materially confidered, are owing. But it will, by no means, therefore follow, that a Man may not do good Actions, upon truly good and generous Motives. If he cannot, his Incapacity muft either proceed from want of Knowledge, or of Power. To Say Man cannot know the best Motives, upon which he ought to act, is to deny the Ufe of Reafon and Prudence, in the chief Inftance, wherein they can be of Ufe to him; to fay that he cannot act upon fuch Motives, which he knows to be the best, is to fuppofe his Knowledge was given

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him,

him, not to direct, but only to reproach and condemn him; to Shew him his Mifery, and his Defects.

Now where feveral Motives may be reafonably affigned for any Action, it is more human, more juft, and equitable, to afcribe it to the beft Motives; at least it is highly injurious to human Nature, and against all the Rules of common Ingenuity, wholly to exclude the beft Motives.

And therefore all this Gentleman has faid, concerning the Power of Flattery, may be allowed to him, without any Confequence to his Argument. It not being the Queftion, Whether fome of the most celebrated Actions of Men, have not been owing to Va