Virtue, and a Search into the the former. Vindication of the Principles afferted by the Au- thor of the Characteristicks, in his Inquiry concerning Virtue, with a Confutation of the Argu- ments proposed by the Author of the Search against him, and against ---- Concerning publick Affection, and publick Good, as oppofed to private Intereft. A Difficulty propofed and obviated. An Chap. IV. What the Rule of Perfection to Chap. V. Whence an Obligation of conform- ing to this Rule arifeth. Chap. VI. Whether the foregoing Rule is of fufficient Extent to regulate our mo- Chap. VII. Concerning the End of Man in refpect to his Happiness. page 77. Chap. VIII. The prefent and future Rewards of moral Virtue, confidered, more diftinct-; page 240 tion of the Senfes, the Imagination, and Paffions, particularly in this Chapter of the Senfes. page 169. Chap. XI. Of the Imagination. page 182. Chap. XII. Of the Paffions. page 201. Chap. XIII. Of Defire and Inclination in general. Chap. XIV. Whether moral Virtue is really practicable? page 249. Chap. XV. Of common, or fufficient; and Special Grace. page 285. Chap.XVI. Concerning the Nature and Force of moral Habits in general. page 304 Chap. XVII. How good Habits may be preJerved, or augmented, and ill Habits deftroyed. Chap. XVIII. Whether a Principle of Honour, in Contradiftinction to that of moral Virtue, is to be admitted? Chp. XIX. Some hiftorical Obfervations, page 362 upon the Progrefs of moral Philofophy, among the Ancients; and concerning their Authority. page 346. page 397 Chap. XX. An Argument of Carneades, relating to the Subject of moral Virtue, particularly, confidered. The CONCLUSION. page 423 page 449. CHAP. CHAP. I. That there is a real Diftinction between moral Good and Evil. I. Wherein this Diftinction is founded. II, III, IV, V. IlluArations of it from fenfible Objects. VI, VII, VIII. Tet the Idea of Order not taken from the juft or beautiful Proportion between fenfible Objects, but pre-fuppofed. IX. Confirmed by a Sentiment of Cicero. X. An Application of it: XI, XII, XIII. An Objection propofed, XIV. and more particularly A I. cularly folved from the Confideration of a ftrait, and of a crooked Line. XV, XVI. What Advantage may be made of it towards proving the real Diftinction of moral Virtue. Lay it down as the Foundation of my present Defign, that the Diftinction of moral Good and Evil depends on the Nature of Things, and the different Relations, wherein they stand towards each other; that this Diftinction, therefore, is not owing to any meer pofitive Law or Appointment whatever, human or divine nor to any Custom, general Confent of Mankind, or Opi |